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Abstract 
The study of violence against civilians with its over 200 million dead in the 20th century is 
understudied if viewed in terms of the death toll compared to the studies of inter-state and 
civil war. R.J. Rummel’s extensive data collection of democide in the period 1900-87, has 
unfortunately lain dormant, mostly untouched by other researchers since its publication in 
1997. This thesis has made use of this dataset, and converted it into time-series format in 
order to facilitate multivariate analyses. Instead of focusing on one type of violence against 
civilians, the thesis splits it into four different analyses on democide; one for democide 
performed by regimes against its own population; one for democide in a foreign state; one 
performed by non-state groups; and one category with the total for all of the other three. This 
division proves fruitful, as the three types of democides yield different results. The analyses 
show that autocracies are most violent when it comes to regime democide, with no difference 
between democracies and semi-democracies. Analyses on foreign democide, however, show 
that democracies are the least violent type of government, with no clear difference between 
autocracies and semi-democracies. Non-state democide, on the other hand, shows no clear 
difference between the three types of government. The role of economic development is also 
an interesting finding. While less-developed countries are more violent when it comes to 
regime democide, the exact opposite is found on foreign democide. 
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1. Introduction 
In the years between 1900 and 1987, over 169 million civilians were killed – more than four 
times the 38.5 million battle deaths during the same period (Rummel 1994: 3f), yet research 
on the subject matter has suffered from a lack of comprehensive country-year dataset. 
Research on violence against civilians has for the most part focused on the onset or incidence 
of violence, as opposed to the numbers killed, which vary considerably from event to event. 
In this thesis, I will present an analysis based on Rummel’s (1997) dataset, with estimated 
democide divided into three different categories: regimes killing its civilians; non-state groups 
killing civilians; and regimes against a foreign state’s civilians. Using this dataset, I perform 
four different analyses, one for each group as well as one for the sum of all democide. My 
main aim is to look for a possible connection between regime type and the severity of 
democide. By converting Rummel’s data into time-series, it has become possible to perform 
multivariate analyses where Rummel himself only did bivariate. Furthermore, the dataset has 
a longer time span than most of the ones used before, a wider definition of violence against 
civilians which increases the number of cases, as well as estimates for the total number of 
deaths. These three factors make it possible to say more, and with greater certainty, about the 
connection between regime type and violence against civilians than what other datasets have 
allowed us to do before. 
The thesis starts with three theory chapters. Definitions of violence against civilians 
are discussed in Chapter 2, before moving to previous research on the violence against 
civilians in Chapter 3. Chapter 4 discusses theories on the connection between violence 
against civilians and government. The dataset is presented in Chapter 5, leading to the 
research design in Chapter 6. The analyses are shown in Chapter 7, with a discussion in 
Chapter 8. 
My main finding is that the division of democide into three categories is a valuable 
categorization. One cannot look at democide as just any type of killing of civilians; there are 
different factors at work from one type to the other that help to explain the severity. Looking 
at the total sum of incidents of democide, democracies are less violent than semi-democracies, 
which in their turn are less violent than autocracies. When the analyses are split by type of 
democide, autocracies are still the most violent regime type, but democracies are as violent as 
semi-democracies for both regime and non-state democide. The reason why democracies 
seemed less violent than semi-democracies in an analysis of the total numbers is found in the 
analyses for foreign democide, where democracies are far less violent than their semi-
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democratic and autocratic counterparts. While the difference between semi-democracies and 
democracies depends on the type of democide, autocratic states seem to carry out the most 
democide no matter what category one looks at. Furthermore, my analyses show differences 
in the effects of ethnic distribution, where homogenous states have more violent regimes, and 
states where the second largest ethnic makes up a high proportion of the population will 
experience more severe democide perpetrated by non-state groups. Similarly, the economic 
development of a state acts in two different directions when analyzing regime and foreign 
democide separately. In the former analysis, the more economically developed a state is, the 
less violent its regime. On the other hand, the more economically developed a state is, the 
more violent it will be against foreign civilians. 
 
2. Defining intentional killing of noncombatants 
2.1 The UN definition of genocide 
A multitude of definitions have been suggested to describe intentional murders of a large 
number of noncombatants. The first and most commonly used term has been genocide, 
created in 1944 by the Polish-Jewish jurist Raphael Lemkin (Valentino 2004: 9; Hagtvet 
2008: 58). Lemkin, who in his early years read about the Huguenots in France, the pogrom in 
Bialystok, and acquittal of the perpetrators of the slaughter of Armenians from 1915 to 1923, 
felt it was wrong that a person committing murder was punished, but those responsible for 
killing of a million people were not. Having fled to the United States after the Nazi invasion 
of Poland in 1939, watching the injustice committed against those the Nazis deemed less than 
human, Lemkin was determined to do something about it. In a series of articles published six 
months prior to the Nuremberg Tribunal where leading Nazis were to be tried for their crimes 
against peace, crimes against humanity and war crimes, Lemkin coined the term genocide 
(Totten & Bartrop 2009: 3). The word combines the Greek word genos, which can be 
translated into “kin”, “race”, “clan” or “tribe”, and the Latin word cide, which can be 
understood as “killing” (Valentino 2004: 9; Totten & Bartrop 2009: 3). He drafted a 
resolution where he asked the United Nations to study and consider making genocide an 
international crime. Then he spent many hours forming relationships with diplomats as well 
as educating representatives of various nations on the topic in order to make the resolution 
happen. The initial resolution was passed by the General Assembly on the 11
th
 of December, 
1946, and said: 
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Genocide is a denial of the right of existence of entire human groups, as homicide is the denial of the 
right to life of individual human beings; such denial of the right of existence shocks the conscience of 
mankind, results in great losses to humanity in the form of cultural and other contributions represented 
by these human groups and is contrary to moral law and to the spirit and aims of the United Nations. 
Many instances of such crimes of genocide have occurred when racial, religious, political and other 
groups have been destroyed, entirely or in part. […] The General Assembly therefore, Affirms that 
genocide is a crime under international law which the civilized world condemns, and for the 
commission of which principals and accomplices – whether private individuals, public officials or 
statesmen, and whether the crime is committed on religious, racial, political or any other grounds – are 
punishable (UN General Assembly Resolution 96). 
 
While the initial resolution included “political or any other groups”, this was removed after 
the Soviet Union, Poland and some other nations argued against it. The Soviet representatives 
held that the term political group does not have a scientific definition, while the Poles argued 
for the lack of distinguishing characteristics. Others again noted that political groups are 
voluntary, whereas racial, religious and national groups are not, and that the former should 
therefore be removed from the resolution. On the other side of the debate, France argued that 
while political groups might not have been prime targets in the past, they would become so in 
the future. There was also fear that the exclusion of political groups would lead perpetrators to 
use the political opinions of a racial or religious group as a pretext to perform genocide 
without being liable to sanctions (Totten & Bartrop 2009: 4). 
Finally, in 1948, the UN Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime 
of Genocide (UNGC) was approved by the United Nations, where it was defined, and still 
says today (UN 2011): 
 
In the present Convention, genocide means any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, 
in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such:  
(a) Killing members of the group; 
(b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group;  
(c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical 
destruction in whole or in part;  
(d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group;  
(e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group (OHCHR 2010).  
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2.2 Critique of the resolution 
This compromise resolution has, however, not stood unchallenged. The International 
Commission of Jurists recommended a revision of the definition to include political groups in 
1973. In 1985 a similar recommendation was put forth by Ben Whitaker, the UN Rapporteur 
to Genocide (Totten & Bartrop 2009: 5). Other arguments against the standing definition have 
been about the rather vague phrases “intent”, “in whole or in part” and “as such”. Scholars 
disagree as to what constitutes intent of genocide, and whether it means that one has to have 
clear evidence such as testimony from one or more planners, documents, or a copy of a 
broadcast etc. In the context of genocide, intent should not be confused with a goal or motive. 
According to the UN definition, the only evidence prosecutors need is to therefore show that 
the acts were done intentionally (Gellately & Kiernan 2003:15). Because of this, international 
law now allows actions on the ground to be used as evidence of intent, as was done in the 
tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda. The phrase “in whole or in part” has led to 
confusion about whether there is a minimum limit to the killing. “As such” refers to whether 
specific groups have been targeted intentionally rather than being victims of collateral damage 
(Totten & Bartrop 2009: 34f). 
Another criticism of the UN Convention on genocide is that it protects the rights of 
groups, but not individuals. Individuals are assigned an additional and different quality when 
bound together as members of a group, which separates them from the rest of society. This is 
a problem because not all groups can be said to count as a “people” (Hagtvet 2008: 81). As 
seen above, the UN Convention’s Article 2 lists nationality, ethnicity, racial or religious 
groups as groups that have protection under the Convention, ruling out other groups based on 
-social, gender, economic or political criteria. This makes it hard to punish the perpetrators of 
such crimes as, for example, the victims of Pol Pot’s regime, or Stalin’s deportations of 
political opponents (Hagtvet 2008: 81). On the other hand, the popularization of the 
expression “genocide” has diluted the meaning of the word over the years (Valentino 2006: 
10). It has even been used to characterize such diverse phenomena as interracial adoption, 
abortion and lack of government funding for AIDS research.  
 
2.3 Alternative conceptions of violence against civilians 
Due to the shortcomings and stretching of the concept of genocide, many scholars have 
moved away from this term. Just as it was hard to find a consensus on an adequate definition 
of genocide in the UN, it has been difficult to find a single definition among researchers. This 
has led genocide researchers to introduce several new terms that have been used in different 
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research projects. While there is a discrepancy between the number of deaths between some 
of the definitions, others may have similar numbers. Some are even used interchangeably, 
depending on who is using them. 
The lack of an agreed upon definition of the killing of noncombatants is a challenge 
for scholars in this field. For instance, it becomes hard to compare results between two 
research papers using datasets based on different definitions. Wayman and Tago (2010) 
compare different datasets and conclude that many existing controversies can be explained by 
the choice of datasets. 
As we will see, the definitions vary a lot, and I have selected Rummel’s definition of 
democide, since his dataset has the longest time-span, which will make the analyses less 
sensitive to outliers. In addition to this, the definition of democide is broader than any of the 
other definitions on violence against civilians, and does not discriminate as far as the total 
number of killed is concerned. Any murder of civilians is counted, no matter how few deaths 
have occurred. This wide definition strengthens the results by increasing the number of cases 
of violence against civilians. And lastly, Rummel’s data includes estimates of the number of 
civilians killed, which will enable us to differentiate small and big incidents instead of treating 
the two as the same, as would be the case with a dummy variable, as Valentino et al. (2004) 
and Downes (2006) used. A detailed examination of the different datasets I considered is 
reviewed in Chapter 2.4. 
 
Politicide 
Politicide is defined by Harff and Gurr (1988: 360) as “the promotion and execution of 
policies by a state or its agents which result in the deaths of a substantial portion of a group”. 
Genocide is a sub-category where victimized groups have been defined by their communal 
characteristics, such as nationality, ethnicity and religion. In politicide, on the other hand, 
groups are defined in terms of their political beliefs, their class or their organized opposition 
to the state/dominant group. Unlike genocide, victims of politicide are always engaged in 
some oppositional activity (Harff 2009: 72) by their hierarchichal position or political 
opposition to the regime and the dominant groups.  
 
Mass killing 
Valentino (2004:11ff) describes mass killing as “the intentional killing of a massive number 
of noncombatants”. It does not matter what group the people are members of, as long as the 
killings are done intentionally. This means that mass killing is not limited to direct killing by 
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the use of arms, for example. As with Rummel’s concept of democide, he includes indirect 
causes of death. While Valentino admits that it can be hard to determine if a killing is 
intentional or not, he says that they need not be the result of policies designed to kill; they will 
be counted as intentional if they are the result of policies trying to force civilian populations 
to change their behavior and if the perpetrators could foresee that such policies could result in 
widespread death. Although this makes the description quite similar to Rummel’s democide, 
mass killing does not require a government to be the perpetrator. The offender can belong to 
any group in a society. Another difference is that the term democide includes any killing of 
civilians, no matter how few deaths. 
 Rummel use the terms “mass murder” or “massacre” to describe the intentional and 
indiscriminate murder of large numbers of people, perpetrated by government agents, for 
example, in the shape of shooting down unarmed demonstrators, or throwing grenades into 
prison cells before retreating under pressure from enemy troops (Rummel 1994: 35). Easterly, 
Gatti and Kurlat (2005: 132) use a similar definition for “mass killing” as Rummel does for 
“mass murder” but do not limit themselves to government agents. 
 
One-sided violence 
One-sided violence is a term used by Uppsala Conflict Data Programme (UCDP), and is 
defined as “the use of armed force by the government of a state or by a formally organized 
group against civilians which results in at least 25 deaths” (Kreutz & Eck 2005: 2; Eck & 
Hultman 2007). The collateral death of civilians (see Eckhardt 1989 for a discussion) is not 
included if the target of the attack was against non-civilians, and such phenomena as 
intentional starvation, which is included in Rummel (1995), of a people will not be counted in 
the dataset. The definition of one-sided violence is not limited to a state being the perpetrator, 
but includes cases where other agents are the executors of violence. 
 
Democide 
Democide is described by Rummel (1994: 36) as “murder by government agents acting 
authoritatively”. Even though Rummel’s definition states that democide is something that is 
perpetrated by the state, his statistical compendium (Rummel 1997b) still includes democide 
by non-state groups. Democide is any murder of a civilian by a government. The only 
criterion is that these deaths are the outcomes of purposive acts, processes, policies or 
institutions of a government. This means that unlike genocide, politicide and mass murder, 
democide will not only count deaths caused by arms, but also indirect deaths by acts of 
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government such as policies that cause starvation, diseases caused by blockades or destruction 
of necessities of life. 
 
2.4 Choosing a dataset 
There are several datasets to choose from when analyzing violence against civilians and they 
use qualitatively different definitions of this kind of violence. The four definitions with 
accompanying datasets discussed in Section 2.3 are those of Downes (2006), Rummel (1994), 
Harff (2003), Valentino, Huth and Balch-Lindsay (2004) and UCDP (2010; Eck and Hultman 
2007). In addition to differences in definitions, they also cover different time periods, with 
Rummel covering the longest period (1900-87), and UCDP covering the shortest period of 
time (1989-2009).  
 Downes’s (2006) dataset covers the longest time period, ranging from 1816-2003. The 
dataset has a very vague definition of violence against civilians, adding cases of “civilian 
victimization” in interstate wars. There does not seem to be a minimum number of deaths in 
order to be included in the dataset, nor does there seem to be a tally of the number of civilian 
deaths for the dataset, as Downes uses a dichotomous variable as an indicator for violence 
against civilians. 
 Easterly, Gatti and Kurlat (2005) covers the longest time period but for Rummel. 
These authors use a vague definition to what amounts as a mass killing or not, and does only 
state that “substantial numbers of human beings” (p. 7) have to be killed. 
Harff (2003) has the narrowest definition of violence against civilians with its geno-
politicide definition, and is, therefore, expected to show the lowest number of cases and 
lowest amount of victims
1
. The total dataset consists of 37 cases in the time period 1955-
2001
2
, with an estimated death count of 10,717,000–17,169,000. In order to be included in the 
dataset, the death toll has to be “in the thousands or more” (Harff & Gurr 1988:365), and has 
to take place in a country with a population of at least 500,000 inhabitants. This first vague 
criterion reduces the precision of this dataset, and it is probable that some geno-politicides 
have been excluded, such as Grenada’s politicide of demonstrators in 1983 (which counts 100 
civilian deaths in Rummel (1997b: 298), or the politicide in Uruguay between 1973 and 1984 
with 300 civilian deaths (ibid: 334). 
                                                 
1
 Harff does, however, have more deaths for the five cases from 1989-2001 than the UCDP, with its broader 
definition has as a total sum for the entire dataset. 
2
 Harff & Gurr (1988) is an earlier version of the dataset, with 44 cases for the period 1945-87 – some of which 
were removed for the Harff (2003) dataset. 
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Valentino, Huth and Balch-Lindsay’s (2004) dataset is a collection of mass killings 
occurring between 1945 and 2000. Unlike the other datasets, the numbers here are only 
gathered from violence against civilians during wars, a factor that should reduce the total 
figure. In addition to this, Valentino et al. have a minimum number of 50,000 killed over a 
period of five years in order for it to be counted as a mass killing, excluding a significant 
number of cases. Indeed, there are only 30 cases of mass killings found in this data – a lower 
number than Harff’s geno-politicide numbers. In addition to this, Valentino et al. only use a 
dichotomous variable for mass killings, thus depriving themselves of the possibility of seeing 
what variables account for the intensity of the killings. 
The UCDP dataset covers, with its 20 years, the shortest time period, but it may also 
have the most precise estimates. In order to be included in the dataset, there has to have been 
a one-sided violence count of over 25 deaths per year, making it much more sensitive to low-
intensity violence than that of Valentino et al. Unlike the Downes (2006), Easterly et al. 
(2005) and Valentino et al. (2004), the UCDP data have been coded in time-series format. As 
such we can use it to show when an act of one-sided violence was most deadly, and when it 
was least violent. In addition to this, they have also coded every different actor with their own 
ID, unlike any of the other datasets. This means that one country may have several different 
actors performing one-sided violence in one country year (Eck & Hultman 2007: 236). One 
problem with this dataset, apart from the short time-span, is the case of Rwanda in 1994. Out 
of the total 573,000 deaths in the dataset, 500,000 occurred in Rwanda, or 87 per cent of the 
total number of deaths (UCDP 2011). An overview of the datasets discussed above can be 
seen in Table 2.1. 
 
Rummel’s wide definition and his use of a long time period yield a larger dataset, and 
also a much larger death count,  than the other datasets. For the 1900-87 period, Rummel 
counted 169,198,000 victims of democide. More than 1,000
3
 sources have been consulted in 
finding the numbers for all the different cases, yielding a total number of 8,200 estimates. 
Even though Rummel’s definition of democide implies that the state has to be the actor, he 
has also included what he calls “rebel democide” into the dataset, but separating this from the 
total count of democide. 
 
                                                 
3
 I counted 1,057 sources in Rummel (1997b), and there are probably more, as the numbers for China and Russia 
are not included. 
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Table 2.1: A comparison of the datasets 
Author Years Definition Data Notes 
Downes (2006) 
1816-
2003 
Civilian 
victimization 52 cases 
Dichotomous kill variable, 
only during wars 
Easterly, Gatti and Kurlat 
(2005) 
1820-
1998 Mass killing 174 cases 
“Substantial numbers 
killed” 
Rummel (1994) 1900-87 Democide 560 cases4 
 No minimum number of 
deaths 
Harff (2003) 
1955-
2001 Geno-Politicide 37 cases 
Min 500,000 population, 
killed must be in ”1000s” 
Valentino, Huth and Balch-
Lindsay (2004) 
1945-
2000 Mass killing 31 cases 
Dichotomous kill variable, 
min 50,000 over 5 years 
UCDP (2010) 
1989-
2008 
One-sided 
violence 
Time 
series Min 25 per year 
 
 
Based on this, the Harff and Valentino et al. datasets will not be analyzed. In comparison with 
Rummel’s dataset, they have a shorter time span and fewer cases, making their data less 
precise and more vulnerable for outliers. As for Downes’s data, the time span is impressive, 
but the definitions seem to be too loose. Because it is limited to violence against civilians in 
war, the dataset becomes too small for my analysis. Rummel’s dataset has an edge over the 
UCDP dataset in the length of the coverage over time and its complexity compared with the 
two excluded datasets. The UCDP data has a more precise measurement of deaths as well as 
being coded in time-series format, which makes it very interesting. The far longer time-span 
and wider definition in Rummel’s dataset is, however, more tempting, and converting this 
dataset into time series format could give new and interesting results. 
 I left out the dataset of Armstrong and Davenport (2008), which covers geno- 
politicide in the period 1946-2000 based on Rummel’s (1997), Stanton’s (2002) and Harff’s 
(2003) data. The reason for not discussing it in the section is that the dataset is not publicly 
available,  and could therefore not be considered in this thesis.  
3. Type of government and violence against civilians 
3.1 The two sides of the debate 
As mentioned in the previous chapter, there are conflicting views on whether or not the type 
of government influences the likelihood of violence against civilians. On one side, authors 
                                                 
4
 This is the number of cases I used in my adaptation of the dataset, and Rummel’s number of cases is 
considerably higher. The number here represents the number of cases that give the shortest time intervals 
possible, which means that two or more cases that have the same time interval will be added up and counted as 
one case in my dataset. 
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like Rummel (1995), Harff (2003), and Valentino, Huth and Balch-Lindsay (2003) maintain 
that democracies are less violent towards civilians than non-democracies are. On the other 
side, authors such as Krain (1997), Mann (1999) and Downes (2006) reject this notion and 
claim that democracies are no better than other types of government when it comes to killing 
civilians. 
Rummel (1995) analyses democides for all regimes during the period 1900-87, where 
141 of all 432 state regimes performed democides during these 88 years. This article 
concludes that “power kills, and absolute power kills absolutely” (p 25). Krain (1997) uses 
Harff and Gurr’s (1988) data for geno-politicides, and includes 35 cases of geno-politicides 
during the period 1945-82. Unlike Rummel, Krain does not find any correlation between the 
power concentration (that is the extent the power in a state is centralized in a small number of 
institutions) in a state and geno-politicides. He adds that he is not willing to reject Rummel’s 
analysis, but claims that while power may be a prerequisite, it does not determine alone when 
genocide will occur. Harff (2003), on the other hand finds similar results to Rummel in her 
article covering 37 cases of geno-politicide for the period 1955-2001. While she finds 
democratic and quasi-democratic regimes to be less violent against civilians, she notes that 
when leaders form an exclusionary ideology which overrides principles or justifies efforts to 
persecute, restrict or kill certain categories of people, there is an increased chance of seeing 
geno-politicide. Examples of such exclusionary ideologies are advocates of firm variants of 
Marxism-Leninism, adherents of rigid anti-communist doctrines, rulers of Islamic states 
following Sharia laws, doctrines that claim an ethnic and ethno-nationalist superiority, and 
states where there is a strict secular nationalism that excludes the political participation of 
religious groups. Valentino et al.’s (2003) article, which tests 31 cases of mass killing during 
the period of 1945 to 2000, also finds a significant correlation between regime type and mass 
killing, showing that highly autocratic regimes have a higher chance of engaging in the mass 
killing of civilians during an armed conflict than highly democratic regimes.  
Mann (1999: 20) challenges Rummel’s claim that the few genocides that are 
conducted by democracies are perpetrated secretively with no democratic mandate. Among 
other things, he points to cases of democratic mass killings like the fire bombings of Tokyo 
and Dresden, the use of napalm in Vietnam, or the atomic bombs, all of which were decided 
through democratic constitutional processes. Mann adds that Rummel’s comment on 
democracies’ mass killings being done in secrecy was not unique to democracies, but that 
Hitler and Stalin also had their genocides hidden from the public. It should be noted that a 
large part of the democides by Hitler and Stalin, unlike their contemporary democratic 
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leaders, were domestic, and they therefore have a much higher incentive to hide the 
democides. Downes’s (2006) results, on the other hand, show that liberal democracy has no 
effect on the occurrence of violence against civilians in wars. In addition, he finds that while 
democracies are no more nor less likely to kill civilians than non-democracies in normal wars, 
they are more likely than autocracies to kill civilians in wars of attrition.This effect he 
attributes to democracies’ cost sensitivity – that is the falling popularity among the electorate 
should a conflict and/or its costs exceed what was first portrayed. However, these results 
cannot easily be compared directly to those of Krain, Rummel or Harff, as Downes’s data 
only applies to civilian deaths in war-time in interstate conflicts. 
 
3.2 Are democracies less violent against civilians? 
3.2.1 The political norms argument 
Modern democracies are open and competitive systems where politicians with conflicting 
views routinely clash against each other. In the democratic system, there is a constant 
competition between different parties, and a presence of rules, norms and guidelines that the 
parties have to adhere to. A democracy is only feasible when these rules are agreed upon, and 
followed by its politicians and citizens (Dixon 1994: 15). The competitive situation between 
the political parties, as well as being used to abiding by the rules, makes democratic citizens 
and the elites of the incumbent government and the opposition more receptive to appeals for 
human rights as well as international legalities on the laws of war. The implication is that 
democracies should be more likely to refrain from breaking international laws, even during 
war (Valentino, Huth & Balch-Lindsay 2004: 382). Leaders of autocratic states are socialized 
into a system that tolerates and may even encourage the use of force against the opposition - 
either by seizing power by the use of military force or by eliminating political opposition. 
Democratic leaders, on the other hand, have been socialized into a system which prohibits the 
use of violence and threats and instead encourages compromise in order to come to an 
agreement. The lessons political leaders learn in their way to power in their own country is 
then thought to be mirrored on the international scene (Rousseau et al. 1996: 513). As such, 
autocrats who have had success with killing civilians at home may be willing to kill another 
state’s civilians. Democrats, on the other hand, who have not had similar experiences at home, 
and instead have had success with non-violent actions, may refrain from killing an enemy’s 
civilians intentionally. 
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While an autocrat might be used to coercing his own subjects in order to achieve his 
policies, democratic leaders are more used to solving political problems through compromise 
and discussions (Maoz & Russett 1993: 625; Rummel 1997a: 101). This culture of 
compromise makes democracies more adept at solving conflicts among each other 
(Henderson 1991:123f). While this has been found for interstate conflicts, one can draw 
similar conclusion for intrastate conflicts. Although full democracies and full autocracies 
alike have a lower risk of experiencing civil conflict onset than hybrid regimes, the effect of 
conflict settlement is more in line with democratic ideals. If there is a conflict between the 
governing body of a state and a non-state group, there is a better chance of seeing successful 
negotiations if both parties are used to these kinds of politics. Indeed, democratic regimes 
have been found to be more successful in negotiating settlements in civil conflicts, while 
autocratic regimes are much less likely to do so (Valentino, Huth & Balch-Lindsay 2004: 
382f). An example of the efficiency of democratic strategies through negotiation is seen in 
Horowitz and Sharma (2008: 769), who, in determining strategies for fighting ethnic 
insurgencies in India, found that democracies had a short-term positive effect by using 
coercive strategies (this does not involve genocide or ethnic cleansing) against insurgents. 
However, the short-term effect was turned into an increased local alienation which helped the 
insurgents militarily, as well as helping them make advances politically against local 
moderates. Pursuing a more cooperative approach by giving more local autonomy and 
economic inducements did, however, have a more lasting positive effect. The right to 
protection for minorities, as well as the inclusion of political opponents, is a main feature of 
democratic norms. Combined with competitive elections, this can act as a bulwark against the 
rise of exclusionary ideologies that have been found to have a higher chance of using violent 
means against its own population (Harff 2003: 62f). 
 
3.2.2 The institutional structure argument 
Unlike leaders in autocratic states, democratic leaders have formalized institutions that 
monitor abuse. These factors include the legislature, political bureaucracies, as well as key 
interest groups that all have to give their consent in order to go into a conflict or kill civilians. 
In addition to this, democratic leaders are likely to be held responsible for any wrong 
decisions, and might be removed from office in a future election (Maoz & Russett 1993: 626; 
Rummel 1997a). Sen (1990: 240) uses, as an example, the connection between freedom and 
famines. A higher amount of freedom will help avoid famines through, for example, the 
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freeing of markets and leaving room for productive opportunities connected with profit 
incentives, or by political pressure groups who induce governments to act if there is a 
shortage of food. This means that democratically elected leaders must be more careful of 
venturing into schemes that do not follow democratic ideals and that are unpopular among the 
electorate. While the incumbent political leaders in every state will always try to maintain 
their position, political opponents aim to thwart the leaders from maintaining the status quo 
when the leadership has failed to achieve their policy goals, or when they have made 
unpopular decisions. This shows that in democracies, the opposition has easier and nonviolent 
means to challenge the people in power. In turn, this should mean that democratic leaders face 
a higher cost of failure that forces them to ensure that their policies are likely to go through. 
Using military force is an example of a risky policy for the regime (Rousseau et al. 1996: 
513). The citizens, who are the ones who feel the costs of war the most, will normally have a 
natural inclination towards peace. In a democratic regime, this public attitude has to be taken 
into consideration by the political leaders, for the fear of being punished in the following 
election (Morgan & Campbell 1991: 190).  
While autocratic leaders can use the state military force quite freely, a similar 
occurrence is much less likely in democracies. Unlike autocratic states, democratic states are 
constrained in that the decision to use military force is not in the hands of a single person. It is 
shared between the leader of the state and other institutions, as one can see in countries like 
the United States where the formal authority is shared between an independent legislature and 
the executive (Morgan & Campbell 1991: 191). Non-democracies may also have stronger 
constraints on the executive; for example, in a one-party dictatorship where the leader must 
answer to the persons in the highest positions in the party (Morgan & Campbell 1991: 192). 
These factors do not necessarily mean that democracies will remain completely pacifist, as 
they will go to war in case of emergencies and in order to protect themselves and their 
interests (Maoz & Russett 1993: 626). Nevertheless, what happens when they are at war will 
arguably be affected by democratic structures. 
Since a huge number of episodes of violence against civilians happen during civil 
wars, it is also interesting to look toward research on civil wars when trying to find factors 
explaining violence and government type. One prominent analysis is done by Hegre et al. 
(2001), who find that there is indeed a relationship between the regime type and the onset of 
civil wars. Their results show that there is not a linear relationship, but a concave one. Highly 
democratic and highly authoritarian states have few civil wars, and the regimes in the middle 
are the most conflict-prone. This result also holds when controlling for whether a regimewas 
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in the transition towards democracy or autocracy and  when a transitional regime had 
stabilized as either an autocracy or a democracy. Because of the combination of somewhat 
open and slightly repressive and/or inefficient institutions in semi-democracies, chances of 
violence are higher due to the grievances caused by the repression/ineffectiveness and the 
openness allowing the formation of groups that eventually may take militarized action. 
Autocracies on the other hand will be more repressive, and will strike down such attempts to 
cause violence against the regime, while democracies encourage solving conflicts by means 
other than by using force (Hegre et al. 2001: 33f). If one were to connect this to violence 
against civilians, it is possible to see a situation where a semi-democratic state has instances 
of violence against civilians in a power struggle like an election, following Smith’s 
retributive, ideological, utilitarian and monopolistic genocides as described in the previous 
chapter. This does not necessarily mean that one would see a concave curve when it comes to 
violence against civilians and the degree of openness, if the repressive acts done by the 
autocratic states are in the form of killing civilians. So the results could be similar to those of 
Lacina (2006), who find that democracies have less violent civil wars than other regime types, 
which she attributes to democratic norms, institutional adaptability and that democracies are 
more selective as to which conflicts they get involved in. 
Indeed, as the results of Easterly, Gatti and Kurlat (2005: 136ff) show, autocracies are 
as violent as semi-democracies when it comes to mass killing. The authors divide the 
democracy scores into four quartiles, and find that the three quartiles with the lowest 
democracy score had similar, high frequencies of massacres, whereas the quartile with the 
most democratic countries had a significantly lower score.  
 
Hypothesis 1a: Democracies are less democidal than other types of government 
 
3.3 Are democracies just as violent as other types of government? 
The democratic peace argument that democracies are constrained by institutional checks or by 
peaceful norms has not been universally accepted. Maoz and Russett (1993: 625) speculate 
that when a non-democratic and a democratic country wage war against one another, the 
democratic state may see itself forced to adapt to the norms of an international conflict if it 
believes that its democratic norms stands in the way of victory or in any way might be 
exploited by the non-democratic country. One may like to believe that democracies would not 
forego democratic principles and start killing civilians. But as will be discussed below, 
15 
 
guerrilla warfare is an example of a type of conflict where democracies may start targeting 
civilians. Bueno de Mesquita, Morrow, Siverson and Smith (1999: 804) find that democracies 
make an extra effort and, in general, try harder than non-democracies during a war by putting 
extra resources into the war effort instead of saving the money in order to pay those who 
backed them during wartime.  
To explain why democracies might be as aggressive against civilians as non-
democracies are, Downes (2006: 154) notes that a democratic state in an interstate war may 
target civilians in order to save lives on one’s own side or simply in desperation because the 
war is not won quick enough and/or is too expensive. One could arguably draw a parallel 
between the argument of protecting one’s own people and the American response to the 
criticism of the interrogation methods in Guantanamo Bay detention camp. Acts of 
desperation are, according to Downes (2006), more likely to occur in democracies, and 
especially in wars of attrition. Wars of attrition are also more lethal, even to the victor, giving 
even more incentive to find new ways to shorten the conflict, moving the cost of fighting from 
one’s own troops over to the enemy’s civilians (Valentino, Huth & Croco 2006: 348ff). This 
might make for a reasonable strategy for the leaders who understand that it is much easier to 
wage war against civilians since they do not shoot back and, therefore, do not cause the same 
amount of casualties against one’s own troops (Downes 2007:879). The casualty factor in 
interstate wars is not likely to be underestimated in democracies because democratic leaders 
have to take into consideration something that is much less of a topic for autocratic rulers - the 
support of the electorate. Due to this, the democratically elected leaders are more eager to 
wage a short war because the public opinion would quickly turn against him if casualties rise 
or if the war seems unwinnable (Downes 2007: 873). Indeed, Gartner and Segura (1998:298) 
show that public opinion is affected by the number of casualties in the war, but they also 
conclude that a short, but very violent war may not be any better as far as public opinion is 
concerned, than a long conflict with a steady casualty rate. It could, however, be argued 
against Downes that the consideration of the electorate should imply that democracies are less 
violent against civilians instead of more violent (Bueno de Mesquita et al: 1999: 800) 
Guerrilla warfare can often be seen in wars of attrition, and especially those where one 
of the parties is significantly weaker than the other. This kind of warfare, however, poses a 
great challenge to its targets, since the guerrillas often hide amongst the civilian population. 
This makes it hard to eradicate the threat, and therefore, makes genocide more likely 
(Valentino, Huth & Balch-Lindsay 2004). Guerrillas are often dependent on support from the 
civilian population for things like shelter, food and information, and this dependence makes 
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the civilian population an attractive target for government forces, thus cutting the guerrillas’ 
line of support (Valentino, Huth & Croco 2006: 355). As far as guerrilla wars are concerned, 
the percentage of conflicts won by states against insurgents using guerrilla tactics has been 
steadily dropping since the peak during 1851-1875. In this period, ninety per cent of conflicts 
against insurgents were won by the state, compared to the twenty some per cent in the period 
1976-2005 (Lyall & Wilson 2009: 69ff). If there is a connection between the decreasing 
amounts of conflicts won against insurgents and the increased chance of genocides in wars of 
attrition, there is a possibility that there has been an increasing amount of civilian deaths after 
the aforementioned peak. However, Easterly, Gatti and Kurlat (2005:135), find that massacres 
were more likely to happen in democratic countries in the 19
th
 century than in the 20
th
 
century. This is attributed to the fact that most massacres were performed as a part of the 
colonization process. One might imagine that this is due to liberal democratic reluctance to 
use such force against civilian populations. But this pre-supposes that the massacres were the 
reason why these conflicts against insurgents using guerrilla tactics were won.  
Due to the cost sensitivity seen in democratic countries, they tend to attack other 
countries where they believe that the war will be of short duration and inexpensive (Bueno de 
Mesquita et al: 1999: 799). Democracies win a disproportionate amount of the wars they enter 
(Reiter & Stam 1998: 387), and are also more likely to fight on battlefields that are not 
contiguous to their own borders, as it is easier for them to shield their own civilian population 
(Valentino, Huth & Croco 2010: 542). 
Gartner and Regan (1996: 284f) find that it is not regime type per se that determines a 
state’s repressiveness5, but the type of demands or threats they face from their political 
opposition. Based on this they conclude that the reason why democracies experience less 
repression than other regime types is because democracies experience fewer extreme demands 
due to the different channels opposition groups can use for dissent, and have, therefore, fewer 
reasons to be repressive. Regan and Henderson (2002: 122) connects this with Fein’s (1995: 
176ff) “More Murder in the Middle” hypothesis in which she finds that semi-democracies are 
more repressive than their autocratic and democratic counterparts. Based on this, Regan and 
Henderson claim that the repression is due to the increased amount of serious threat to the 
regime, indirectly saying that governments in semi-democracies have less control than in 
other regime types. While political repression does not necessarily mean the killing of 
                                                 
5
 As with violence against civilians, repression is defined in many different ways. Most relevant in this context is 
the definition used by Gartner and Regan (1996), who view political repression as the use of violence as a 
method for political control. 
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civilians, the threat argument is nevertheless a credible reason for murdering civilians. 
Combined with the cost-sensitivity discussed above, an increased threat could make a regime 
take pre-emptive action in order to avoid future loss.  
 
Hypothesis 1b: Democracies are as democidal as non-democracies in wars 
Hypothesis 1c: Semi-democracies are more democidal than both autocracies and 
democracies in war 
4. Research on violence against civilians 
In this section I will first present a classification of motives that some scholars believe to be 
useful in understanding violence against civilians. After this, I present factors that have been 
correlated with violence against civilians in earlier analyses, or factors that are correlated with 
intrastate or interstate wars, and that I suspect may be significant when it comes to violence 
against civilians. Since the research on violence against civilians is limited, many of the 
theories presented here are from research on civil wars. While I recognize that the two are not 
the same and one cannot draw conclusions based on another type of conflict, I believe that 
civil wars have several axial points with democide, and that there is possible to draw parallels 
between the two. 
 
Motives/rationale behind violence against civilians 
Before advancing to the structural explanations, I will first try and say something about the 
motives behind violence against civilians. While such motives are not readily quantifiable and 
suited for a statistical analysis, it may give valuable insight into understanding the topic 
better. 
Killing civilians is seen by some as a rational decision made by leaders (Valentino 
2004: 68). Trying to discover the motives as to why groups would go through with such a 
venture is a tough nut to crack. Scholars have tried to classify different types of motives and 
some of these explanations are similar, while others vary greatly. For instance, Chalk and 
Jonassohn (1990: 29) classify motives for genocide into four different categories: (1) to 
eliminate real or potential threats; (2) to spread terror among real or potential enemies; (3) to 
acquire economic wealth; (4) to implement a belief, theory or ideology. Smith (2009: 40ff) 
lists five different categories that he calls: (1) retributive genocide; (2) institutional genocide; 
(3) utilitarian genocide; (4) monopolistic genocide; (5) ideological genocide. Unlike the two 
former studies, Jones (2006: 262ff) maintains that one has to look to the individual in order to 
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understand why genocides take place, and locates four different psychological elements that 
are essential to understanding génocidaires: (1) narcissism; (2) greed; (3) fear; (4) humiliation. 
Though seemingly quite different, these three researchers have quite similar views on 
motives, as we can see in Table 4.1. 
 
Table 4.1: A comparison of different explanations of motives 
Cat. Chalk and Jonassohn Smith Jones 
1 (1) Elimination (2) Institutional  (3) Fear 
  (2) Terror     
2   (1) Retributive (4) Humiliation 
3 (4) Belief/ideology (5) Ideologic   
4 (3) Economy (3) Utilitarian (2) Greed 
5 
 
(4) Monopolistic (1) Narcissism 
Sources: Chalk and Jonassohn (1990: 29), Smith (2009: 40ff), Jones (2006: 262ff) 
 
Smith’s institutional genocide is explained as a routinization of terror against its people in 
order to display one’s own power and hinder future retaliations, as well as devastating a city 
or territory instead of incorporating it into one’s own system. One can see how Chalk and 
Jonassohn’s elimination of potential threats and terror from real or potential enemies fit 
Smith’s definition. Jones’s “fear” category says that a party, in fear of being killed, might kill 
civilians in a pre-emptive strike. This is similar to the categories mentioned above. Under the 
second category, Jones’ “humiliation” explanation can be explained as a situation where the 
perpetrator has been humiliated in the past and wants revenge to regain lost honour. This 
motive is fairly close to Smith’s category of retributive genocide, where the perpetrators 
blame the victims, rationalizing that they deserve punishment for what they have done in the 
past or for what they are. This latter part also partly overlaps with Jones’ “narcissism” 
explanation. The third category comprising of Chalk and Jonassohn’s belief/theory/ideology 
and Smith’s ideological genocide are both straightforward, where the focus is on the battle 
between ideologies as a motive for killing civilians. The fourth category includes all of the 
authors’ focus on the quest for wealth in some form. When it comes to Smith’s monopolistic 
genocide and Jones’ narcissism category, the connection between them is perhaps less 
evident; the former defines his category as one where significant cleavages between religious, 
racial and ethnic groups create a fight for power, and the latter explains his narcissism 
category as one where the perpetrators see themselves as superior to other groups and 
deserving of special treatment. There is a possibility that this situation occurs in Smith’s 
monopolistic genocide, but not necessarily, as the genocide might just be a struggle for power, 
19 
 
an “us or them” scenario. A problem with these three motivations is that they do not explain 
why non-state groups would perform violence against civilians as well, since it does not 
include such factors as the fight for political rights or equal opportunities. 
The different motives presented here are just from three scholars, and many more have 
tried to explain the motives for killing civilians differently but still arrive at similar 
conclusions. Making an exhaustive list is indeed challenging, as violence against civilians 
often will not be explained easily by one explanation, otherwise one would expect to see more 
violence against civilians in other places with a similar situation. Violence against civilians 
happens due to a combination of different reasons and is not easily explained, but some 
general patterns have been found. 
 
Development  
A state’s development can influence the probability of violence against civilians in the state. 
In the period 1946-89, over one third of all types conflicts took place in low-income, 
developing countries. This figure rose to 50 per cent in the period 1990-2003 (UNDP 2005: 
154). These relationship is confirmed in a multivariate analysis by Fearon and Laitin (2003: 
76) who interpret that a low GDP/capita as a proxy for weak state capacity. While Fearon and 
Laitin’s results apply to civil war, Harff (2003: 69) found that a low level of development did 
not affect the risk of experiencing a geno-/politicide once state failure has occurred. However, 
Harff also includes the variable “trade openness” which may interfere with her measure for 
development (infant mortality rate). While Harff’s results did not support it, I find it likely 
that a developed state is less likely to experience violence against civilians than less 
developed states, which leads me to the second hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 2: Less developed countries commit more democide than developed countries 
 
During wars 
During a civil war where the fighting parties are fighting a symmetric war, where they have 
similar military capabilities, the violence against combatants and civilians usually takes place 
in a limited territory, such as the conflict in the final stages of the Sri Lankan civil war. 
Combatants in these types of conflict are usually killed in combat on the frontline. Civilians 
on the other hand, are isolated from the battlefields, and violence against them in this type of 
conflict takes the form of assassinations by armed groups entering villages or towns, due to 
naval or aerial bombing or massacres and executions that take place during a territorial 
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conquest (Balcells 2010: 296f). In an asymmetric civil conflict, one of the parties will have 
better military capabilities than the other
6
. Arguably, the chance of killing civilians is higher 
in this type of conflict. Non-state groups might follow this strategy because of problems 
reaching military targets due to the state’s superior organization and firepower, and therefore 
find other - civilian - targets instead. The state actor, on the other hand, could see the killing 
of civilians as a solution when they have no real military targets to hit, and must attack non-
state groups who live amongst civilians (Gross 2009: 321f). By killing these civilians, the 
state create an environment where the civilians do not want to protect the non-state groups for 
fear of their own lives, and would force the non-state groups to move. The same 
characteristics we see in symmetric and asymmetric civil wars are likely to be seen in a war 
between two nations, with the exception that the defending nation is less likely to kill their 
own civilians, but may turn to shelling enemy civilians, if they have the capacity to do so, 
with the same rationale as inferior non-state groups use in asymmetric civil wars. 
 
Previous genocide 
Whether or not a state has seen violence against civilians in the past can also be a reason for 
civilian killings in the present. A group that has been mistreated in the past may engage in a 
reprisal, attacking civilians of opposing groups, and blaming their victims for what they have 
done in the past, thus dehumanizing them in the process (Smith 2009: 40ff). A case in 
particular is the Hutu/Tutsi conflict in Rwanda. Past killing of civilians could also trigger 
future violence if the perpetrators had success with this strategy, and want to repeat the 
outcome with the same sort of violence (Harff 2003: 62).  
 
Neighbours 
In research on civil war several authors have found that a state’s individual characteristics are 
not all that matters, whether or not one sees intrastate conflict. Indeed, there seems to be a 
contagion effect, where a conflict may spread from one country into another. Buhaug and 
Gleditsch (2008) find that a contagion effect does not depend on the exposure to proximate 
conflicts, but that ethnic linkage between groups of the two states makes a conflict more 
likely to spread. When it comes to democide, it seems likely that if ethnic group A performs 
democide on ethnic group B in one state, this might cause group B to retaliate on group A in a 
neighbouring state. Leaders of a state may also learn how efficient the neighbour’s democide 
                                                 
6
 Usually the state, and in those cases where the state is the weaker part, one will probably see a successful coup. 
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is in repressing opponents, and decide to build upon the neighbour’s successful experiences 
and do the same themselves. However, it may work as a deterrent, as the leaders may 
recognize the atrocities done in a neighbouring state and its effect, and therefore shy away 
from using the same strategy. One example of the spreading of a conflict is the Tutsi army 
that went into Rwanda from Uganda in 1990, fuelling what would become a violent genocide 
four years later, and leading to the Hutu militia Interahamwe fleeing to the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo from where they now operate (Hintjens 1999). 
 
Social cleavages 
Social cleavage theory (Valentino 2004: 16ff) maintains that cleavages such as ethnic, 
cultural, religious, class divisions, political or economic exclusions or high levels of 
discrimination can be a powerful force behind mass killings. Such cleavages may create an 
“us vs. them” mindset, and dehumanizes the other party, which is perceivedas  inferior to 
one’s own. This theory is not very specific to what kind of constellation of ethnic groups that 
is giving the highest risk of democide and the most violent democides. Research on civil war 
can arguably give some parallel lessons. 
Collier and Hoeffler (2004: 588) show that states with an ethnically dominant group 
are more likely to see civil conflict than ethnically fragmented states. Krain (1997) also find 
effects based on the distribution of ethnicities in a state, when he shows that, when accounting 
for the duration of the geno-politicide, the more homogenous
7
 the population in a society is, 
the more severe a genocide or politicide will be. When opponents of a state or group is of a 
uniform ethnicity, that whole ethnic group might be seen as potential enemies, and therefore 
killed, even if it is clear that not every person of that ethnicity is an opponent (Downes 2007: 
878). Another reason why leaders choose to kill members of the enemy’s ethnicity could be 
that they, in fear of seeing rebellion behind their own lines, try to quell resistance before it 
happens. By killing most of the civilians with the same ethnicity as the enemy’s, one also 
reduces the opposing group’s interest in trying to reconquer the area and liberate their ethnic 
brethren (Downes 2006: 154). From this the third hypothesis is: 
 
Hypothesis 3: Ethnically homogenous states are more democidal 
                                                 
7
 Unlike Collier and Hoeffler, Krain does not use the phrase ethnic dominance , but a homogenous state will 
arguably have an ethnic dominant group, although an ethnic dominant group does not necessarily have to exist in 
a homogenous state. For example a state with six groups, where one constitutes 50 per cent of the population, 
and the other five 10 per cent each, there would be an ethnic dominant group, but the state is not considered 
homogenous. 
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5. Dataset 
5.1 Rummel’s data 
Since states normally do not count the number of civilians they have murdered, the numbers 
will, in most cases, be estimates. Rummel’s approach to finding these numbers is what he 
calls reasonable approximation, which is based on six different principles: (1) the variation 
principle, where one uses estimates from both extremes
8
 while still being credible and 
authoritative. This avoids biased results that estimates based on one of the extremes yield; (2) 
the comprehensiveness principle, which states that one should include as many estimates as 
possible as long as these are independent, even if the estimated number is the same as another 
source; (3) the disaggregation principle, in which the estimates should be divided into the 
best sub-estimates available, for example, using the number of people killed in campaigns, 
deportations, massacres and camp deaths separately instead of using only total estimates. This 
is done to avoid exaggerations and underestimates; (4) the error range principle, in which one 
includes low and high sub-estimates for each case of democide as well as including the most 
probable estimate. Thus, when summing up all the low estimates for a period, it is likely that 
these figures are underestimated, with the opposite for the sum of the high numbers, thus 
creating a range of error for the medium estimate; (5) the consolidation principle, where one 
always use the lowest and highest estimates one can find, even if other sources have another 
low or high estimate, but where one adds the total for mid-estimates, and divides this between 
the number of estimates
9
. However, Rummel notes that there are situations where the 
consolidation differs from this; (6) the disclosure principle, stating that all sources, estimates 
and relevant comments should be disclosed, including any kind of calculations that have been 
undertaken to reach the final totals, making it easier for others to make additions and 
adjustments. 
As stated above, Rummel counts a total of 169 million murders (Rummel 1994: 4), the 
numbers of the worst murdering states can be seen in Table 5.2. 
 
                                                 
8
 By extremes I mean the highest and the lowest estimates given, two estimates that are likely to be different 
from the perpetrators and the victims. 
9
 Rummel uses an example of two different medium estimates of 2,000,000 and 2,500,000, where the final mid 
estimate will be 2,250,000. Whereas for the low estimates he has 1,000,000 and 850,000, and uses 850,000 as 
the low estimate, and for the high estimate he has 4,600,000 and 3,500,000, choosing the former as his high 
estimate. 
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Table 5.2: Most deadly regimes, numbers in thousands (Rummel 1994: 4)
10
  
Regimes  Total democide  Regimes  Total democide  
USSR 61 911 Pakistan 1 503 
China (PRC) 35 236 Mexico 1 417 
Germany 20 946 Yugoslavia (Tito) 1 072 
China (Kuomintang) 10 075 Russia 1 066 
Japan 5 964 China (Warlords) 910 
China (Mao Soviets) 3 466 Turkey (Atatürk) 878 
Cambodia 2 035 United Kingdom 816 
Turkey 1 883 Portugal (Dictatorship) 741 
Vietnam 1 678 Indonesia 729 
North Korea 1 663 ”Lesser murderers” 2 792 
Poland 1 585     
    World Total 169 202 
 
 No less than 77 per cent of all civilian deaths from democide have been conducted in, 
or by, three states: the Soviet Union, China (nationalist and communist) and Germany. 
However, in terms of democide as a share of the population, some smaller states are more 
violent. At the top of this list is the Cambodian Khmer Rouge’s democide at an annual rate of 
8.16 per cent in the years 1975-79, killing over 31 per cent of the population. The next three 
countries on the list that have an annual rate of over 1 per cent are Turkey in 1919-23, 
Yugoslavia in 1941-45 and Poland in 1945-48, with an annual democide rate of 2.64 per cent, 
2.51 per cent and 1.99 per cent respectively (Rummel 1994: 7). In Rummel’s data, 137.9 
million of the total dead are killed by totalitarian regimes, 28.6 million by authoritarian 
regimes, and two million by democratic states (Rummel 1994: 15).  
The data collected by Rummel have, however, not gone uncriticized. Dulic (2004a) 
argues that Rummel’s methods for gathering data suffer from a lack of source criticism, and 
uses Rummel’s numbers for the Yugoslav democide as an example. Dulic’s main criticism is 
the uncritical use of secondary sources. He points to several sources Rummel has used which 
Dulic deems as unreliable - sources that Dulic believes exaggerate the number of people 
killed. Using demographic data, Dulic shows that if Rummel’s numbers were to be true, 
Yugoslavia’s annual population growth for the period 1941-48 would have to be almost 3 per 
cent - more than twice the population growth Rummel himself estimated for the period 1941-
50. Based on the case of Yugoslavia, Dulic questions the trustworthiness of the rest of the 
data if Rummel has used similar sources/methods for other cases. Rummel’s (2004) answer to 
                                                 
10
 These numbers do not include Rummel’s 38 million estimated famine death as a consequence of the Great 
Leap Forward. 
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these comments is that Dulic focuses on just a small time period for his estimate, instead of 
the total period the democide occurred (1944-87), and asks why Dulic has not provided any 
estimates of his own in comparison. Rummel also comments that the Yugoslavian democide 
was just one out of 218 cases, and therefore, does not say anything about his estimates or 
methods in general. Dulic’s (2004b) reply to this is that Rummel did not try to refute Dulic’s 
criticism and avoids the central argument about Rummel’s methodological problems. Mann 
(1999: 20) also disagrees with Rummel’s estimates, arguing that the numbers killed by 
napalm in Vietnam are minimized. But he does not claim that there is a systematic under- or 
over reporting in the dataset. In either case, one cannot claim that the data are completely 
accurate. It seems likely that the numbers for democide conducted in or by democracies are 
more precise, as democracies have more non-governmental organizations following the state’s 
actions as well as a critical press and opposition, all with the ability to voice their opinion 
should such numbers be understated. 
Despite Dulic’s criticism, I have used Rummel’s numbers for the entire dataset with 
the exception of the famines in 1959-63 caused by the Great Leap Forward in China. Rummel 
did not initially include his estimate of 27 million famine deaths caused by the great leap 
forward, but started including these famine deaths when he became aware that the Chinese 
leadership was well aware of the famine and did not try very hard to prevent it (Rummel 
2005). While Rummel upped his estimate to 38 million, Dikötter (2010: 325ff) presented new 
and trustworthy data which exceeds Rummel’s estimate, and Dikötter shows that as many as 
45 million people died during that famine. Since such a big discrepancy could make a 
difference in the analyses, as well as the clearer numbers given by Dikötter, I have decided to 
use his estimate instead
11
. 
 
5.2 Restructuring Rummel’s dataset 
As seen above, Rummel’s data is a result of consulting many different sources and then 
estimating the number of deaths based on these sources. Except for the numbers for Russia 
after 1917, China and Germany, all of the estimates are found in Rummel (1997b). For every 
democide case, he first writes what the democide is about or who it is against. Then he makes 
a list showing the death estimates of his source(s) as well as their estimated start and end 
years. Based on these estimates, he produces his own estimate. The number of sources he has 
consulted varies widely from case to case, where some of them show no sources, while others 
                                                 
11
 I did analyses using Rummel’s numbers instead of Dikötter’s, and the results were practically identical with 
those used in the main analyses in Chapter 7. 
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may show more than 30. How much consideration he has taken of the sources also varies. 
Some of his estimates are the same as one or more of his sources, while other estimates show 
widely different numbers than all of his sources. In the latter situation he has usually extended 
the time period of his source, and in the process added more deaths, probably to account for 
killings he believes to have happened in those years. Since Rummel has not tried to build a 
time-series dataset, his start and end years do not need to be completely accurate. There are 
instances where he uses the exact same numbers as his sources, but where he may have 
changed start and end periods from 1963-70 to 1960-75. This does, of course, give Rummel a 
buffer for his numbers in case the estimates were too high and in case there was democide 
before and after the period of the source’s estimate. The generosity in creating large intervals 
for democide created some problems when I tried to convert his data into a country-year 
format. Figure 5.1 shows that there are many cases which have a very long interval. For this 
reason my analysis is on the incidence and severity of democide rather than their onsets. 
 
Figure 5.1: Number of cases per interval-year (x = interval-year, y = frequency) 
 
 
The gravest examples are USA and Liberia, where the former has recorded 
lynchings/vigilante executions/KKK victims for the whole period of 88 years, and the latter 
has recorded “forced labour dead” for the same period. But fortunately, as seen in Figure 5.2, 
the number of deaths recorded are mostly in the earlier years. 
 
Figure 5.2: Number of dead per interval-year (x = interval-year, y = no. dead in 
thousands) 
 
26 
 
 
 Regardless of the length of the time intervals I have divided the number of deaths reported 
for the case, by the number of years the case was active. So a case of 10,000 dead over a 
period of 10 years shows up as 1,000 dead per year in my dataset. Thus, I neglect when a 
democide was its most intense, but Rummel’s data gives no basis for judging the temporal 
dynamic of individual democides. The shorter the interval, the less of a problem with this 
strategy. Nevertheless, the long intervals are far from optimal and I have tried to change these 
into smaller ones. The optimal solution would, of course, be to find sources that have a single 
number per year, but this would be too time-consuming, and probably leave substantial 
inaccuracies as well. I have tried to make a cut-off at 10 years, as the maximum interval. 
Since I have wanted to stay true to Rummel’s data, I have tried to look over every case and 
look at Rummel’s sources to see whether they have a shorter time span than what Rummel 
has used. If they do have a shorter time interval, and if the numbers of these sources are very 
similar to those of Rummel, I changed Rummel’s start and end years to match those of his 
sources. A potential problem with this strategy is that, in the case of Rummel’s estimates 
being correct, my changing of the start and end years might make some years more intense 
than they really were. While I managed to lower the time period for some of the cases, I was 
not successful in making the cut-off I set at 10 years, as we can see from Figure 5.3, which is 
very similar to that of Figure 5.1. 
 
Figure 5.3: Number of cases per interval-year after edit (x = interval-year, y = 
frequency) 
 
 
Figure 5.4 will therefore also show approximately the same numbers as Figure 5.2 since there 
have not been many changes. The only visible change is the one of using Dikötter’s (2010) 
estimates on the great famine in China.  
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Figure 5.4: Number of dead per interval-year after edit (x = interval-year, y = no. dead 
in thousands) 
 
 
Rummel lists many estimates that he has left out for one reason or another. Therefore,  
I always had to go to his final democide estimate for the country, and work backwards to find 
where his numbers come from. Due to the size of his dataset, it is sometimes a maze of 
numbers trying to retrieve all the data I want. For example, he can have an estimate on line 
250, which is a result of lines 240 and 230, and going to these lines I see that they are the 
result of lines 200, 195, 190 and so on.  
In some of the estimates, Rummel’s sources have been unclear as far as the start or end 
years are concerned. In these cases I chose to assume that his guesstimate is correct. There are 
also some places in the dataset where he has no start year, or no end year, and in these 
situations I have consulted his sources. Following Rummel’s own coding strategy in those 
cases where he has no low estimate, I use the medium one if possible. If there is no medium 
estimate, I use the low one if possible. And if there is no high estimate, I use the medium 
estimate if possible. 
In addition to creating a dataset with a country-year structure, I also chose to split the 
democide variable into three different categories: one for regime democide; one for foreign 
democide; and one for non-state democide. This made the whole ordeal even more time-
consuming. But if I were to discover that this division does not yield any new results, it is 
easier to merge the data back into a single variable again than to go the other way. 
 
5.3 Rummel’s data in country-year format 
After converting the dataset into time series, it becomes possible to view the development in 
murders over time in a more precise way. Rummel did this (1997: 466), but because he had 
not converted his data into country-year format, the graph becomes smoother, and it is harder 
to spot the peaks and drops. Figure 5.5, shows my numbers (blue) compared to the original 
numbers of Rummel (in red). The faint green colour in 1959-64 represents Rummel’s 27 
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million estimated famine deaths in his 1997 volume, whereas the orange line is his newest 38 
million assessment from 2005 (Rummel 2005). The sharper lines in my data is due to the 
changes done in the interval years 
 
Figure 5.5: Total number of deaths per year, numbers in thousands 
 
 
Three of the major peaks are all caused by famines in Russia (1922), Russia (1934) and China 
(1960) respectively. The peak after World War II in 1949 can be accounted to Chinese 
communist democide, combined with Russian deportation and labour camp deaths. The last 
major peak occurs in 1971, and is largely due to Pakistan’s democide in East Pakistan 
(currently Bangladesh). 
Since I decided to code the democide count into three different categories following 
Rummel’s own categories (although mostly overlooked in his analyses), it is useful to see the 
distribution of killings among the three. From Figure 5.6 we see that regime democide is by 
far the largest and most serious type. While foreign democide did have a significant peak 
during the World War II years, the number of dead due to non-state democide is miniscule 
compared to the other two. 
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Figure 5.6: The death count split into regime, foreign and non-state democide, numbers 
in thousands 
 
 
Not surprisingly, the most violent states by far are China, Germany and Russia. Together they 
constitute over 88 per cent of the regime democide count of 175 million, 70 per cent of the 
foreign democide count of 39.5 million, and 11 per cent of the non-state democide count of 
1.75 million. Removing these three states from the graph, we see the result in Figure 5.7.  
 
Figure 5.7: Number of deaths per year after removing China, Germany and Russia, 
numbers in thousands 
 
 
As with the total numbers, there is still a major peak during the Second World War, and Japan 
is a major contributor to creating this peak along with Yugoslavia. As in Figure 5.5, the spike 
in 1971 is the democide performed in East Pakistan. The Khmer Rouge’s regime democide is 
the best explaining factor for the peak in the late 1970s, and the last peak around 1985 is due 
to Ethiopian democidal famine. Note that the scale on the vertical axis has changed 
considerably, reflecting the exclusion of the “megamurderers”. 
Just as interesting as looking at the number of killed due to democide every year is 
looking at the number of cases of democide per year. Even though the number of deaths in 
democides seems to have been declining since the 1960s, one can see from Figure 5.8 that the 
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number of democides did actually rise from the mid-1930s until the early 1980s, with a small 
drop after the Second World War, and then another drop after 1982. The numbers in this 
figure do not inform us of the number of nations performing democide, but are the sum of all 
types of democide. This means that it is possible that one nation has three cases of democide 
in one year (but no more than three since all cases of any type of democide is added into their 
respective categories). Theoretically a count of 81 cases of democide could be carried out in 
as few as 27 states. Even though the number of cases of democide per year rose steadily from 
the mid-1920s, the number of cases of democide adjusted by the number of countries dropped 
sharply from its peak in the early 1930s, and has slowly been decreasing since the end of the 
Second World War. Therefore one can assume that the rising trend of democide can be 
attributed to the introduction of the new nation states. 
 
 
Figure 5.8: Number of cases of democide per year 
 
 
 
When we separate the three categories, we can see that regime democide is still the most 
frequent type of democide, but as seen above, it has a drop after 1982. Apart from the World 
War II years, the number of cases of foreign and non-state democide seem to follow each 
other at around 5-10 cases per year, however, without the same drop in the early 1980s as we 
have seen in regime democide. 
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Figure 5.9: Number of cases of democide per year divided in three categories 
 
 
This dip at the end may suggest a similar trend to the one for the number of armed 
conflicts, which peaked in the early 1990s, and then later dropped and plateaued around 2002 
(Gleditsch et al. 2002; Harbom & Wallensteen 2010). If this were the case for democide, one 
would expect the number of cases of democide to continue dropping from the 1987 level of 
about 50 cases. Since there is no way to see if this stands with Rummel’s data, I did the same 
test with the UCDP data which goes from 1989 onwards, leaving 1988 as a gap year. Even 
though these two measures are not the same, it is still interesting to see whether there has been 
any drop using another definition on violence against civilians. The UCDP numbers of states 
with one-sided violence can be seen in Figure 5.10. 
 
Figure 5.10: Number of cases and killed of one-sided violence per year for the period 
1989-2004, using UCDP data
12
 
 
 The peak in 1994 goes up to 501,814, which mostly consists of the 500,000 killed in Rwanda. 
                                                 
12
 The number of cases has been counted in the same fashion as was done with Rummel’s dataset, by counting 
non-state democide and regime democide as two separate cases if they were performed the same year.  
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As one can see from the figure, the number of cases of one-sided violence has not 
decreased the same way as the number of armed conflicts, nor does the number of people 
killed. While I cannot find any decrease in the number of one-sided violence in the UCDP 
data, Anderton (2010: 463) shows a decline in genocides from 1989 and steadying from 2002 
when using the Political Instability Task Force’s dataset, thus supporting the theory of a 
similarity between violence against civilians and the number of conflicts. 
6. Variables and research design 
6.1 Variables 
The analyses in this paper use four dependent variables and seventeen independent variables, 
all of which are presented in short below. 
 
Democide 
The number of democidal deaths is as mentioned earlier, based on Rummel’s (1997b) 
estimates for the period 1900-87. This data has been divided into three different categories: 
regime democide; non-state democide; and foreign democide. Based on these three types of 
democide, I have made four dependent variables: (1) regime democide, which is all democide 
within a state done by the state itself; (2) non-state democide, a variable which counts 
democide carried out by a group that does not represent the state; (3) foreign democide, a 
variable which counts any democide committed outside of a country’s own borders; and 
lastly, (4) total democide, which is the total sum of all democide (regime, non-state and 
foreign). Disaggregating Rummel’s data into a country-year format and different forms of 
democide makes it possible to see whether there are different effects explaining the different 
types of democide and gain a better understanding of the temporal dynamics at play. 
  
Population 
The population data is mostly gathered from Maddison (2011). His data goes as far back as 
1822 for a handful of countries, which is useful since the democide data goes back to 1900. 
Notwithstanding, there are also many gaps, especially in the early years, but the data are 
complete from 1950 onwards. Where applicable, I have filled some gaps with population data 
from Fearon and Laitin (2003). A complete list of the missing values and the instances I have 
used Fearon and Laitin data can be found in Appendix A. 
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Energy consumption per capita 
As a measure of the state’s economic development, I use Correlates of War Project’s data on 
primary energy consumption instead of a normal GDP per capita. In contrast to data on GDP 
per capita, or infant mortality rate – the most commonly used measures of development, the 
energy consumption data also covers the first half of the 20
th
 century. The primary energy 
consumption is data on a state’s energy consumption in thousand coal-ton equivalents. The 
idea behind this variable is that the more energy consumption a state has, the larger potential 
manufacturing base of the economy and the larger the economy will be (Correlates of War 
2010: 45ff).The measure is calculated per capita to account for the size of the population in 
the state. 
 
Polity2 
The variable for measuring type of government is retrieved from the Polity IV project. The 
data created in this project measures the competitiveness of political participation, the 
constraints on the chief executive, and the openness and competitiveness of executive 
recruitment (Marshall, Gurr & Jaggers 2009). Based on these measurements, one has a scale 
ranging from -10 to +10, with the former being strongly autocratic and the latter strongly 
democratic. 
 
Democracy 
Since I want to be able to test for non-linear effects on type of government, I have included a 
dummy variable for democracy and one for autocracy, and these will also be used in 
interaction terms in order to test for regime-specific effects on other variables. Using the 
polity2 data, I have created a dummy variable where any country with a score of +7 or more 
on the scale is counted as a democracy with the value 1, and any other is counted as 0. This 
cut-off value is the same as Harff (2003: 63) and Eck and Hultman (2007: 242) used in their 
articles. As I mentioned earlier, the difference in definitions of violence against civilians 
makes it hard to compare the results. This also goes for the variables used, and for this reason 
I have decided to follow Harff’s definition of democracies and autocracies. I believe that a 
standardization of definitions will help to move the research forward. 
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Autocracy 
Just like with the democracy variable, I have used Polity IV data as a basis for my autocracy 
variable. In case there are differences between autocratic countries and semi-autocratic/semi-
democratic countries, the autocracy variable will test this. The dummy variable counts 
autocracies as those with a score of 0 or lower. Just as with the democracy dummy, this 
dummy uses the same cut-off points as Harff and Eck and Hultman. And combined with the 
democracy variable, we will be able to distinguish three groups: full democracies (+7  +10), 
semi-democracies (0  +6) with some democratic features, and full autocracies (-10  0).  
 
Democide in neighbouring states 
As discussed above, it is likely that there is some kind of neighbourhood effects of democides. 
To account for this, I created a variable for democide in neighbouring states. This is a count 
variable based on the democide data. For every country year, this variable counts how many 
of a state’s neighbouring countries have performed democide. The variable checks for 
democide of any nature, and does not differ between types of democide. Optimally, I would 
want to have one for every three types, but with the lack of differential theoretical arguments 
on how the three forms of democide can spill into neighbouring countries, I did not prioritize 
testing this. The variable only checks for land-contiguous states - for example Japan’s 
democides will not appear in any other state’s neighbouring democides count. 
Based on this variable, I have created two interaction terms, one with the neighbouring 
state’s democide and whether the country of interest is a democracy, and one with the 
neighbourhood variable and autocracy. With these extra variables I may be able to see 
whether autocracies or democracies are more likely to be affected by their neighbour’s 
actions. For instance, we could see if the spread of violence throughout the Middle East, with 
the exceptions of Lebanon, Israel and Turkey (all three states with a considerable element of 
popular participation in politics and institutional checks and balances), during the so-called 
Jasmine revolutions, are unique to non-democracies, or if they could have spread as easily 
between democracies. 
 
Earlier democide 
In order to find whether or not past democide has any effect on present democide, I have 
created a count variable which counts the number of years since the last democide. The 
variable is operationalized as a decay-variable, where the variable’s value increases for every 
year without democide, and zeroes if there is an incidence of democide. With this variable, it 
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is possible to control for temporal dependence. If the results are similar to those of Harff 
(2003) and Smith’s (2009), one can expect that a recent democide will increase the chances of 
a new one taking place. 
 
Intrastate war 
The Correlates of War project has a list of all intrastate wars between 1816 and 2007 
(Correlates of War 2011). Based on the data here I have created a dummy variable which 
codes any country in an intrastate war as 1, and those not as 0. The dataset does include an 
estimate of number of people dead, and though it would have been interesting to see whether 
the intensity of intrastate war affects democide, I chose not to out of time consideration. 
Two interaction terms have been created in combination with this variable: one with 
democracy and interstate war; and another with autocracy and interstate war. With these 
interaction terms I will be able to see if one is more violent than the other during intrastate 
wars, testing Hypothesis 1b. 
 
Interstate war 
As with intrastate war, I use the Correlates of War data, making the same coding decisions. I 
also create interaction terms with autocracy/democracy and interstate war in order to test 
whether democracies are any different from non-democracies in interstate wars as well as 
testing Hypothesis 1b. 
 
Ethnic fractionalization 
To measure ethnic diversity, I use the Ethno Linguistic Fractionalization (ELF) index. The 
ELF index calculates the likelihood of two people chosen at random being from two different 
ethnic groups. A country with a score of 0 on this variable will be completely homogenous, 
and a country with a score of 1 will be completely heterogeneous. This variable, along with 
the two measures below, has been copied from Fearon and Laitin (2003). A problem with this 
data is that it does not go further back than 1945. However, when going through Fearon and 
Laitin’s dataset, they use the same measures from year to year for every country, even in such 
cases when a country has been split up, such as Pakistan in 1971, The Soviet Union in 1990, 
or Ethiopia in 1993, so their data are gathered for one year, and then converted into time-
series format. Being aware of the reservations this implies, I have decided to use the data from 
1945-87 for the earlier 45 year period as well. 
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Size of 2nd largest ethnic group 
While the ELF index will get a high score if there are many small ethnic groups, I have also 
included a variable which checks the size of the second largest group. The reason I have 
added a variable like this is because the larger the second group becomes, the more power it 
may be expected to have. While Cunningham, Gleditsch and Salehyan (2009) find that the 
stronger a non-state group is, the shorter wars will be, while the opposite is true for smaller 
ethnic groups. It remains to be seen whether or not these results will hold for violence against 
civilians. The variable goes from 0, where there is no second group, and to 0.44 where one 
has two identically-sized sized ethnic groups. 
 
Table 6.1 Descriptive statistics 
  N Min value Max value Mean Std. Dev. 
Dependent variables 
     Total democide 8,164 0 11,338.18 26.72 333.49 
Regime democide 8,164 0 11,338.18 21.6 313.19 
Non-state democide 8,164 0 150 0.21 2.69 
Foreign democide 8,164 0 3,688.01 4.9 97.62 
Independent variables (continuous) 
     ln(population) 6,981 4.82 13.57 8.9 1.5 
ln(pec/capita) 6,150 -10.66 4.85 -1 2.42 
Years since last democide 8,178 0 87 18 21.87 
Polity2 7,602 -10 10 -0.88 7.22 
Democide in neighbouring states 8,164 0 9 1.11 1.22 
Ethnic fractionalization 7,649 0.001 0.92 0.35 0.27 
Size of 2nd largest ethnic group 7,649 0 0.44 0.14 0.11 
Autocracy * neighb. democide 7,602 0 9 0.82 1.23 
Democracy * neighb. democide 7,602 0 5 0.2 0.6 
 
N Min value Max value 0 1 
Independent variables (dummies) 
     Democracy 7,602 0 1 74.11 % 25.89 % 
Autocracy 7,602 0 1 39.70 % 60.30 % 
Intrastate war 8,164 0 1 93.01 % 6.99 % 
Interstate war 8,164 0 1 94.00 % 6.00 % 
Autocracy * intrastate war 7,602 0 1 94.63 % 5.37 % 
Democracy * intrastate war 7,602 0 1 98.83 % 1.17 % 
Autocracy * interstate war 7,602 0 1 96.97 % 3.03 % 
Democracy * interstate war 7,602 0 1 98.29 % 1.71 % 
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6.2 Method of analysis 
The most commonly used regression model is ordinary least squares (OLS) regression. OLS 
is a linear regression model which estimates the value of the dependent variable based on the 
values of the independent variables (Ringdal 2001: 465). OLS has some assumptions that 
need to be met: (1) the residuals have a mean of zero; (2) the residuals have constant variance 
for all independent variables; and (3) there is no correlation between the residuals (Ringdal 
2001: 407; Hamilton 1992: 111). 
The dependent variables used in the analyses of this paper are count variables, and 
normal linear regression models such as OLS can be used. However, using this type of 
regression may result in inconsistent, inefficient and biased estimates (Long & Freese 2006: 
349). So while there are situations where the results in a linear model are reasonable, it might 
be safer using models more suited to these kinds of variables. The most commonly used 
methods for estimating count models are the negative binomial and the Poisson regressions 
(Cameron & Trivedi 1998: 59, Harvey 1989: 358). However, count variables are often over-
dispersed where the conditional variance exceeds the conditional mean (Cameron & Trivedi 
1998: 60). Looking at the dependent variables in Table 6.1, we see that the variance far 
exceeds the mean for all four dependent variables, proving a clear over-dispersion in my data. 
Nevertheless, all of the models were tested using OLS. As we can see in Tables 9-12 in 
Appendix B the results are similar for many of the variables, but also deviate at several other 
variables. 
While the linear regression models, as mentioned earlier, do not necessarily yield the 
best results in count data, the Poisson regression is the most basic model in this kind of data. 
This regression type determines the probability of the count by a Poisson distribution in which 
the mean is a function of the independent variables. However, while the Poisson regression 
model suggests that the conditional variance of the outcome is equal to the conditional mean, 
the conditional variance often exceeds the mean (Long 1997: 217f). In these events, as is the 
case with my data, the negative binomial regression is better suited to handling the over-
dispersion (Cameron & Trivedi 1998: 71). There are also times where the simple Poisson and 
negative binomial regression models are not sufficient, especially when there is an excess of 
zeros in the dependent variable (Long 1997: 218). In such an event, the zero-inflated Poisson 
(ZIP) and the zero-inflated negative binomial (ZINB) regressions are better at estimating the 
phenomenon at hand. The zero-inflated models improve the under-prediction of zeros by 
increasing the conditional variance without altering the conditional mean. The model assumes 
that there are two groups present in the dataset, one “always zero group” and one “not always 
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zero group”, where the former has an outcome of 0, with a probability of 1, and the latter may 
have a zero count, but there is a non-zero probability of seeing a positive count (Long & 
Freese 2006: 394). 
Looking at Figures 1 through 4 in Appendix A
13
, the variables do indeed have an 
abundance of zeros. However, tests are performed in order to determine which test of the 
negative binomial, Poisson, ZIP and ZINB are best suited. These tests include the Vuong test 
and the Bayesian information criterion (BIC) and Akaike information criterion (AIC) tests.
14
 
For all of the models, the ZINB regression is therefore preferred by these tests. 
The ZINB regression is a two-part model, estimating the count model (number of 
persons killed) and also estimating a binary model (whether or not an observation is predicted 
to include a democide or not). While the count model is calculated on the basis of the negative 
binomial, the binary, or inflated model, as mentioned above, it treats the variable as a logit, 
where you have either zeros or non-zeros (Hilbe 2007: 174ff). However, unlike a logit model, 
the inflated model tries to predict the occurrence of zeros and not the probability for a case of 
scoring 1 on the dependent variable. As with all statistical analyses, the task of deciding 
which variables will help predict what groups are “always zero” has to be done from a 
theoretical approach. For my models, I have decided to use four variables: number of years 
since last democide; intrastate war; interstate war; and (for most of my models) polity2
15
. The 
variable measuring the number of years since last democide is chosen because most of the 
acts of democide happen several years in a row, giving this variable the value 0 for a lot of the 
democide, excluding the first year of democide as well as single year incidents
16
. The two 
variables for war are chosen on the basis that they have been significant in understanding both 
the occurrence of genocides and severity of civil wars (Krain 1997: 347). The inclusion of the 
polity2 measure is partly based on the earlier theory that democracies are more peaceful, but 
also as an extra method of testing democracies’ chance of committing no democide, in 
addition to the severity of democide as will be done in the main analysis. 
6.3 Reliability and validity 
Reliability and validity are central terms in ensuring the quality of scientific analyses. While 
the former is about whether repeated measures with the same instrument of measurement 
                                                 
13
 The figures may seem evident, but they are very efficient in showing the over-dispersion of the data. 
14
 These tests were performed using the “countfit” command in STATA. 
15
 Where the variable is excluded, I will state this explicitly. 
16
 For example if there was a democide that lasted 10 years, the first year would get the value 1 (no previous 
democide), and the rest of the years would get the value 0. However, if a state experienced democide just one 
year, that year would get the value 1, but the following year would get the value 0. 
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yields the same results, the latter term is about whether what one tries to measure actually is 
what one wants to measure. A high reliability is a prerequisite for a high validity (Ringdal 
2001: 166).  
Reliability covers whether repeated measures with the same instrument of 
measurement yields the same results. Having a high reliability is a prerequisite for achieving a 
high validity, but is not enough in itself (Ringdal 2001: 166). Since there is almost always a 
measurement error in a variable, one can say that the value of the variable is created by two 
conditions: the true value; and measurement errors, where the errors are either systematic or 
random (Ringdal 2001: 167). It is very likely that there are measurement errors in the dataset 
used in the analyses of this paper, and these errors are probably not limited to those pointed 
out by Dulic (2004a) and Mann (1999) mentioned previously. The farther back in time the 
dataset goes, the higher chance there is of having numbers that deviate from what the true 
numbers would have been. For instance, the national population census of people in a country 
may not have been as thorough in 1900 as it was in 1988, and it is reasonable to believe that 
there are big differences between countries as well. In some instances, there are no estimates 
for some countries, creating missing values. The number of people killed in democide is 
probably a bigger victim of uncertainty. This is indeed the case for the number of Chinese 
death during the famines caused by the Great Leap Forward, where Chinese officials 
manipulated the numbers, which again led to an underestimate of the total deaths. Dikötter’s 
(2010) acquisition of new and reliable data proved that there were millions of more deaths 
than previously believed. As with population, the numbers on democide become more 
uncertain the older they are. In addition to this, states are not necessarily willing to give out 
the numbers of civilian deaths, and so the numbers are in some cases estimates. As a way of 
strengthening the reliability of the democides, Rummel consulted over 10,000 sources, and 
while the numbers may not be completely accurate, they are the best we have, and are not 
likely to be biased in any direction.  
Validity is about whether or not what one tries to measure actually is what one wants 
to measure. While reliability is more of an empirical issue, validity also requires a theoretical 
assessment (Ringdal 2001: 166). As mentioned above, a high validity is dependent on having 
a high reliability. When the total number of democide is over 200 million, it is not 
unreasonable to believe that not every one of them is an intentional murder of a civilian. This 
margin of error is, however, likely not so big that the validity would suffer from it and that the 
democide variables do not obfuscate the validity. While there are no apparent problems with 
the dependent variables, there could be issues concerning the validity of some of the 
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independent variables. Two of these are the government dummies that measure divide 
countries into democracies, autocracies or semi-democracies. The cut-off points would 
categorize a state with a score of 6 on the polity2 scale in the same category as a state with the 
score of 0, even if its government is much closer to a “democracy” with a score of 7. There is 
no doubt that the choice of these categories will influence the results, but I accept Harff’s 
(2003: 63) argument on the choice of categories, and recognize that this argument could be 
placed no matter where the cut-off point was set. Nevertheless, the usage of the polity2 
variable in some of the models will alleviate this problem somewhat. The usage the democide 
in neighbouring countries is also somewhat problematic, as states of the same type of 
government seem to be spatially clustered, and it is hard to say which of the two variables are 
explaining the phenomenon, or if they both explain it. There could be a situation where 
democide happens because of contagion effects, and would have happen no matter which type 
of government was present. And there is also a possibility that it is the type of government 
that causes the contagion to take place. Using ethnicity as a variable is also a hot potato as 
there is no clear definition as to what an ethnicity is, and it is therefore heavily reliant on the 
interpretation/classification by the researchers creating the data. Since one person can belong 
to more than one ethnicity, it is likely that some people in the dataset are classified with an 
ethnicity they would not classify themselves as. However, without having a world-wide 
questionnaire on this classification, such errors must be accepted. 
7. Results 
In this chapter I test the hypotheses presented above. The analyses have been divided into four 
different parts: total democide; regime democide; non-state democide; and foreign democide. 
In all of the four parts I start off with a simple model using the linear polity2 variable, but I 
later replace this variable by two dummy variables for democracy and autocracy. Doing so 
makes it possible to see whether there is a linear or non-linear correlation between 
government type and democide, such as the concave relationship found for the onset of civil 
war (Gleditsch, Hegre & Strand 2009: 182). By analyzing the different types of democide 
separately, I am able to see whether the relationships between the independent variables 
differ, depending on the type of democide. For instance, by using the foreign democide 
variable I can then test Downes’s (2006) results that democracies are just as violent against 
civilians in wars as autocracies are (Hypothesis 1b). This analysis could not have been done 
satisfactorily using the variable for total democide as this variable also includes the democide 
of its own people and might, therefore, obscure the results. For example, you could have a 
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situation where state A murders 10,000 civilians in another state in a given year and none 
within its own borders, while state B murders the same amount of its own people, but none 
abroad. The two nations would be treated equal in the analysis. However, since Downes 
measures the killing of another nation’s civilians, a comparison could not have been made by 
using a variable for total democide. 
 
7.1 Determinants of total democide 
First, I will start off analyzing the determinants for any type of democide done by a state or a 
group within the state. I am aware that a wide analysis merging the three types of democide in 
my dataset, regime, non-state and foreign, may not yield the most precise estimates as there 
are differences between the three types that will not show in the analyses below. However, I 
want to see whether there are variables that do not give strong results for the individual 
analyses, but which will show up in the total democide estimate, thus making me able to 
generalize on a larger scale. The results are shown in Table 7.1 below. 
As we can see from the results in Table 7.1, the size of the population is a significant 
factor in all nine models at a 0.01 level, where states with a higher population experience 
more democidal deaths. This finding is not surprising. There is a higher chance of suffering 
10,000 deaths in a population of ten million than in one of one hundred thousand. 
Development does not prove to be significant in any of the models. The number of years since 
the last occurrence of democide does also seem to have a negative effect in all the models 
except models seven and nine where the interaction terms with neigbouring democide is 
included. This suggests that the longer the length of time since the last democide, the less 
chance there is of seeing a new one (inflated model), and that the total deaths are likely to be 
fewer (count model). Note that because the inflated variables predict the probability of seeing 
zero democide, the variables in the inflated part should have the opposite direction of those in 
the regression part. Intrastate and interstate wars both have a positive effect on democide at 
the 0.01 level for the first five models and it seems that perpetrators kill civilians who are 
potential enemies, or knowingly or unknowingly help enemies of the state. With the 
introduction of the interaction terms, the effect vanishes completely for intrastate war, but 
persists on interstate wars, only now the significance has dropped to 0.05 in the seventh 
model, and 0.1 in the tenth model. 
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Table 7.1 Total democide 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 
                
  ln(Population) 0.943*** 0.773*** 0.979*** 0.793*** 0.734*** 0.780*** 0.767*** 0.731*** 0.718*** 
 
(0.145) (0.135) (0.152) (0.144) (0.149) (0.149) (0.144) (0.149) (0.149) 
ln(PEC/capita) (0.068 -0.053 -0.079 -0.059 -0.054 -0.061 -0.053 -0.053 -0.05 
 
(0.077) (0.076) (0.078) (0.078) (0.079) (0.078) (0.077) (0.079) (0.078) 
Democide in neighb. states 0.274*** 
 
0.284*** -0.011 0.311*** 0.307*** 0.194 0.131 
  
(0.094) 
 
(0.095) (0.207) (0.096) (0.106) (0.263) (0.261) 
Years since last democide (0.026*** -0.027*** -0.033*** -0.033*** -0.031*** -0.034*** -0.032*** -0.033*** -0.031*** 
 
-0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.008) (0.009) 
Intrastate war 0.814*** 0.892*** 0.665** 0.764*** 0.976*** -0.143 0.784*** -0.195 0.974*** 
 
(0.282) (0.286) (0.258) (0.248) (0.246) (0.688) (0.247) (0.892) (0.241) 
Interstate war 1.856*** 2.091*** 1.898*** 2.144*** 2.005*** 2.203*** 3.120*** 2.036*** 3.001*** 
 
(0.374) (0.442) (0.414) (0.466) (0.47) (0.47) (0.928) (0.48) (1.044) 
Autocracy 
  
1.153*** 0.850** 0.254 0.667* 1.047*** 0.335 0.617 
   
(0.35) (0.346) (0.493) (0.365) (0.381) (0.494) (0.596) 
Democracy 
  
-0.788** -0.663* -0.687* -0.779** -0.39 -0.61 -0.225 
   
(0.388) (0.368) (0.408) (0.366) (0.379) (0.41) (0.452) 
Autocracy*interstate war 
     
-1.158 
 
-1.08 
       
(1.145) 
 
(1.242) 
Autocracy*intrastate war 
    
1.266* 
 
1.194 
 
      
(0.722) 
 
(0.903) 
 Democracy*interstate war 
    
-1.423 
 
-1.521 
       
(0.967) 
 
(1.049) 
Democracy*intrastate war 
   
1.013 
 
1.58 
 
      
(0.774) 
 
(1.049) 
 Autocracy*neighb. democide
  
0.407* 
  
0.202 0.275 
     
(0.236) 
  
(0.285) (0.273) 
Democracy*neighb. democide 
  
-0.06 
  
-0.323 -0.223 
     
(0.203) 
  
(0.283) (0.225) 
Polity2 -0.126*** -0.098*** 
         (0.024) (0.02)             
Constant -7.779*** -6.635*** -8.434*** -7.038*** -6.129*** -6.872*** -7.022*** -6.188*** -6.348*** 
  (1.411) (1.331) (1.527) (1.46) (1.618) (1.535) (1.435) (1.612) (1.615) 
Inflated variables 
        Years since last democide 0.268*** 0.266*** 0.264*** 0.264*** 0.264*** 0.215*** 0.263*** 0.264*** 0.264*** 
 
(0.042) (0.042) (0.042) (0.043) (0.043) (0.036) (0.043) (0.043) (0.043) 
Intrastate -51.1*** -34.4*** -37.0*** -31.8*** -33.4*** 
17
 -36.1*** -30.4*** -33.252*** 
 
(3.636) (3.763) (3.576) (3.762) (3.762) 
 
(3.69) (3.789) (3.772) 
Interstate -0.715* -0.643* -0.661* -0.616* -0.616* -0.38 -0.586 -0.61 -0.601 
  (0.377) (0.371) (0.378) (0.371) (0.371) (0.473) (0.373) (0.372) (0.376) 
Observations 6,082 6,082 6,082 6,082 6,082 6,082 6,082 6,082 6,082 
Country-years of democide 2,104 2,104 2,104 2,104 2,104 2,104 2,104 2,104 2,104 
Standard errors shown in parentheses. Significance by asterisk: *p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
17
 Model 6 would not converge with the variable for intrastate war among the inflated variables, and was 
therefore removed. I tested the effect of removing this variable from the other models as well, and the absence of 
the variable did not have any effect on the results, and it is therefore unlikely that the removal of the removal of 
the intrastate war variable has any effect on model six. None of the models would converge with the Polity2 
variable included. 
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The continued effect of interstate war is not surprising if we remember Figure 5.5, where the 
total number of democide during World War II was very high. And, as we can see in Tables 
1-4 in Appendix B, even when World War II is excluded, interstate war still remains just as 
significant. The exclusion of World War II has practically no effect on the results for any of 
the models in all of the analyses. What happens in the neighbouring states seems to affect the 
state itself, suggesting that violent methods that are used abroad are more likely to be 
imported and used domestically. 
 While, in the first model, the polity2 variable is significant, I was interested in seeing 
if the variable capturing inclusion of the democide in neighbouring states had any effect on 
the polity2 significance. The reason for this is that autocratic states, as well as democratic 
states, are spatially clustered, and for this reason the neighbouring variable could perhaps 
catch whether the less violent inclination for democracies is due to some unmeasured fact in 
democratic clusters or, if the effect of democracy persists, a genuine effect of democracy. As 
we can see in Model 2, the polity2 variable remains significant at a 0.01 level which means 
that the government effects on democide are not affected by what is happening in 
neighbouring states. In Model 3, the polity2 variable is replaced by one dummy for autocracy, 
and one for democracy; as we can see from the results, autocratic regimes are more violent 
than the mixed regimes, while democracies are less deadly, with significance values of 0.01, 
and 0.05 respectively. Re-introducing the neighbour variable in Model 4, the significant 
effects of autocracy and democracy have now diminished to the 0.05 and 0.1 level. Just as in 
the previous model, democide in neighbouring states is positively correlated and significant at 
the 0.01 level. This suggests that there is an effect in democracies that reduces the risk of 
democide, but also that there seems to be some kind of clustering effect. In Model 5, 
interaction terms with type of government and democide in neighbouring states are included, 
and the effect for democracy, autocracy, and democide in neighbouring states is no longer 
significant, and only the interaction term with autocracy and neighbouring democide is 
positively correlated. Albeit only at a 0.1 level, it still suggests that violence against civilians 
is more likely to spread across borders into an autocratic regime than other types of 
government. In the sixth model, we see that the interaction term with autocracy and interstate 
war is slightly significant at the 0.1 level, hinting that autocracies are more violent than mixed 
regimes. For the seventh model, neither of the two new interaction terms is significant. 
Neither of the last two models, which include the interaction terms with neighbours and those 
with wars, yields any significant results. Based on these results, we can conclude that the type 
of government is significant in understanding democide, with democracies being less violent 
44 
 
than other types of regime in accordance with Hypothesis 1a. The only disturbance to this 
result is the variable showing democide in neighbouring states. Whether the clustering of 
government types or another clustering such as economic development is the real explanation 
I cannot say. Nevertheless, some of the effect that can be uniquely attributed to regime type 
remains, thus there is a genuine effect of regime type on democide severity accounting for the 
spill-over effects from neighbouring countries.  
 Looking at the inflated variables, we do not find any unexpected results. We see, for 
example, that the number of years since the last occurrence of democide increases the 
possibility of having no democide, whereas an intrastate conflict decreases this possibility for 
all of the models. An interstate conflict also point in the same direction as intrastate wars, but 
is only significant at the 0.1 level, and only for four of the models.  
 
7.2 Determinants of regime democide 
The models used in this analysis include the same independent variables as with the total 
democide regression. In addition, I add two variables for ethnicity, which could not be used in 
the total democide analysis as it includes foreign democide, and it is unlikely (although not 
impossible) that a state’s composition of ethnic groups is a strong determinant for democide 
in a foreign state. It could be discussed whether the variable for interstate war should be 
included or not, as this is an analysis which focuses on the democide within one country. 
However, there may be situations where a state uses the chaotic situation of a war to rid itself 
of perceived internal threats, not unlike the German persecution of Jews during the Second 
World War. Or – more likely – a state may focus more on their external enemy during an 
interstate war, and therefore kill fewer of its own enemies. The results of the regression can be 
seen in Table 7.2. 
Like the models for total democide, population has a positive impact on democide, 
and its significance can be explained in the same fashioned as was done for total democide. 
As was noted in chapter four, low income countries are more often involved in civil wars 
(Fearon & Laitin 2003: 76; Hegre & Sambanis 2006: 524), and the results in the analyses 
above show that development has an effect on democide as well. In all the models we see a 
significant and negative effect of development, at a 0.05 level, implying that regime 
democides are more deadly in poorer countries. This result is in accordance with Poe, Tate 
and Keith’s (1999: 306) findings that economically developed states are less likely to repress 
their subjects, supporting the second hypothesis, and going against Harff’s (2003: 70) findings 
45 
 
that once internal wars and regime changes have begun, economic development makes no 
difference.  
Table 7.2 Regime democide 
  Model 10 Model 11 Model 12 Model 13 Model 14 Model 15 Model 16 Model 17 Model 18 
                
  ln(Population) 0.954*** 0.628*** 1.001*** 0.629*** 0.603*** 0.616*** 0.651*** 0.618*** 0.629*** 
 
(0.161) (0.139) (0.16) (0.135) (0.131) (0.141) (0.132) (0.14) (0.13) 
ln(PEC/capita) -0.256** -0.249** -0.278** -0.255** -0.229** -0.255** -0.255** -0.225** -0.227** 
 
(0.112) (0.112) (0.111) (0.108) (0.103) (0.106) (0.106) (0.105) (0.101) 
Democide in neighb. states 0.557*** 
 
0.570*** 0.621** 0.592*** 0.539*** 0.584* 0.537* 
  
(0.099) 
 
(0.099) (0.3) (0.101) (0.095) (0.341) (0.279) 
Years since last democide -0.025*** -0.023** -0.036*** -0.031*** -0.032*** -0.031*** -0.030*** -0.036*** -0.034*** 
 
(0.009) (0.009) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.013) (0.013) 
Intrastate war 1.076*** 1.356*** 0.933*** 1.237*** 1.438*** 1.284 1.199*** 1.672* 1.666*** 
 
(0.303) (0.289) (0.298) (0.253) (0.27) (0.816) (0.25) (0.919) (0.287) 
Interstate war 0.856* 0.573 0.722 0.479 0.406 0.454 -2.905*** 0.448 -2.552*** 
 
(0.489) (0.445) (0.457) (0.406) (0.402) (0.405) (0.922) (0.408) (0.938) 
Autocracy 
  
2.132*** 1.960*** 1.915** 1.930*** 1.735*** 1.864** 1.622** 
   
(0.533) (0.485) (0.764) (0.592) (0.453) (0.787) (0.73) 
Democracy 
  
-0.395 0.257 0.962 0.414 0.111 0.907 0.781 
   
(0.672) (0.597) (0.649) (0.608) (0.564) (0.644) (0.582) 
Ethnic fractionalization -0.608 -1.618** -0.317 -1.427** -1.398** -1.495** -1.457** -1.440** -1.509** 
 
(0.862) (0.713) (0.863) (0.708) (0.669) (0.728) (0.711) (0.685) (0.671) 
Size of 2nd largest ethnic group -0.753 0.793 -1.257 0.701 1.53 0.83 0.55 1.594 1.498 
 
(1.831) (1.832) (1.867 (1.811) (1.723) (1.827) (1.811) (1.773) (1.749) 
Autocracy*interstate war 
     
3.819*** 
 
0.129 
       
(1.003) 
 
(0.294) 
Autocracy*intrastate war 
    
0.12 
 
-0.027 
 
      
(0.879) 
 
(0.942) 
 Democracy*interstate war 
    
2.500* 
 
3.450*** 
       
(1.368) 
 
(1.028) 
Democracy*intrastate war 
   
-0.858 
 
0.296 
 
      
(0.94) 
 
(1.121) 
 Autocracy*neighb. democide 
  
0.06 
  
0.108 1.932 
     
(0.315) 
  
(0.353) (1.278) 
Democracy*neighb. democide 
  
-0.672** 
  
-0.705** -0.633** 
     
(0.295) 
  
(0.352) (0.272) 
Polity2 -0.174*** -0.124*** 
         (0.046) (0.041)               
Constant -8.366*** -6.214*** -9.803*** -7.376*** -7.423*** -7.289*** -7.309*** -7.595*** -7.417*** 
  (1.549) (1.317) (1.586) (1.395) (1.488) (1.507) (1.368) (1.605) (1.517) 
Inflated variables 
        Years since last democide 0.247*** 0.243*** 0.238*** 0.236*** 0.234*** 0.236*** 0.239*** 0.177*** 0.181*** 
 
(0.046) (0.047) (0.047) (0.048) (0.049) (0.048) (0.048) (0.049) (0.048) 
Intrastate -30.1*** -31.9*** -35.8*** -32.0*** -28.2*** -29.1*** -37.5*** 
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(4.155) (4.433) (4.011) (4.176) (4.315) (4.196) (4.218) 
  Polity2 0.005 0.009 0.016 0.013 0.01 0.02 0.017 -0.007 0.001 
  (0.069) (0.065) (0.065) (0.065) (0.066) (0.066) (0.062) (0.084) (0.076) 
Observations 6,032 6,032 6,032 6,032 6,032 6,032 6,032 6,032 6,032 
Country-years of democide 1,764 1,764 1,764 1,764 1,764 1,764 1,764 1,764 1,764 
Standard errors shown in parentheses. Significance by asterisk: *p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01 
                                                 
18
 The intrastate variable was removed among the inflated variables for models 17 and 18 because the models 
would not converge with them. I tested the effect of removing the variable for Model 10 through 16, and no 
effect could be seen, and there should not be any problems involved by excluding the variable in the two models. 
46 
 
 
 
Humphreys and Weinstein’s (2006: 429) comment that civilians bear a significant toll 
in civil wars would make us expect that civil wars should also be a significant factor in 
explaining democides. Just like the total democide analysis, the intrastate war variable is 
correlated with more democide. Considering what was mentioned earlier about regime 
democide being, by far, the most deadly of the democides, such parallel results are not 
surprising since the two variables will be similar in terms of number of deaths.  
As for interstate wars, its significance is only slightly positive until Model 17 and 18 
where the interaction terms are included. The results of the those two models might suggest 
that interstate wars have a pacifying effect for democracies and mixed regimes, while 
autocracies are more likely to use interstate wars for “cleaning up” at home. However, 
recognizing that the difference between autocracies and democracies might not be so big, as 
the democracy interaction term is slightly significant in model sixteen. It could be that states 
use the guise of war to rid itself of potential or present enemies while its population is busy 
focusing on the external threat. One could believe that this is an effect that should be seen in 
mixed regimes as well, as the instability of these regimes make them more vulnerable when at 
war and have fewer resources to allocate towards internal threats. However, one explanation 
why mixed regimes are not killing their own civilians during interstate wars could be that the 
already limited resources forge solidarity against the foreign threat, rallying the people around 
the flag. 
Democide in neighbouring states acts the same way in the analyses for regime 
democide as it did for total, with a positive significance at 0.01 levels for the models where it 
the interaction terms between government type and neighbouring democide are not included, 
in which it shows to be slightly significant at a 0.05 and 0.1 level. This destabilizing effect 
from having democide in neighbouring countries does not seem to be as strong in 
democracies as it does for autocracies and semi-democracies, as we can see from Model 18.  
Just like for total democide, polity2 is significant at the 0.01 level for both models 
where it is included, suggesting that the proponents for democracies being more peaceful 
(Rummel 1995; Harff 2003;Valentino et. al 2003) are correct. However, when we split the 
polity2 variable, we find that the autocracy variable is significant at a 0.01 level for Models 
12, 13, 15 and 16, and at a 0.1 level in Models 14, 17 and 18, and that democracy is only 
significant at a 0.1 level in the models where the interaction terms where government and 
neighbouring democide is included. Democracies are therefore not necessarily more peaceful, 
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but the difference is that autocracies are more violent than mixed and democratic regimes. 
This does, however, not necessarily rule out Rummel (1995), whose main argument is that 
unrestricted power is the main culprit. 
The interstate variable shows a strong correlation for the models where the interaction 
terms with government and interstate wars are included, and then in a negative fashion. As we 
can see from Models 15 and 18, autocracies are more violent than semi-democracies with a 
significance at the 0.01 level, whereas democracies in interstate wars only show a slight 
tendency in Model 16, implying that interstate wars have a pacifying effect on regime 
democide, but less so for autocracies. The prediction of the interaction, as seen in Figure 7.1, 
shows that interstate wars do not seem have a pacifying effect on autocracies. Thus there is 
clearly a differential effect of wars conditional on regime type 
 
Figure 7.1 Interaction term between autocracy and interstate war in Model 16 
 
A: Interstate at 10
th
 and Autocracy at 10
th
 percentile; B: Interstate at 90
th
 and Autocracy at 10
th
 percentile; 
C: Interstate at 10
th
 and Autocracy at 90
th
 percentile; D: Interstate at 90
th
 and Autocracy at 90
th
 percentile. 
As both these variables are dummies, 10
th
 percentile represents 0, and 90
th
 percentile represents 1. 
 
While the size of the second largest group does not have any effect on regime 
democide, the ethnic fragmentation yields the same results as Krain (1997) – that ethnically 
dominated regimes are more violent against its civilians than fragmented states. This is in 
accordance with the third hypothesis. One explanation could be that the leadership of an 
ethnically fragmented state could not easily target one ethnic group, as it might spark fear in 
the other ethnic groups. In a state with a dominant ethnicity, on the other hand, the leaders 
would not worry a significant portion of the population were it to kill civilians of a minor 
ethnicity. Lastly, the results from the models support Smith (2009) and Harff’s (2003) results 
that killing civilians in the past could trigger democide in the future. 
 When it comes to the inflated variables, we find similar results as we did in the count 
model with a pacifying effect of years since last democide, and an increased risk of any 
democide during intrastate wars. Polity2, on the other hand, is not significant for any of the 
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models, which indicates that, while type of government matters for the severity of democide, 
it does not affect whether or not a democide happens in the first place. 
  
7.3 Determinants of non-state democide 
The analyses for non-state democide contain the same variables as the regime democide, 
except for the interstate variables which has been removed. Since the actor is not a state, and 
most likely the least powerful party in an internal dispute, one would presume that the factors 
deciding the extent of democide should deviate from the other analyses. And as seen from the 
results in Table 7.3, this holds true. 
 The first thing we see that is different from the previous models is that population is 
no longer a significant factor, and it seems like the explanation used for total and regime 
democide that the more people in a state, the more potential victims, does not hold for non-
state democide. A possible explanation for this will be examined a little later.  
Just like for regime democide, the level development has a negative effect. However, 
the correlation is weak, and only at the 0.1 level for all models, except Model 22, where it is 
at the 0.05 level. As seen in previous models, the number of years since the last democide is 
negatively correlated with democide, supporting Harff (2003) and Smith (2009), suggesting 
that groups keep the same strategies that have been successful in the past, or retaliate against 
actions taken against them earlier. No effect of regime could also mean that democratic states 
are less able to deter groups from using violence. 
Intrastate war is also a significant factor in non-state democide. I shall not speculate 
whether it is the non-state group or the regime that starts the killing of civilians first, but it is 
not unreasonable to think that the significant result of intrastate war in regime and non-state 
democide are linked together, as actions done by one group are likely to trigger a similar 
retaliatory response from the other party, for instance via a spiral of insecurity as was seen in 
the civil wars in former Yugoslavia (Kaufman 2001: 9ff). This effect vanishes, however, with 
the introduction of the interaction terms.  
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Table 7.3 Non-state democide 
  Model 19 Model 20 Model 21 Model 22 Model 23 
            
ln(Population) 0.159 0.151 0.149 0.152 0.150 
 
(0.196) (0.196) (0.195) (0.193) (0.191) 
ln(PEC/capita) -0.192* -0.195* -0.185* -0.198** -0.180* 
 
(0.099) (0.099) (0.096) (0.098) (0.094) 
Democide in neighb. states 0.187 0.190 0.798** 0.200 1.041*** 
 
(0.200) (0.200) (0.319) (0.203) (0.323) 
Years since last democide -0.091*** -0.091*** -0.092*** -0.091*** -0.092*** 
 
(0.028) (0.028) (0.029) (0.027) (0.028) 
Intrastate war 3.291*** 3.247*** 3.177*** 2.810** 1.370 
 
(0.322) (0.327) (0.329) (1.096) (0.850) 
Autocracy 
 
0.712 2.063** 0.574 2.108** 
  
(0.565) (0.984) (0.545) (0.926) 
Democracy 
 
0.394 0.844 0.401 1.037 
  
(0.587) (1.059) (0.591) (1.048) 
Ethnic fractionalization -1.320 -1.216 -1.236 -1.134 -1.099 
 
(0.883) (0.926) (0.909) (0.908) (0.886) 
Size of 2nd largest ethnic group 5.536*** 5.400*** 5.572*** 5.293** 5.403** 
 
(2.022) (2.041) (2.135) (2.066) (2.114) 
Autocracy*neighb. democide 
  
-0.785** 
 
-1.040*** 
   
(0.362) 
 
(0.373) 
Democracy*neighb. democide 
  
-0.179 
 
-0.446 
   
(0.387) 
 
(0.454) 
Polity2 -0.016 
    
 
(0.040) 
    
Autocracy*intrastate war 
   
0.603 2.025** 
    
(1.106) (0.823) 
Democracy*intrastate war 
   
-0.024 1.501 
        (1.350) (1.173) 
Constant -4.989** -5.472*** -0.179 -5.421*** -0.446 
  (2.092) (2.044) (0.387) (2.022) (0.454) 
Inflated variables 
     
Years since last democide 0.015 0.017 0.018 0.015 0.017 
 
(0.019) (0.017) (0.018) (0.017) (0.017) 
Intrastate -1.911 -8.764 -5.489 -5.576 -6.642 
 
(4.414) (10.349) (15.604) (5.531) (4.988) 
Polity2 -0.283 -0.292 -0.290 -0.213 -0.275 
  (0.186) (0.183) (0.349) (0.344) (0.222) 
Observations 6,032 6,032 6,032 6,032 6,032 
Country-years of democide 381 381 381 381 381 
Standard errors shown in parentheses. Significance by asterisk: *p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01 
 
Democide in neighbouring states only becomes significant when the interaction terms 
are included. What is interesting is that the interaction term with autocracy and neighbouring 
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democide seems to have a significant negative effect on democide, whereas no such effect can 
be found for the similar interaction with democracy. However, looking at the coefficients, we 
see that the interaction term with autocracy and neighbouring democide is practically the 
same as it is with neighbouring democide, and instead strengthens the autocracy variable, 
making it significant. This suggests that democracies both experience negative effects from 
having neighbours who perform democide, while autocracies seem unaffected by the 
proximity to democide. However, while the autocracy and neighbouring democide interaction 
is fine, we see in Figure 7.2 that the interaction with democracy is dominated by the effects of 
neighbouring democides. 
 
Figure 7.2 Interaction between democracy and neighbouring democide in Model 21 
 
A: Neighbouring democide at 10
th
 and Democracy at 10
th
 percentile; B: Neighbouring democide at 90
th
 and 
Democracy at 10
th
 percentile; C: Neighbouring democide at 10
th
 and Democracy at 90
th
 percentile; D: 
Neighbouring democide at 90
th
 and Democracy at 90
th
 percentile. As the democracy variable is a dummy, the 
10
th
 percentile represents 0, and 90
th
 percentile represents 1. 
 
Looking at the ethnic variables, we see that the results are quite different from those 
seen in regime democide. While the ethnic fractionalization variable is insignificant for all the 
models, the size of the second largest ethnic group is positively correlated for all five of the 
models at a 0.01 level for the first two, and a 0.05 level for the remaining two. This is 
somewhat opposed to Ellingsen (2000: 242) , who found no connection between ethnic 
polarization and the incidence and onset of civil war. The results are more similar to 
Montalvo and Reynal-Querol’s (2005: 812) findings that polarization is significant in 
explaining incidence of civil war. While these results have been on the onset and incidence of 
civil war, Esteban and Ray’s (2008: 180) analyses might transfer better to my own analyses, 
as they have included the severity of conflict in addition to the occurrence. They find in their 
analysis that while ethnically polarized states do not experience more conflicts, the conflicts 
they do engage in are more severe than societies that are not ethnically polarized. One might 
assume that the larger the size second ethnic group, the more favorable its military capability 
relative to the dominant group. However, the lack of significance on this variable on regime 
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democide does not support this assumptionFigure 7.3 shows that the number of people killed 
in states where the second largest group is a significant share of the population rises 
exponentially with its relative size to the largest group in the state.  
 
Figure 7.3 Estimated number of people killed on 10th, 50th and 90th percentile of the 
size of the second largest ethnic group in Model 23 
 
These numbers are estimated when all other variables in the models are set at their mean. Numbers indicate 
estimated kill count for the different percentiles of the size of the second largest ethnic group variable. The 
numbers here are numbers for the count-model, that is the observations that do not have 0 on democide. 
 
In a conflict between two parties, one could assume that the threat to the biggest group would 
also increase exponentially with its relative size to the opposing group, giving credence to a 
relative capability effect with ethnicities and democide. If this interpretation is correct, it may 
also help understand the lack of significance of population, since the non-state democide 
depends more on capacity of the non-state group than the population. It should, for example, 
be easier for an ethnic group of 500,000 in a state of 1,000,000 to wage war against the state, 
than it is for an ethnic group of 500,000 in a state of 10,000,000, since, in the latter example, 
the state should have better capabilities of defending itself and its population. An example of 
this is found in Cunningham, Gleditsch and Salehyan (2009: 592), who find that strong rebel 
groups are more likely to wage war effectively against the government. Thus, the population 
of a state and the potential victims a non-state group have, does not necessarily affect the 
number of people it will kill.  
 As we can see from the inflated variables, there are no significant factors in any of the 
models. This is interesting, as it would suggest that democracies and semi-democracies are 
just as likely to experience non-state democide as autocracies, but when it first happens, 
autocracies are more violent (as we could see in the count model). Intrastate wars do not seem 
to affect the occurrence of democide, only its severity.  
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7.4 Determinants of foreign democide 
The dynamics of foreign democide are likely to be quite different from regime and non-state 
democide. For instance, the killing of another state’s population is an act of war, and one 
would believe that a prerequisite for this type of democide is exactly that – the presence of an 
interstate war. Likewise, there are several variables used in the previous analyses that make 
little sense, including the following models, such as the variables for ethnicity. Gartzke and 
Gleditsch (2006) find that two states that have similar cultural ties are more prone to 
experience civil conflict, especially if a cultural group is politically dominant in one state, but 
a minority in the other. Ellingsen (2000: 242), on the other hand does not find any correlation 
between ethnic ties to a neighbouring state and the incidence of civil war or armed conflict. I 
have not examined the possibility of such a relationship when it comes to democide. While I 
do recognize that ethnic ties may be correlated with foreign democide, I chose not to include 
that variable in my dataset. Using the two ethnic variables that have been used earlier would 
simply not suffice, as it does not say anything about the possible cultural ties with another 
state. Similarly, while I do acknowledge that there may be situations where a rebel group 
seeks shelter and may be supported by people in a neighbouring state, I  doubt that an 
intrastate war should be an important factor in understanding foreign democide in general. I 
ran some analyses with the intrastate variable included. These showed no significant 
correlation between intrastate wars and foreign democide. Based on this, I have chosen to 
exclude this variable as well. Therefore, in Table 7.4 the models for foreign democide are 
smaller than all of the previous models. 
As we can see from Table 7.4, the population variable is significant as it was for 
regime democide, albeit at 0.1 significance in Models 24 and 26, and 0.05 in Model 25. It is 
not unreasonable to believe that highly populated states will fight bigger wars than lesser 
populated ones. If population is a measurement of power, it is more likely that the higher 
populated country fight within the smaller opponent’s borders, thus giving them the 
opportunity to target the less populated state’s civilians. 
The number of years since the last democide is, unlike the 23 previous models, not 
significant. The lack of significance of the years since the last democide variable can be 
explained by the fact that foreign democide will mostly happen during interstate wars, and the 
occurrence of war with foreign states is not connected with when a state last performed 
democide, and are also quite rare.  
 
53 
 
Table 7.4 Foreign democide 
  Model 24 Model 25 Model 26 
        
ln(Population) 0.655* 0.730** 0.680* 
 
(0.373) (0.353) (0.373) 
ln(PEC/capita) 0.486** 0.497** 0.526** 
 
(0.214) (0.208) (0.217) 
Years since last democide -0.006 -0.032 -0.026 
 
(0.045) (0.042) (0.044) 
Interstate war 2.405*** 2.426*** 4.857* 
 
(0.697) (0.671) (2.897) 
Autocracy 
 
0.549 0.697 
  
(0.672) (0.805) 
Democracy 
 
-1.724*** -1.461** 
  
(0.611) (0.641) 
Autocracy*interstate war 
  
-0.447 
   
(1.212) 
Democracy*interstate war 
  
-1.353 
   
(1.054) 
Polity2 -0.144** 
  
 
(0.056) 
  
Constant -5.622 -6.176 -5.848 
  (3.822) (3.836) (3.998) 
Inflated variables 
   
Years since last democide 0.232*** 0.218*** 0.222*** 
 
(0.066) (0.069) (0.071) 
Interstate -2.932*** -2.932*** -2.863*** 
 
(1.047) (1.048) (1.047) 
Polity2 -0.170*** -0.161*** -0.160*** 
  (0.063) (0.060) (0.061) 
Observations 6,082 6,082 6,082 
Country-years of democide 491 491 491 
Standard errors shown in parentheses. Significance by asterisk: *p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01 
 
As in all the models for the other types of democide, we see that the development 
variable is also significant for foreign democide. However, the direction has changed, and it 
now seems like a well-developed state increases the number of persons killed in foreign 
democide. It, therefore, demonstrates the necessity of disaggregating between different forms 
of democide. This change of direction would help explain why the development variable was 
not significant in the models for total democide, as it is negative and significant for regime 
democide. The relative capabilities argument used on population can also be used on the 
positive significance for development, if we believe that economically well developed nations 
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have better military equipment, and are better suited for winning the wars they fight, and 
therefore fight outside their own borders. 
Not very surprisingly, the interstate war variable is significant for the first two models 
at a 0.01 level, and at a 0.1 level for Model 26, where interaction terms with 
democracy/autocracy and interstate war are introduced – neither of which are significant.  
Just as the polity2 variable in Model 24, the democracy variable is negatively 
correlated with democide in the last two models. While democracies seem to perform less 
foreign democide than autocracies and semi-democracies, there does not seem to be a 
difference between them in the interaction terms, thus confirming Hypothesis 1b. It should be 
noted that most of the effect of the interaction terms are driven mostly by the interstate 
variable, as can be seen in Figure 7.4 and Figure 7.5. 
 
Figure 7.4 Interaction between interstate wars and democracy in Model 26 
 
A: Interstate at 10
th
 and Democracy at 10
th
 percentile; B: Interstate at 90
th
 and Democracy at 10
th
 percentile; 
C: Interstate at 10
th
 and Democracy at 90
th
 percentile; D: Interstate at 90
th
 and Democracy at 90
th
 percentile. 
As both these variables are dummies, 10
th
 percentile represents 0, and 90
th
 percentile represents 1. 
 
Figure 7.5 Interaction between interstate wars and autocracy in Model 26 
 
A: Interstate at 10
th
 and Autocracy at 10
th
 percentile; B: Interstate at 90
th
 and Autocracy at 10
th
 percentile; 
C: Interstate at 10
th
 and Autocracy at 90
th
 percentile; D: Interstate at 90
th
 and Autocracy at 90
th
 percentile. 
As both these variables are dummies, 10
th
 percentile represents 0, and 90
th
 percentile represents 1. 
 
 The inflated variables yield interesting results. Not surprisingly, interstate war 
increases the risk of any democide (negatively linked to observing no democide), but unlike 
the results from the intensity of democide, the number of years since the last democide is now 
significant. It would seem that the number of years since the last democide does not have any 
impact on the intensity of foreign democide in the count model. But it does have an impact on 
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whether foreign democide will happen in the first place, as we can see from the significance 
of years since last democide in the inflated models. The polity2 variable is, unlike regime and 
non-state democide, a significant factor, but in a negative fashion - the more democratic a 
state becomes, the likelihood of seeing a democide increases
19
. However, combined with what 
we saw above where democracies were less deadly than their semi-democratic and autocratic 
counterparts, it can seem as if democracies perform  foreign democide more frequently, but 
they are less deadly when they do. 
 Table 7.5 below shows a summary of the results in relation to the hypotheses. 
 
Table 7.5 Summary of results 
Hypotheses Total Regime Non-state Foreign 
1a: Democracies are in 
general less democidal 
than other types of 
government 
Yes, a weak 
correlation 
No, less democidal 
than autocracies, 
but same as mixed 
regimes No Yes 
1b: Democracies are as 
violent as non-
democracies in wars Yes 
Yes for intrastate 
wars, no for 
interstate wars No Yes 
2: Less developed 
countries commit more 
democide than 
developed countries No Yes 
Yes, a weak 
correlation No, the opposite 
3: Ethnically 
homogenous states are 
more democidal N/A Yes No N/A 
 
7.5 Discussion 
conomic development is not significant in the models for total democide due to the 
discrepancy of the results for regime and foreign democide. Thus, it is obvious that the whole 
should be viewed differently than just as the sum of its parts. 
We cannot conclude that economically developed states kill fewer civilians than others. They 
do, however, kill fewer of their own citizens, and more of other nations’ civilians.Tthe 
development variable had a negative sign in regime and non-state democide, but a positive 
sign in foreign democide; the latter may say something about the state’s capacity in interstate 
wars. 
 As for population, governments in large countries are responsible for killing more 
civilians than governments in less populated countries. This is most likely because larger 
states are more likely to have more enemies at home, creating a larger regime democide, as 
well as engaging in bigger wars abroad/fighting on another state’s turf. However, the severity 
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 Since the inflate-model, as mentioned earlier, measures the likelihood of seeing a zero (that is no democide), a 
negative value on the polity2 variable means a higher chance of democide the more democratic a state is. 
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of non-state democides is not affected by a country’s population. This is probably because it 
is more a question of the non-state group’s capabilities to perform large scale democides than 
it is about the total population of the state. Population in itself would therefore not be the 
determining factor, but it is more about the opportunity to perform democide, and not only for 
non-state democide, but also for regime and foreign democide. 
 Looking at the three types of democide together, we saw that autocracies are 
significantly more violent than semi-democracies for regime democide, while democracies 
did not differ significantly from hybrid regimes. However, when we looked at foreign 
democide, autocracies did not prove to be much different from semi-democracies, but 
democracies were significantly less violent. Non-state democide, on the other hand, did not 
show any difference between the three forms of government. Looking at the graphs in Figure 
7.6, we see the estimated deaths for each of the three types of government for each of the 
three forms of democide. 
 
Figure 7.6 The effect of regime type on the number of democide deaths for model 13, 20 
and 25. A = Autocracy, S-D = semi-democracy, D = Democracy
20
  
 
There seems to be a convex relationship between type of government and regime 
democide, with autocracies as the most violent type. However, while democracies’ democides 
were not significantly more violent than semi-democracies, they still seem to be more violent 
overall. While democracies are less violent than autocracies, the difference might not be 
significant. I did one analysis where I replaced semi-democracies with autocracies as the 
reference group with the dummies, and democracies were significantly (at a 0.05 level) less 
violent than autocracies. Even though non-state democide did not show any significant 
differences, we see that the tendency is a convex relationship also. The findings of a convex 
relationship between governments and internal democide, that is regime and non-state 
democide, is curious. This goes against the concave relationship seen in the onset of civil war, 
as well as democratic civil conflicts being less violent than semi-democratic and autocratic 
(Gleditsch, Hegre & Strand 2009: 181). However, as the middle graph shows, semi-
democracies and autocracies are significantly more violent than democracies in terms of 
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 These numbers are estimated when all other values in the models are set at their mean. Numbers indicate 
estimated kill count for the regime. 
57 
 
foreign democide, thus making democracies in the total model less violent than semi-
democracies as well. Moreover, these are all results from the count model which means that 
the estimates are on how violent the democides are in states that do experience democide. The 
type of government did, on the other hand, not affect the chance of having a democide in the 
first place for regime and non-state democide, while foreign democides are more likely to 
happen the more democratic a state is. This is a strange finding, but while it necessarily is 
controversial for democratic leaders to kill civilians, it would be easier to hide democide in 
another state, and necessarily easier for the government to get away with democide against 
one’s enemy than it would be with killing parts of their own electorate. 
Looking at the results from the three types of democide together, it is possible that 
relative capabilities are important in understanding democide. As we saw for regime 
democide, ethnic homogenous states had more violent regimes than fragmented states, while 
states with a large second ethnic group were more violent, and from foreign democide we saw 
that a large population and a good economic development were both positively correlated 
with foreign democide – both factors that should be an advantage in wars. However, with this 
reasoning, regimes with a large ethnic second group should be less violent since the regimes’ 
relative capabilities are worse than in homogenous societies. But it must be seen in connection 
with the non-state democide’s increased deadliness if the second group is large and the fact 
that a regime will most likely perceive them as a threat, murdering their civilians, or as a 
response to previous killings of its own civilians. This theory of relative capability goes 
against Wood (2010), who tests the effects of rebel capabilities on one-sided violence and 
finds the opposite of what I have theorized – namely that weaker insurgents are more violent 
against civilians, while strong groups perform comparatively less violence, but cause the 
regimes to increase their violence. A problem with Wood’s analyses is that he has employed 
the negative binomial regression where the zero-inflated negative binomial would be better 
suited, and yield different results
21
. Furthermore, his data only includes states that have seen 
one-sided violence, disregarding possible conflicts around the world where there are rebel 
groups, regardless of size, who do not kill civilians. This might have biased the results. 
Nevertheless, I cannot rule out that Wood’s results may be similar in this dataset, as the usage 
of ethnic fractionalization and the size of the second largest group are poor estimates of rebel 
capability. This is, in any case, worthwhile investigating further for example by using the 
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 I did a fit test on his models, and after finding ZINB to be the best method of analysis, I did a quick replication 
analysis of his models using ZINB instead of NBR. The results did not show a correlation between the rebel 
capability and the severity of the violence. 
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dataset of Cunningham, Gleditsch and Salehyan (2009) or a similar dataset that allows one to 
evaluate the comparative strength of non-state groups to that of the state. 
In Chapter 5, we saw that China, Russia and Germany by far dominated democide 
with a share of over 77 per cent of the total democidal deaths in the 1900-87 period. One 
could therefore assume that these three states affect the results in such a way that the results 
would be very different without them. However, analyses done without these three states
22
 
are, with a few exceptions, pretty consistent with the  the models that include them. The 
biggest difference is that the variable for ethnic fractionalization is no longer significant for 
regime democide. Apart from this, the differences are mostly significance values 
strengthening or weakening one level, such as the economic development effect on non-state 
democide, which is now significant at a 0.05 level instead of a 0.1 level, and the same variable 
going from 0.05 levels to 0.1 levels for foreign democide.  
Even though I used Rummel’s data, our results were slightly different. Where Rummel 
found a strong connection between democracies and the lack of democide, my results show a 
more nuanced picture, especially for regime democide where democracies are just as violent 
as semi-democracies. The conversion of the dataset into time-series format is one possible 
explanation, but the inclusion of other variables is probably a more decisive factor. On regime 
democide, the inclusion of a population variable seems to have a great effect on the regime 
variables, whereas for foreign democide the inclusion of population, development and 
interstate wars all have a strong effect the government variables. My results do, however, not 
necessarily say that Rummel was wrong when saying that “power kills, absolute power kills 
absolutely”, only that the effects of regime type by itself are not so strong as Rummel 
claimed. 
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 See Tables 5-8 in Appendix B. 
59 
 
8. Conclusions  
In previous studies, researchers have used different definitions of violence against civilians 
which has led to the generation of different datasets. With the exception of Krain (1997), they 
all focus on the onset or incidence of violence, but not at severity. Most analyses do not use a 
time-series approach, thus ignoring possible changes to, for example, government, during 
episodes of violence against civilians, as well as temporal dependence. The data for creating a 
time-series dataset that is not limited by the definition of violence against civilians has, 
however, been available since Rummel’s (1997) collection of data became accessible. With 
the exception of Wayman and Tago (2010) who used Rummel’s data to create a time-series 
dataset for the onset of democide for the years 1945-2000, Rummel’s data has lain dormant. 
Based on Rummel’s data, I have presented and analyzed a time-series dataset with three 
different measures of democide: regime; non-state; and foreign democide, as well as an 
aggregate measure. 
 My immediate objective was to determine whether or not democracies are less violent 
than other types of government, as well as testing the effects of economic development and 
the distribution of ethnic groups within a state. While democracies are less violent than 
otherregime types  in terms of  the total amount of democide committed by a state, the largest 
difference is that democracies perform far less foreign democide than semi-democracies and 
autocracies.,However, they experience slightly more democide than semi-democracies, but 
this difference is not significant. Both are significantly less violent than autocracies. In terms 
of democide in wars, the role of democracy is not easily determined. The interaction terms 
showed democracies to be as violent as the other two for many of the models, and 
democracies were only less violent than autocracies when analyzing the effect of interstate 
wars on regime democide. However, the interaction terms did, in most cases, seem to be 
dominated by the war variables, and not showing a real interaction effect. The hypothesis 
focusing on the economic development of a country, specifically well-developed states being 
less violent, proved to be correct for regime democide, but surprisingly, the opposite was true 
for foreign democide. As hypothesized, the ethnic distribution in a state was significant in that 
ethnically homogenous states experience more regime democide than ethnically fragmented 
ones. While there was no such effect for non-state democide, an increased size of the second 
largest ethnic group increases the estimated democide as well. The results also showed that 
while analysing democide, one should not only look at the number of people killed, but also 
the context – whether it was perpetrated by a regime or a non-state groups and whether or not 
it was committed against foreign civilians. 
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If one were to build on this, I would suggest two different ways of improving the 
results – by developing the dataset further, and by looking at other possible factors. There are 
two obvious ways to improve the dataset and one not so apparent. First, the democides with 
very long intervals(cf. Figure 5.3) should be examined further.  The interval should preferably 
be shortened, thus improving the precision of the results. An estimate for democides measured 
over forty years will miss every peak and valley, and may skew the results. Secondly, 
democide taking place after 1987 should be added, as there might be differences in the 
dynamics of democide after the end of the Cold War. Finally, as the earlier analyses have 
shown that distinguishing different types of democide will yield different results, one should 
explore the possibility of dividing the types of democide further. One possibility would be to 
divide democide into the types of explanations shown in Table 3.1. This would not be too 
different from what Harff and Gurr (1988: 368) did when they split genocides into 
Hegemonial and Xenophobic, and politicides into repressive, repressive/hegemonial, 
retributive and revolutionary. Valentino (2004: 70ff)  also used motives when dividing mass 
killings into different categories. This division lets you see different results from ideological 
democide  and  one based on  retribution However, deciding what motivates the different 
democide would require a lot of the person coding the data Since the motives in Table 3.1 are 
not mutually exclusive and can be coloured by the coder, it may not even be possible to do in 
a satisfactory manner.  
 Apart from changes in the dataset, future research could explore what mechanisms in 
democracies make them less likely to experience some forms of democide, whether it is 
public participation in elections, freedom of speech, institutional checks, or legal ways of 
showing dissent and opposing the government. With the current measures, we automatically 
assume that it is a combination of all these factors, while there may be the off chance that the 
main reason for the lack of democide in democracies is centered around one factor in 
particular. If it were to be one mechanism that is a lot more important than all the others, it is 
possible that the same mechanism could, explain why not all of the non-democracies are 
violent. 
Another topic for  future research is to measure the relative capabilities of the actors 
performing democide and their enemies. At what point (if there is one) does the threat of the 
opposing group become so imminent that the leaders turn to democide in order to protect their 
interests. If relative capability is an explanatory factor, it might help to explain why 
population did not have a significant effect on non-state democide. 
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Furthermore, the possibility of a contagion effect merits further investigation, as this 
was a significant factor in regime democide. For instance one could consider a division of the 
neighbouring democide variable, as this variable was very strong factor on regime democide. 
It could be that leaders see that neighbour regimes have success with democide, and decide to 
follow this strategy to their opposition. Or perhaps non-state democides in neighbouring states 
cause regimes to perform democide. For example, if rebel groups in state A are becoming a 
serious threat to the regime, and the leaders of state B engage in a pre-emptive strike, this will 
send a message about what will happen if rebel groups within its own borders attempt to copy 
their neighbours. 
 While violence against civilians may not be as common in the 21
st
 century as it was in 
the 20
th
 century, it remains an important topic for research. It is essential to understand why 
there is less democide today than it was fifty years ago as this information will help prevent 
future democide. I feel this thesis is a step in that direction, but I acknowledge that there is 
still a long way to go. 
  
62 
 
9. References 
Anderton, Charles H. (2010): “Choosing Genocide: Economic Perspectives on the Disturbing  
Rationality of Race Murder”, Defence and Peace Economics, 21(5): 459-486 
Balcells, Laia (2010): “Rivalry and Revenge: Violence against Civilians in Conventional Civil  
Wars”, International Studies Quarterly, 54(2): 291-313 
Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce, James D. Morrow, Randolph M. Siverson & Alastair Smith  
(1999): “An Institutional Explanation of the Democratic Peace”, American  
Political Science Review, 93(4): 791-807 
Buhaug, Halvard, Lars-Erik Cederman & Jan Ketil Rød (2008): ”Disaggregating Ethno- 
Nationalist Civil Wars: A Dyadic Test of Exclusion Theory”, International Organization,  
63(3): 531-551 
Buhaug, Halvard & Scott Gates (2002): ”The Geography of Civil War”, Journal of Peace  
Research, 39 (4): 417-433 
Benoit, Kenneth (1996): “Democracies Really Are More Pacific (in General): Reexamining  
Regime Type and War Involvement”, Journal of Conflict Resolution, 40(4):  
636-657 
Cameron, A. Colin & Pravin K. Trivedi (1998) Regression Analysis of Count Data,  
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 
Chalk, Frank Robert & Kurt Jonassohn (1990): The History and Sociology of Genocide:  
Analyses and Case Studies, New Haven, CT: Yale University Press 
Collier, Paul & Dominic Rohner (2008): “Democracy, Development, and Conflict”, Journal  
of the European Economic Association, 6(2-3): 531-540 
Collier, Paul & Anke Hoeffler (2004): ”Greed and Grievance in Civil War” Oxford Economic  
Papers, 56 (4): 563-595 
Correlates of War (2010): “National Material Capabilities Data Documentation”, last accessed  
25.04.11 from  
http://www.correlatesofwar.org/COW2%20Data/Capabilities/NMC_Codebook_v4_0.
pdf. 
Correlates of War (2011): “COW Wars v. 4.0, 1816-2007”, last accessed 24.03.11 from  
http://www.correlatesofwar.org/. 
Cunningham, David E., Kristian Skrede Gleditsch & Idean Salehyan (2009): ”It Takes Two: A  
Dyadic Analysis of Civil War Duration and Outcome”, Journal of Conflict Resolution,  
53(4): 570-597 
DeRouen Jr, Karl R. & David Sobek (2004): ”The Dynamics of Civil War Duration and  
Outcome” Journal of Peace Research, 41 (3): 303-320 
Dikötter, Frank (2010): Mao’s Great Famine: The History of China’s Most Devastating  
Catastrophe, 1958-1962, New York: Walker 
Dixon, William J. (1994): “Democracy and the Peaceful Settlement of International Conflict”,  
American Political Science Review, 88(1): 14-32 
Downes, Alexander B. (2006): ”Desperate Times, Desperate Measures – The Causes of  
CivilianVictimization in War”, International Security, 30(4): 152-195 
Downes, Alexander B. (2007): ”Restraint or Propellant? Democracy and Civilian Fatalities in  
Interstate Wars”, Journal of Conflict Resolution, 51(6): 872-904 
Dulic, Tomislav (2004): “Tito’s Slaughterhouse: A Critical Analysis of Rummel’s Work on  
Democide”, Journal of Peace Research, 41(1): 85-102 
Dulic, Tomislav (2004): “A Reply to Rummel”, Journal of Peace Research, 41(1): 105-106 
Easterly, William, Roberta Gatti & Sergio Kurlat (2005): “Development, Democracy, and  
Mass Killings”, Journal of Economic Growth, 11: 129-156 
Eck, Kristine & Lisa Hultman (2007): “One-Sided Violence Against Civilians in War:  
Insights from New Fatality Data”, Journal of Peace Research, 44(2): 233-246 
Eckhardt, William (1989): “Civilian Deaths in Wartime”, Security Dialogue, 20(1): 89- 
63 
 
98 
Ellingsen, Tanja (2000): “Colorful Community or Ethnic Witches’ Brew? Multiethnicity and  
Domestic Conflict During and After the Cold War”, Journal of Conflict Resolution,  
44(2): 228-249 
Esteban, John & Debraj Ray (2008): “Polarization, Fractionalization and Conflict”, Journal of  
Peace Research, 45(2): 163-182 
Fearon, James D. & David Laitin (2003): ”Ethnicity, Insurgency and Civil War”, American  
Political Science Review, 97 (1): 75-90 
Fein, Helen (1995): “More Murder in the Middle: Life-Integrity Violations and Democracy in  
the World, 1987”, Human Rights Quarterly, 17(1): 170-191 
Gartner, Scott Sigmund & Patrick M. Regan (1996): “Threat and Repression: The Non-Linear  
Relationship Between Government and Opposition Violence”, Journal of Peace  
Research, 33(3): 273-287 
Gartner, Scott Sigmund & Gary M. Segura (1998): “War, Casualties, and Public  
Opinion”, Journal of Conflict Resolution, 42(3): 278-300 
Gartzke, Erik (1998): “Kant We All Just Get Along? Opportunity, Willingness, and the  
Origins of the Democratic Peace”, American Journal of Political Science, 42(1):  
1-27 
Gartzke, Erik & Kristian Skrede Gleditsch (2006): ”Identity and Conflict: Ties that Bind and  
Differences that Divide”, European Journal of International Relations, 12(1): 53-87 
Gellately, Robert & Ben Kiernan (2003): The Specter of Genocide – Mass Murder in  
Historical Perspective, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 
Gleditsch, Nils Petter, Håvard Hegre & Håvard Strand (2009): ”Democracy and Civil War”,  
in Manus I. Midlarsky, ed. Handbook of War Studies III, Ann Arbor MI: University of  
Michigan Press, 155-192 
Gleditsch, Nils Petter, Peter Wallensteen, Mikael Eriksson, Margareta Sollenberg & Håvard  
Strand (2002): ”Armed Conflict 1946-2001: A New Dataset”, Journal of Peace  
Research, 39(5): 615-637 
Goodin, James (2006): What’s Wrong With Terrorism? Cambridge: Polity 
Gross, Michael L. (2009): ”Asymmetric War, Symmetrical Intentions: Killing Civilians In  
Modern Armed Conflict”, Global Crime, 10(4): 320-336 
Hagtvet, Bernt (2008): Folkemordenes svarte bok [The Black Book of Genocide], Oslo:  
Universitetsforlaget 
Hamilton, Lawrence C. (1992): Regression With Statistics, Belmont CA: Duxbury  
Harbom, Lotta & Peter Wallensteen (2010): “Armed Conflict, 1946-2009”, Journal of Peace  
Research, 47(4): 501-509 
Harff, Barbara (2003): ”No Lessons learned from the Holocaust? Assessing Risks of  
Genocide and Political Mass Murder since 1955”, American Political Science Review,  
 97(1), 57-73 
Harff, Barbara (2009): “Recognizing Genocides and Politicides”, in Totten, Samuel and Paul  
R. Bartrop (ed.) Genocide Studies Reader, New York: Routledge 
Harff, Barbara & Ted Robert Gurr (1988): “Toward Empirical Theory of Genocides and  
Politicides: Identification and Measurement of Cases since 1945”, International  
Studies Quarterly, 32(3): 359-371 
Harvey, Andrew C. (1989): Forecasting Structural Time Series Models and the Kalman  
Filter, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 
Henderson, Conway W. (1991): “Conditions Affecting the Use of Political Repression”,  
Journal of Conflict Resolution, 35(1): 120-142 
Hegre, Håvard & Nicholas Sambanis (2006): “Sensitivity Analysis of Empirical Results on  
Civil War Onset”, Journal of Conflict Resolution, 50(4): 508-535 
64 
 
Hegre, Håvard, Tanja Ellingsen, Scott Gates & Nils Petter Gleditsch (2001): “Toward a  
Democratic Civil Peace? Democracy, Political Change, and Civil War, 1816-1992”,  
American Political Science Review, 95(1): 33-48 
Hilbe, Joseph M. (2007): Negative Binomial Regression, Cambridge: Cambridge University  
Press 
Hintjens, Helen M. (1999): “Explaining the 1994 Genocide in Rwanda”, The Journal of  
Modern African Studies, 37 (2): 241-286 
Humphreys, Macartan & Jeremy M. Weinstein (2006): “Handling and Manhandling Civilians  
in Civil War”, American Political Science Review, 100(3): 429-447 
Jones, Adam (2006): Genocide – A Comprehensive Introduction, London: Routledge 
Kalyvas, Stathis N. (1999): “Wanton and Senseless?: The Logic of Massacres in Algeria”,  
Rationality and Society, 11: 243-285 
Kaufman, Stuart J. (2001): Modern Hatreds: The Symbolic Politics of Ethnic War, Ithaca,  
NY, Cornell University Press 
Keller, Jonathan W. (2005): “Leadership Style, Regime Type, and Foreign Policy Crisis  
Behavior: A Contingent Monadic Peace”, International Studies Quarterly, 49:  
205-231 
Krain, Matthew (1997): “State-Sponsored Mass Murder: The Onset and Severity of  
Genocides and Politicides”, The Journal of Conflict Resolution, 41(3): 331-360 
Kreutz, Joakim & Kristine Eck (2005): “UCDP One-sided Violence Codebook” last accessed  
15.11.09 from  
http://www.pcr.uu.se/digitalAssets/15/15876_One- 
sided_violence_Dataset_Codebook.pdf 
Leeds, Brett Ashley & David R. Davis (1999): “Beneath the Surface: Regime Type and  
International Interaction, 1953-78”, Journal of Peace Research, 36(1): 5-21 
Long, J. Scott (1997): Regression Models for Categorical and Limited Dependent Variables,  
Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage 
Long, J. Scott & Jeremy Freese (2006): Regression Models for Categorical Dependent  
Variables Using STATA, College Station, Tx: Stata Press 
Lyall, Jason & Isaiah Wilson III (2009): “Explaining Outcomes in Counterinsurgency Wars”,  
International Organization, 63: 67-106 
Maddison, Angus (2011): “Statistics on World Population, GDP and Per Capita GDP, 1-2008  
AD”, last accessed 29.03.11 from http://www.ggdc.net/MADDISON/oriindex.htm 
Mann, Michael (1999): “The Dark Side of Democracy: The Modern Tradition of Ethnic and  
Political Cleansing”, New Left Review, 235: 18-45 
Mansfield, Edward D. & Jack Snyder (1995): “Democratization and War”, Foreign Affairs,  
 74(3): 79-97 
Marshall, Gurr & Jaggers (2009): “Polity IV Project. Political Regime Characteristics and  
Transitions, 1800-2009 – Dataset Users’ Manual”, last accessed 24.03.11 from  
http://www.systemicpeace.org/inscr/p4manualv2009.pdf 
Maoz, Zeev & Bruce Russett (1993): “Normative and Structural Causes of Democratic Peace,  
1946-1986”, American Political Science Review, 87(3); 624-638 
Montalvo, José G. & Marta Reynal-Querol (2005): “Ethnic Polarization, Potential Conflict,  
and Civil Wars”, American Economic Review, 95(3): 796-816 
Morgan, T. Clifton, & Sally Howard Campbell (1991): “Domestic Structure, Decisional  
Constraints and War: So Why Kant Democracies Fight?”, Journal of Conflict  
Resolution, 35(2): 187-211 
OHCHR (2010): Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights:  
“Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide”,  
last accessed 24.11.10 from http://www2.ohchr.org/english/law/genocide.htm 
65 
 
Oneal, John R., & Bruce M. Russett (1997): “The Classical Liberals Were Right: Democracy,  
Interdependence, and Conflict, 1950-1985”, International Studies Quarterly,  
41(2): 267-293 
Owen, John M. (1994): “How Liberalism Produces Democratic Peace”, International  
Security, 19(2): 87-125 
Poe, Steven C. & C. Neal Tate (1994): “Repression of Human Rights to Personal Integrity  
in the 1980s: a Global Analysis”, American Political Science Review, 88(4):  
853-872 
Poe, Steven C., C. Neal Tate, Linda Camp Keith (1999): ”Repression of the Human Right to  
Personal Integrity Revisited: A Global Cross-National Study Covering the Years  
1976-1993”, International Studies Quarterly, 43(2): 291-313 
Regan, Patrick M. & Errol A. Henderson (2002): “Threats and Political Repression in  
Developing Countries: Are Democracies Internally Less Violent?”, Third World  
Quarterly, 23(1): 119-136 
Reiter, Dan & Allan C. Stam III (1998): “Democracy, War Initiation, and Victory”, American  
Political Science Review, 92(2): 377-389 
Ringdal, Kristen (2001): Enhet og mangfold. samfunnsvitenskapelig forskning og kvantitativ  
metode [Unity and Variey: Social Science Research and Quantitative 
methods],Bergen: Fagbokforlaget 
Rousseau, David L., Christopher Gelpi, Dan Reiter & Paul K. Huth (1996): “Assessing the  
Dyadic Nature of the Democratic Peace, 1918-88”, American Political Science  
Review, 90(3): 512-533 
Rummel, R.J. (1992): Democide. Nazi Genocide and Mass Murder, New Brunswick, NJ:  
Transaction Publishers 
Rummel, R.J. (1994): Death by Government, New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers 
Rummel, R.J. (1995): “Democracy, Power, Genocide and Mass Murder”, Journal of Conflict  
Resolution, 39(1): 3-26 
Rummel, R.J. (1997a): Power Kills – Democracy as a Method of Nonviolence, London:  
Transaction Publishers 
Rummel, R.J. (1997b): Statistics of Democide: Genocide and Mass Murder Since 1900,  
Charlottesville, VA: Center for National Security Law, School of Law, University of  
Virginia 
Rummel, R.J. (2004): “One-Thirteenth of a Data Point Does Not a Generalization Make: A  
Response to Dulic”, Journal of Peace Research, 41(1): 103-104 
Rummel, R.J. (2005): Democratic Peace Blog, last accessed 15.09.11 from  
http://democraticpeace.wordpress.com/2008/11/24/reevaluating-chinas-democide-to-
73000000/ 
Savun, Burcu & Brian J. Phillips (2009): “Democracy, Foreign Policy, and Terrorism”,  
Journal of Conflict Resolution, 53(6): 878-904 
Sen, Amartya (1990): “Food and Famine”, in Francis X. Sutton (ed): A World to Make:  
Development in Perspective, 239-262, New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers 
Smith, Roger W. (2009): “Human Destructiveness and Politics: The Twentieth Century as an  
Age of Genocide”, in Totten, Samuel and Paul R. Bartrop (eds.) Genocide Studies  
Reader, New York: Routledge 
Stanton, G (2002): "Genocides, Politicides and Other Mass Murder Since 1945, with Stages in  
2002", www.genocidewatch.org 
Totten, Samuel & Paul R. Bartrop (2009): Genocide Studies Reader, New York:  
Routledge 
UCDP (2011): UCDP One-sided Violence Dataset v 1.3-2011, 1989-2010, last accessed  
24.10.11 
66 
 
UN (2011) Office of the Special Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide, last accessed  
25.04.11  
from http://www.un.org/en/preventgenocide/adviser/pdf/osapg_booklet_eng.pdf 
UNDP (2005): Human Development Report 2005, last accessed 25.04.11 from  
http://hdr.undp.org/en/media/HDR05_complete.pdf 
Valentino, Benjamin A. (2004): Final Solutions: Mass Killing and Genocide in the 20
th
  
Century, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press 
Valentino, Benjamin, Paul Huth og Dylan Balch-Lindsay (2004): “’Draining the Sea’: Mass  
Killing and Guerrilla Warfare”, International Organization, 58 (2): 375-407 
Valentino, Benjamin A., Paul K. Huth & Sarah Croco (2006): “Covenants without the Sword:  
International Law and the Protection of Civilians in Times of War”, World Politics, 
58(3): 339-377 
Valentino, Benjamin A., Paul K Huth & Sarah Croco (2010): “Bear Any Burden? How  
Democracies Minimize the Costs of War”, Journal of Politics, 72(2): 528- 
544 
Wayman, Frank & Atsushi Tago (2009): “Explaining the Onset of Mass Killing, 1949-87”,  
Journal of Peace Research, 47(1): 3-13 
Wood, Reed M. (2010): “Rebel Capability and Strategic Violence Against Civilians”, Journal  
of Peace Research, 47(5): 601-614 
World Bank (2004): World Development Report 2005: A Better Investment Climate for  
Everyone, Washington, DC: World Bank 
67 
 
Appendix A 
Population addendum from Fearon and Laitin (2003) 
Missing for Guyana 
 Use Fearon and Laitin (F&L) for the period 1966-86 
Missing for East or West Germany 
 F&L 1945 and 1950-87 for West Germany 
 F&L 1954-87 for East Germany 
Missing Poland 1918-19 + 1941-45 
 F&L Poland 1945 
Hungary 1901-09 + 1911-12 + 1914-15 
Czechoslovakia 1918-20 
Albania 1915-23 + 1925-26 + 1928-33 
Serbia 1900-20 
Yugoslavia 1941-46 
 F&L Yugoslavia 1945-46 
Cyprus 
 F&L Cyprus 1960-87 
Bulgaria 1901-09 + 1911-12 + 1914-19 
Romania 1901-09 + 1911-12 + 1914-19 
USSR 1941-45 
Russia 1900-22 
Estonia 1917-40 
Latvia 1920-40 
Lithuania 1918-40 
Liberia 1900-49 
F&L Liberia 1945-49 
Ethiopia 1900-49 
F&L Ethiopia 1945-49 
South Africa 1910-12 + 1914-49 
 F&L South Africa 1945-49 
Morocco 1900-12 
Iran 1910-12 + 1914-49 
 F&L Iran 1945-49 
Turkey 1900-12 + 1914-22 
Iraq 1920-49 
 F&L Iraq 1945-49 
Egypt1922-49 
 F&L Egypt 1945-49 
Syria 1944-49 
 F&L Syria 1946-49 
Lebanon 1943-49 
 F&L Lebanon 1946-49 
Jordan 1946-50 
 F&L Jordan 1946-49 
Israel 1948-49 
 F&L Israel 1948-49 
Saudi-Arabia 1926-49 
 F&L Saudi-Arabia 1945-49 
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Two Yemen states 
 F&L North + South Yemen 
Oman 1910-12 + 1914-49 
Afghanistan 1910-12 + 1914-49 
 F&L Afghanistan 1945-49 
Mongolia 1924-49 
 F&L Mongolia 1945-49 
Korea 1900-10 
Korea, North 1948-49 
 F&L Korea, north 1948-49 
Bhutan 
 F&L Bhutan 1971-87 
Pakistan 1947-49 
Nepal 1901-12 + 1914-22 
 F&L Nepal 1945-49 
Two Vietnam states 
 F&L Vietnam north + Vietnam south 
Papua New Guinea 
 F&L Papua New Guinea 
Solomon Islands 
Fiji 
India 1947-49 
 F&L India 1947-49 
 
Histogram of the dependent variables
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Figure 1. Overdispersion of the data for total democide 
 
                                                 
23
 The following four graphs  show that over 8,000 cases have the value 0 (no democide), and the other values 
are not clearly discernible, proving the great overdispersion in the data. 
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Figure 2. Overdispersion of the data for regime democide 
 
 
Figure 3. Overdispersion of the data for foreign democide 
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Figure 4. Overdispersion of the data for non-state democide 
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Table 1. Correlation matrix 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 
Ln(population) [1] 1                                 
Ln(PEC) [2] 0.18 1 
              
  
Years since last democide [3] -0.19 0.06 1                             
Polity2 [4] 0.07 0.27 0.27 1 
            
  
Democide in neighbouring states [5] 0.3 0.03 -0.18 -0.27 1                         
Ethnic fractionalization [6] 0.01 -0.14 -0.22 -0.14 0.17 1 
          
  
Size of second largest ethnic group [7] -0.14 -0.13 0.02 -0.15 0.11 0.49 1                     
Autocracy * neighbouring democide [8] 0.18 -0.05 -0.2 -0.57 0.8 0.14 0.07 1 
        
  
Democracy * neighbouring democide [9] 0.21 0.17 0.07 0.47 0.21 0.02 -0.02 -0.26 1                 
Democracy [10] 0.07 0.32 0.26 0.85 -0.23 -0.13 -0.2 -0.45 0.57 1 
      
  
Autocracy [11] -0.06 -0.24 -0.22 -0.92 0.25 0.12 0.13 0.6 -0.43 -0.74 1             
Intrastate war [12] 0.19 -0.02 -0.17 -0.06 0.12 0.1 0.02 0.09 0.02 0.07 0.07 1 
    
  
Interstate war [13] 0.16 0.03 -0.06 0.04 0.03 -0.03 -0.1 0.03 -0.01 0.02 -0.05 0.09 1         
Autocracy * intrastate war [14] 0.14 -0.05 -0.14 -0.17 0.11 0.06 0.01 0.19 -0.09 -0.15 0.21 0.81 0.07 1 
  
  
Democracy * intrastate war [15] 0.13 0.03 -0.07 0.14 0.03 0.03 0.008 -0.08 0.26 0.18 -0.14 0.4 0.06 -0.02 1     
Autocracy * interstate war [16] 0.1 -0.02 -0.08 -0.12 0.13 -0.03 -0.06 0.18 -0.06 -0.1 0.14 0.1 0.67 0.14 -0.02 1   
Democracy * interstate war [17] 0.09 0.1 -0.01 0.19 -0.07 0.007 -0.03 -0.1 0.09 0.22 -0.16 0.02 0.57 -0.03 0.14 0.02 1 
Significant values in bold
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Appendix B – alternative analyses 
Table 1. Total democide without the Second World War 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 
                
  ln(Population) 0.928*** 0.756*** 0.962*** 0.776*** 0.715*** 0.751*** 0.757*** 0.712*** 0.700*** 
 
(0.15) (0.135) (0.157) (0.141) (0.148) (0.143) (0.143) (0.148) (0.148) 
ln(PEC/capita) -0.082 -0.071 -0.091 -0.075 -0.074 -0.075 -0.075 -0.073 -0.074 
 
(0.076) (0.076) (0.077) (0.077) (0.077) (0.077) (0.077) (0.078) (0.077) 
Democide in neighb. states 0.270** 
 
0.276** 0.046 0.306*** 0.293** 0.261 0.138 
  
(0.108) 
 
(0.109) (0.21) (0.11) (0.116) (0.26) (0.262) 
Years since last democide -0.026*** -0.027*** -0.033*** -0.032*** -0.031*** -0.033*** -0.032*** -0.033*** -0.031*** 
 
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.008) (0.009) (0.008) (0.009) 
Intrastate war 0.857*** 0.910*** 0.712*** 0.784*** 0.981*** -2.687 0.804*** -3.176 0.988*** 
 
(0.266) (0.267) (0.245) (0.23) (0.228) (2.031) (0.233) (2.486) (0.226) 
Interstate war 1.318*** 1.383*** 1.314*** 1.417*** 1.251*** 1.377*** 3.777 1.276*** 3.945 
 
(0.397) (0.407) (0.37) (0.408) (0.412) (0.399) (2.773) (0.417) (3.038) 
Autocracy 
  
1.172*** 0.924*** 0.052 0.702** 1.030*** 0.344 0.361 
   
(0.363) (0.337) (0.68) (0.355) (0.383) (0.704) (0.836) 
Democracy 
  
-0.712* -0.55 -0.355 -0.681* -0.4 -0.01 0.05 
   
(0.391) (0.35) (0.469) (0.349) (0.38) (0.531) (0.588) 
Autocracy*interstate war 
     
-0.81 
 
-0.864 
       
(1.031) 
 
(1.102) 
Autocracy*intrastate war 
    
1.303* 
 
1.29 
 
      
(0.718) 
 
(0.827) 
 Democracy*interstate war 
    
-0.891 
 
-1.076 
       
(1.023) 
 
(1.1) 
Democracy*intrastate war 
   
1.045 
 
1.619 
 
      
(0.775) 
 
(1.008) 
 Autocracy*neighb. democide 
  
0.341 
  
0.127 0.261 
     
(0.245) 
  
(0.288) (0.282) 
Democracy*neighb. democide 
  
-0.14 
  
-0.406 -0.246 
     
(0.199) 
  
(0.275) (0.228) 
Polity2 -0.123*** -0.096*** 
         (0.025) (0.021)               
Constant -7.699*** -6.498*** -8.365*** -6.977*** -6.113*** -6.604*** -6.934*** -6.161*** -6.215*** 
  (1.456) (1.32) (1.561) (1.432) (1.601) (1.464) (1.416) (1.598) (1.602) 
Inflated variables 
        Years since last democide 0.268*** 0.266*** 0.263*** 0.263*** 0.265*** 0.263*** 0.263*** 0.265*** 0.265*** 
 
(0.044) (0.044) (0.044) (0.045) (0.045) (0.045) (0.045) (0.045) (0.045) 
Intrastate -42.32*** -32.086*** -39.313*** -34.021*** -31.678*** -32.234*** -37.482*** -32.048*** -33.248*** 
 
(3.761) (3.836) (3.707) (3.795) (3.845) (3.818) (3.79) (3.872) (3.847) 
Interstate -0.572 -0.568 -0.531 -0.523 -0.563 -0.536 -0.516 -0.557 -0.551 
  (0.431) (0.43) (0.429) (0.43) (0.435) (0.431) (0.434) (0.438) (0.443) 
Observations 5,869 5,869 5,869 5,869 5,869 5,869 5,869 5,869 5,869 
Country-years of democide 2028 2028 2028 2028 2028 2028 2028 2028 2028 
Standard errors shown in parentheses. Significance by asterisk: *p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01 
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Table 2. Regime democide without the Second World War
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  Model 10 Model 11 Model 12 Model 13 Model 14 Model 15 Model 16 Model 17 Model 18 
                
  ln(Population) 0.963*** 0.655*** 1.006*** 0.653*** 
 
0.640*** 
 
0.627*** 0.648*** 
 
(0.16) (0.141) (0.16) (0.138) 
 
(0.144) 
 
(0.14) (0.133) 
ln(PEC/capita) -0.241** -0.246** -0.263** -0.253** 
 
-0.254** 
 
-0.228** -0.227** 
 
(0.108) (0.11) (0.107) (0.107) 
 
(0.105) 
 
(0.104) (0.101) 
Democide in neighb. states 0.517*** 
 
0.533*** 
 
0.555*** 
 
0.676** 0.544* 
  
(0.106) 
 
(0.107) 
 
(0.109) 
 
(0.311) (0.281) 
Years since last democide -0.024*** -0.022** -0.034*** -0.030*** 
 
-0.030*** 
 
-0.031*** -0.033*** 
 
(0.009) (0.009) (0.008) (0.008) 
 
(0.008) 
 
(0.009) (0.012) 
Intrastate war 1.195*** 1.369*** 1.056*** 1.255*** 
 
2.108 
 
0.269 1.669*** 
 
(0.27) (0.282) (0.265) (0.252) 
 
(2.414) 
 
(2.49) (0.29) 
Interstate war 0.903 0.601 0.776 0.495 
 
0.464 
 
0.419 -8.013*** 
 
(0.587) (0.538) (0.539) (0.485) 
 
(0.486) 
 
(0.486) (3.087) 
Autocracy 
  
1.933*** 1.885*** 
 
1.868*** 
 
1.951* 1.545 
   
(0.508) (0.485) 
 
(0.594) 
 
(1.002) (0.995) 
Democracy 
  
-0.467 0.2 
 
0.361 
 
1.727* 1.406* 
   
(0.678) (0.597) 
 
(0.61) 
 
(0.89) (0.787) 
Ethnic fractionalization -1.017 -1.721** -0.76 -1.529** 
 
-1.593** 
 
-1.461** -1.622** 
 
(0.848) (0.726) (0.848) (0.726) 
 
(0.741) 
 
(0.705) (0.691) 
Size of 2nd largest ethnic group -0.45 0.846 -0.93 0.719 
 
0.85 
 
1.45 1.528 
 
(1.856) (1.835) (1.892) (1.82) 
 
(1.84) 
 
(1.801) (1.78) 
Autocracy*interstate war 
       
3.440*** 
         
(1.101) 
Autocracy*intrastate war 
    
0.077 
 
0.285 
 
      
(0.884) 
 
(0.857) 
 Democracy*interstate war 
      
2.056 
         
(1.259) 
Democracy*intrastate war 
   
-0.854 
 
0.582 
 
      
(0.933) 
 
(0.988) 
 Autocracy*neighb. democide 
     
-0.035 0.086 
        
(0.329) (0.297) 
Democracy*neighb. democide 
     
-0.776** -0.638** 
        
(0.337) (0.274) 
Polity2 -0.164*** -0.122*** 
         (0.045) (0.041)               
Constant -8.396*** -6.379*** -9.645*** -7.454*** 
 
-7.381*** 
 
-7.561*** -7.524*** 
  (1.538) (1.321) (1.577) (1.395)   (1.51)   (1.554) (1.527) 
Inflated variables 
        Years since last democide 0.244*** 0.241*** 0.236*** 0.235*** 
 
0.235*** 
 
0.234*** 0.181*** 
 
(0.047) (0.048) (0.048) (0.049) 
 
(0.049) 
 
(0.05) (0.049) 
Intrastate -31.40*** -30.059*** -31.837*** -29.392*** 
 
-36.437*** 
 
-37.430*** 
 
 
(4.19) (4.443) (4.064) (4.243) 
 
(4.257) 
 
(4.391) 
 Polity2 0.015 0.015 0.027 0.02 
 
0.026 
 
0.017 0.012 
  (0.066) (0.063) (0.062) (0.063)   (0.064)   (0.064) (0.073) 
Observations 5,819 5,819 5,819 5,819   5,819   5,819 5,819 
Country-years of democide 1704 1704 1704 1704   1704   1704 1704 
Standard errors shown in parentheses. Significance by asterisk: *p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01 
 
 
                                                 
24
 Model 14 and Model 16 did not converge without the years 1940-45 
74 
 
Table 3. Non-state democide without the Second World War 
  Model 19 Model 20 Model 21 Model 22 Model 23 
            
ln(Population) 0.109 0.096 0.085 0.104 0.094 
 
(0.191) (0.188) (0.185) (0.186) (0.183) 
ln(PEC/capita) -0.176* -0.179* -0.172* -0.184* -0.170* 
 
(0.098) (0.098) (0.093) (0.096) (0.091) 
Democide in neighb. states 0.139 0.148 0.781** 0.144 1.028*** 
 
(0.199) (0.199) (0.339) (0.202) (0.340) 
Years since last democide -0.092*** -0.091*** -0.092*** -0.092*** -0.093*** 
 
(0.030) (0.030) (0.031) (0.030) (0.030) 
Intrastate war 3.338*** 3.302*** 3.254*** 3.086 -1.672 
 
(0.322) (0.330) (0.319) (3.497) (2.570) 
Autocracy 
 
0.767 3.012** 0.659 3.314** 
  
(0.590) (1.381) (0.582) (1.325) 
Democracy 
 
0.530 1.191 0.613 1.756 
  
(0.573) (1.425) (0.569) (1.453) 
Ethnic fractionalization -1.196 -1.073 -1.113 -0.987 -0.968 
 
(0.897) (0.935) (0.908) (0.908) (0.883) 
Size of 2nd largest ethnic group 6.007*** 5.908*** 6.140*** 5.860** 5.990*** 
 
(2.183) (2.208) (2.313) (2.275) (2.323) 
Autocracy*neighb. democide 
  
-0.814** 
 
-1.079*** 
   
(0.379) 
 
(0.390) 
Democracy*neighb. democide 
  
-0.164 
 
-0.468 
   
(0.377) 
 
(0.444) 
Polity2 -0.014 
    
 
(0.041) 
    
Autocracy*intrastate war 
   
0.433 1.967** 
    
(1.150) (0.823) 
Democracy*intrastate war 
   
-0.464 1.233 
        (1.443) (1.224) 
Constant -4.602** -5.132** -6.174*** -5.171** -6.346*** 
  (2.041) (2.008) (2.256) (2.012) (2.208) 
Inflated variables 
     
Years since last democide 0.012 0.017 0.018 0.020 0.016 
 
(0.021) (0.018) (0.018) (0.017) (0.016) 
Intrastate -0.943 -6.325 -7.940 -3.743 -4.997 
 
(3.306) (5.867) (8.342) (3.700) (3.694) 
Polity2 -0.168 -0.311 -0.299 -0.132 -0.213 
  (0.248) (0.217) (0.377) (0.308) (0.291) 
Observations 5819 5819 5819 5819 5819 
Country-years of democide 372 372 372 372 372 
Standard errors shown in parentheses. Significance by asterisk: *p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01 
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Table 4. Foreign democide without the Second World War 
  Model 24 Model 25 Model 26 
        
ln(Population) 0.574 0.666** 0.639* 
 
(0.366) (0.338) (0.356) 
ln(PEC/capita) 0.430* 0.414* 0.448** 
 
(0.234) (0.220) (0.226) 
Years since last democide -0.002 -0.024 -0.022 
 
(0.045) (0.045) (0.045) 
Interstate war 1.882*** 1.914*** 3.224 
 
(0.702) (0.733) (2.779) 
Autocracy 
 
0.573 0.610 
  
(0.748) (0.789) 
Democracy 
 
-1.436** -1.313** 
  
(0.622) (0.659) 
Autocracy*interstate war 
  
-0.028 
   
(1.290) 
Democracy*interstate war 
  
-0.955 
   
(1.039) 
Polity2 -0.132** 
  
 
(0.058) 
  
Constant -4.988 -5.789 -5.573 
  (3.798) (3.703) (3.828) 
Inflated variables 
   
Years since last democide 0.235*** 0.222*** 0.224*** 
 
(0.073) (0.078) (0.078) 
Interstate -2.656** -2.677** -2.575** 
 
(1.199) (1.267) (1.285) 
Polity2 -0.169*** -0.158** -0.157** 
  (0.065) (0.062) (0.063) 
Observations 5,869 5,869 5,869 
Country-years of democide 452 452 452 
Standard errors shown in parentheses. Significance by asterisk: *p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01 
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Table 5.Total democide without China, Russia and Germany 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 
                
  
ln(Population) 0.708*** 0.650*** 0.710*** 0.667*** 0.647*** 0.670*** 0.604*** 0.648*** 0.596*** 
 
(0.165) (0.158) (0.167) (0.165) (0.166) (0.171) (0.161) (0.167) (0.162) 
ln(PEC/capita) -0.059 -0.051 -0.067 -0.058 -0.059 -0.059 -0.059 -0.057 -0.062 
 
(0.080) (0.079) (0.082) (0.080) (0.080) (0.080) (0.080) (0.080) (0.079) 
Democide in neighb. states 
 
0.169 
 
0.170 -0.088 0.201* 0.211* 0.126 0.145 
  
(0.108) 
 
(0.107) (0.196) (0.110) (0.109) (0.278) (0.259) 
Years since last democide -0.024** -0.026*** -0.031*** -0.031*** -0.030*** -0.033*** -0.030*** -0.032*** -0.030*** 
 
(0.010) (0.009) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.009) (0.008) (0.009) 
Intrastate war 1.131*** 0.958*** 0.804*** 0.840*** 1.019*** 0.030 0.892*** -0.140 1.026*** 
 
(0.287) (0.285) (0.267) (0.251) (0.253) (0.722) (0.245) (1.017) (0.245) 
Interstate war 1.947*** 2.013*** 1.866*** 1.994*** 1.799*** 2.028*** 3.504*** 1.833*** 3.451*** 
 
(0.440) (0.505) (0.442) (0.493) (0.465) (0.485) (0.883) (0.472) (1.007) 
Autocracy 
  
0.869** 0.712** 0.183 0.539 1.041*** 0.261 0.801 
   
(0.373) (0.362) (0.472) (0.379) (0.396) (0.472) (0.583) 
Democracy 
  
-0.773** -0.727* -0.802* -0.857** -0.327 -0.732* -0.106 
   
(0.376) (0.373) (0.411) (0.373) (0.395) (0.407) (0.449) 
Autocracy*interstate war 
      
-2.198** 
 
-2.226** 
       
(0.972) 
 
(1.072) 
Autocracy*intrastate war 
     
1.157 
 
1.183 
 
      
(0.748) 
 
(1.019) 
 
Democracy*interstate war 
      
-1.665* 
 
-1.797* 
       
(0.931) 
 
(1.012) 
Democracy*intrastate war 
     
0.976 
 
1.487 
 
      
(0.793) 
 
(1.153) 
 
Autocracy*neighb. democide 
    
0.356* 
  
0.142 0.149 
     
(0.211) 
  
(0.289) (0.264) 
Democracy*neighb. democide 
    
0.005 
  
-0.254 -0.234 
     
(0.199) 
  
(0.297) (0.226) 
Polity2 -0.11*** -0.089*** 
       
  (0.023) (0.021)               
Constant -5.702*** -5.367*** -5.844*** -5.648*** -5.141*** -5.632*** -5.450*** -5.226*** -5.304*** 
  (1.608) (1.583) (1.680) (1.706) (1.766) (1.781) (1.643) (1.773) (1.725) 
Inflated variables 
         
Years since last democide 0.226*** 0.268*** 0.268*** 0.265*** 0.265*** 0.216*** 0.266*** 0.265*** 0.266*** 
 
(0.035) (0.043) (0.043) (0.043) (0.043) (0.036) (0.044) (0.044) (0.044) 
Intrastate 
 
-32.97*** -32.68*** -38.551*** -37.854*** 
 
-31.209*** -38.632*** -33.106*** 
  
(3.876) (3.677) (3.735) (3.767) 
 
(3.696) (3.792) (3.738) 
Interstate -0.446 -0.572 -0.599 -0.543 -0.576 -0.324 -0.559 -0.568 -0.570 
  (0.472) (0.379) (0.384) (0.382) (0.382) (0.482) (0.385) (0.383) (0.388) 
Observations 5,958 5,958 5,958 5,958 5,958 5,958 5,958 5,958 5,958 
Country-years of democide 2,016 2,016 2,016 2,016 2,016 2,016 2,016 2,016 2,016 
Standard errors shown in parentheses. Significance by asterisk: *p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01 
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Table 6. Regime democide without China, Russia and Germany 
  Model 10 Model 11 Model 12 Model 13 Model 14 Model 15 Model 16 Model 17 Model 18 
                
  ln(Population) 0.529** 0.531*** 0.536** 0.510*** 0.537*** 0.508*** 0.537*** 0.572*** 0.585*** 
 
(0.221) (0.189) (0.222) (0.189) (0.176) (0.192) (0.188) (0.184) (0.178) 
ln(PEC/capita) -0.185* -0.225** -0.199* -0.229** -0.218** -0.232** -0.230** -0.219** -0.220** 
 
(0.107) (0.111) (0.104) (0.107) (0.104) (0.107) (0.105) (0.106) (0.102) 
Democide in neighb. states 0.479*** 
 
0.472*** 0.610** 0.496*** 0.445*** 0.613* 0.532* 
  
(0.114) 
 
(0.112) (0.29) (0.117) (0.109) (0.333) (0.273) 
Years since last democide -0.024** -0.023** -0.035*** -0.031*** -0.032*** -0.031*** -0.03*** -0.04*** -0.04*** 
 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.009) (0.008) (0.009) (0.009) (0.008) (0.014) (0.013) 
Intrastate war 1.119*** 1.361*** 0.995*** 1.228*** 1.406*** 1.296 1.194*** 1.466* 1.659*** 
 
(0.311) (0.298) (0.304) (0.262) (0.291) (0.788) (0.26) (0.878) (0.313) 
Interstate war 0.903* 0.646 0.751 0.542 0.461 0.517 -2.611*** 0.495 -2.347** 
 
(0.541) (0.497) (0.53) (0.47) (0.462) (0.47) (0.925) (0.463) (0.932) 
Autocracy 
  
2.122*** 1.900*** 1.939*** 1.877*** 1.697*** 1.874** 1.646** 
   
(0.472) (0.445) (0.741) (0.54) (0.419) (0.761) (0.716) 
Democracy 
  
-0.187 0.158 0.868 0.289 0.042 0.813 0.699 
   
(0.572) (0.558) (0.621) (0.561) (0.53) (0.615) (0.556) 
Ethnic fractionalization -0.169 -1.358* 0.088 -1.108 -1.227 -1.197 -1.146 -1.317* -1.395* 
 
(0.825) (0.779) (0.828) (0.767) (0.751) (0.796) (0.778) (0.756) (0.752) 
Size of 2nd largest ethnic group -0.182 0.792 -0.497 0.672 1.403 0.779 0.542 1.438 1.404 
 
(1.544) (1.743) (1.606) (1.717) (1.673) (1.743) (1.721) (1.74) (1.712) 
Autocracy*interstate war 
     
3.638*** 
 
3.343*** 
       
(1.036) 
 
(1.053) 
Autocracy*intrastate war 
    
0.084 
 
0.185 
 
      
(0.873) 
 
(0.908) 
 Democracy*interstate war 
    
2.204* 
 
3.343*** 
       
(1.333) 
 
(1.053) 
Democracy*intrastate war 
   
-0.698 
 
0.49 
 
      
(0.901) 
 
(1.074) 
 Autocracy*neighb. democide 
  
-0.017 
  
0.007 0.062 
     
(0.308) 
  
(0.352) (0.292) 
Democracy*neighb. democide 
  
-0.648** 
  
-0.721** -0.620** 
     
(0.287) 
  
(0.347) (0.266) 
Polity2 -0.158*** -0.123*** 
         (0.042) (0.039)               
Constant -4.613** -5.271*** -5.758*** -6.160*** -6.738*** -6.171*** -6.154*** -7.101*** -6.963*** 
  (2.013) (1.748) (2.003) (1.795) (1.753) (1.839) (1.777) (1.879) (1.814) 
Inflated variables 
        Years since last democide 0.257*** 0.244*** 0.249*** 0.238*** 0.235*** 0.238*** 0.241*** 0.174*** 0.178*** 
 
(0.048) (0.048) (0.05) (0.049) (0.05) (0.049) (0.049) (0.051) (0.049) 
Intrastate -33.5*** -30.8*** -33.258*** -32.293*** -30.538*** -28.925*** -28.614*** 
  
 
(4.718) (4.66) (4.192) (4.25) (4.36) (4.262) (4.301) 
  Polity2 -0.011 -0.002 -0.004 0.002 0.002 0.008 0.006 -0.018 -0.009 
  (0.064) (0.065) (0.063) (0.066) (0.067) (0.067) (0.063) (0.086) (0.078) 
Observations 5,908 5,908 5,908 5,908 5,908 5,908 5,908 5,908 5,908 
Country-years of democide  1,689  1,689  1,689  1,689  1,689  1,689  1,689  1,689  1,689 
Standard errors shown in parentheses. Significance by asterisk: *p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01 
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Table 7. Non-state democide without China, Russia and Germany 
  Model 19 Model 20 Model 21 Model 22 Model 23 
            
ln(Population) 0.302* 0.29 0.281 0.290* 0.281 
 
(0.174) (0.177) (0.18) (0.174) (0.176) 
ln(PEC/capita) -0.220** -0.220** -0.210** -0.223** -0.206** 
 
(0.104) (0.106) (0.102) (0.104) (0.1) 
Democide in neighb. states 0.25 0.251 0.766** 0.265 1.015*** 
 
(0.214) (0.214) (0.327) (0.215) (0.314) 
Years since last democide -0.090*** -0.089*** -0.090*** -0.089*** -0.090*** 
 
(0.027) (0.027) (0.028) (0.026) (0.027) 
Intrastate war 3.333*** 3.281*** 3.219*** 2.659** 1.378* 
 
(0.319) (0.324) (0.327) (1.074) (0.83) 
Autocracy 
 
0.711 1.872* 0.52 1.899** 
  
(0.578) (1.041) (0.555) (0.957) 
Democracy 
 
0.252 0.688 0.237 0.9 
  
(0.614) (1.117) (0.603) (1.068) 
Ethnic fractionalization -1.548* -1.425 -1.428 -1.317 -1.279 
 
(0.915) (0.97) (0.961) (0.956) (0.941) 
Size of 2nd largest ethnic 
group 5.414*** 5.222** 5.344** 5.072** 5.141** 
 
(2.051) (2.07) (2.141) (2.073) (2.106) 
Autocracy*neighb. democide -0.679* 
 
-0.941** 
   
(0.371) 
 
(0.369) 
Democracy*neighb. democide -0.194 
 
-0.473 
   
(0.414) 
 
(0.468) 
Polity2 -0.026 
    
 
(0.04) 
    Autocracy*intrastate war 
  
0.838 2.097*** 
    
(1.087) (0.813) 
Democracy*intrastate war 
 
0.103 1.455 
        (1.336) (1.144) 
Constant -6.355*** -6.737*** -7.540*** -6.638*** -7.616*** 
  (1.921) (1.887) (2.206) (1.869) (2.119) 
Inflated variables 
    Years since last democide 0.015 0.017 0.018 0.012 0.003 
 
(0.018) (0.018) (0.017) (0.022) (0.019) 
Intrastate -5.823 -6.218 -7.905 -5.628 1.295 
 
(6.163) (9.436) (12.085) (5.193) (2.088) 
Polity2 -0.193 -0.248 -0.281 -0.117 -0.038 
  (0.404) (0.335) (0.238) (0.399) (0.154) 
Observations 5,908 5,908 5,908 5,908 5,908 
Country-years of democide 381 381 381 381 381 
Standard errors shown in parentheses. Significance by asterisk: *p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01 
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Table 8. Foreign democide without China, Russia and Germany 
  Model 24 Model 25 Model 26 
        
ln(Population) 0.813*** 0.880*** 0.814*** 
 
(0.314) (0.295) (0.313) 
ln(PEC/capita) 0.369 0.378* 0.385* 
 
(0.227) (0.210) (0.211) 
Years since last democide -0.005 -0.034 -0.024 
 
(0.046) (0.043) (0.049) 
Interstate war 2.173*** 2.049*** 3.026*** 
 
(0.719) (0.704) (1.054) 
Autocracy 
 
0.337 0.670 
  
(0.753) (0.860) 
Democracy 
 
-1.765*** -1.390* 
  
(0.648) (0.747) 
Autocracy*interstate war 
  
-1.122 
   
(1.326) 
Democracy*interstate war 
  
-1.280 
   
(1.101) 
Polity2 -0.130** 
  
 
(0.066) 
  
Constant -7.238** -7.567** -7.221** 
  (3.218) (3.254) (3.371) 
Inflated variables 
   
Years since last democide 0.226*** 0.210*** 0.217*** 
 
(0.065) (0.069) (0.072) 
Interstate -3.079*** -3.144*** -3.126*** 
 
(0.988) (1.038) (1.039) 
Polity2 -0.160** -0.152** -0.153** 
  (0.069) (0.063) (0.063) 
Observations 5,958 5,958 5,958 
Country-years of democide 470 470 470 
Standard errors shown in parentheses. Significance by asterisk: *p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01 
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OLS Regressions 
Table 9. Total democide 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 
          ln(Population) 34.604*** 23.419*** 34.149*** 22.793*** 23.256*** 22.725*** 23.016*** 23.188*** 23.482*** 
 
(3.356) (3.508) (3.356) (3.502) (3.500) (3.504) (3.500) (3.502) (3.497) 
ln(PEC/capita) -0.034 -1.223 -0.359 -1.742 -2.459 -1.813 -1.509 -2.467 -2.228 
 
(1.924) (1.912) (1.963) (1.950) (1.948) (1.953) (1.948) (1.950) (1.946) 
Democide in neighb 
 
39.904*** 
 
40.947*** -5.660 41.378*** 39.186*** -4.455 -7.117 
  
(3.955) 
 
(3.943) (12.852) (3.944) (3.959) (12.997) (12.901) 
Years since democide -0.008 0.077 -0.090 0.017 -0.047 -0.017 -0.009 -0.064 -0.071 
 
(0.203) (0.202) (0.202) (0.201) (0.200) (0.201) (0.201) (0.200) (0.200) 
Intrastate war 12.170 4.012 11.295 3.803 11.076 -77.841 1.331 -38.267 8.561 
 
(16.850) (16.732) (16.876) (16.745) (16.673) (140.306) (16.734) (141.356) (16.662) 
Interstate war 97.778*** 100.71*** 97.340*** 100.52*** 85.16*** 100.61*** 3.812 85.616*** -25.623 
 
(19.150) (18.995) (19.173) (19.009) (18.982) (19.005) (138.499) (18.989) (138.336) 
Autocracy 
  
36.135*** 18.007 
-
129.59*** 11.069 11.329 -130.0*** -135.5*** 
   
(13.651) (13.645) (32.116) (14.261) (14.112) (32.118) (32.614) 
Democracy 
  
-8.547 5.318 7.612 6.428 8.680 6.947 9.892 
   
(15.293) (15.219) (34.613) (15.795) (15.810) (34.625) (35.309) 
Autocracy*neighb. Dem 
    
66.125*** 
  
64.598*** 65.683*** 
     
(13.562) 
  
(13.714) (13.592) 
Democracy*neighb. Dem 
    
-6.987 
  
-6.275 -6.726 
     
(15.331) 
  
(15.546) (15.373) 
Polity2 -3.402*** -1.459** 
       
 
(0.649) (0.672) 
       
Autocracy*intrastate 
     
75.415 
 
42.223 
 
      
(48.754) 
 
(49.027) 
 
Democracy*interstate 
     
-38.460 
 
-18.618 
 
      
(58.371) 
 
(58.901) 
 
Autocracy*interstate 
      
125.424** 
 
127.030** 
       
(51.786) 
 
(51.645) 
Autocracy*intrastate 
      
-65.725 
 
-56.917 
              (54.288)   (54.197) 
Constant -297.6*** -248.5*** -308.8*** -254.8*** -207.2*** -250.5*** -250.7*** -205.6*** -203.3*** 
  (31.589) (31.705) (33.692) (33.803) (37.405) (34.154) (33.820) (37.487) (37.524) 
Observations 6,082 6,082 6,082 6,082 6,082 6,082 6,082 6,082 6,082 
R-squared 0.031 0.047 0.029 0.046 0.058 0.048 0.05 0.058 0.061 
Standard errors shown in parentheses. Significance by asterisk: *p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01 
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Table 10. Regime democide 
  Model 10 Model 11 Model 12 Model 13 Model 14 Model 15 Model 16 Model 17 Model 18 
          
ln(Population) 32.954*** 20.739*** 32.653*** 20.395*** 21.901*** 20.437*** 20.664*** 21.869*** 22.124*** 
 
(3.373) (3.499) (3.372) (3.493) (3.498) (3.498) (3.494) (3.502) (3.499) 
ln(PEC/capita) -2.564 -4.461** -2.818 -4.856** -5.590*** -4.914** -4.748** -5.595*** -5.468*** 
 
(1.897) (1.884) (1.932) (1.918) (1.918) (1.921) (1.919) (1.920) (1.918) 
Democide in neighb 
 
44.817*** 
 
45.485*** 7.269 45.777*** 44.451*** 8.080 5.181 
  
(3.870) 
 
(3.858) (12.460) (3.858) (3.882) (12.596) (12.518) 
Years since democide 0.116 0.240 0.049 0.197 0.135 0.166 0.190 0.120 0.129 
 
(0.197) (0.195) (0.196) (0.195) (0.194) (0.195) (0.195) (0.194) (0.194) 
Intrastate war 25.701 19.239 24.549 18.985 24.583 -34.964 17.197 -5.932 22.870 
 
(16.335) (16.167) (16.354) (16.176) (16.111) (135.592) (16.189) (136.637) (16.123) 
Interstate war 29.796 30.635* 29.697 30.724* 18.092 31.010* -154.390 18.553 -167.452 
 
(18.542) (18.341) (18.567) (18.358) (18.329) (18.358) (133.959) (18.338) (133.870) 
Autocracy 
  
34.384*** 14.132 -110.73*** 8.496 7.589 -111.24*** -119.50*** 
   
(13.224) (13.187) (31.083) (13.801) (13.671) (31.087) (31.603) 
Democracy 
  
-7.193 5.331 24.171 7.023 2.264 23.559 17.780 
   
(14.944) (14.814) (33.524) (15.407) (15.454) (33.533) (34.290) 
Ethnic fractionalization -46.281** -67.468*** -44.231** -67.265*** -64.890*** -65.685*** -65.069*** -64.087*** -62.723*** 
 
(18.294) (18.188) (18.302) (18.201) (18.109) (18.248) (18.223) (18.159) (18.131) 
Size of 2nd ethnic group -79.257* -116.283*** -77.812* -112.372** -75.454* -109.764** -113.060** -75.107* -76.416* 
 
(44.619) (44.249) (45.080) (44.668) (44.657) (44.768) (44.804) (44.759) (44.797) 
Autocracy*neighb. Dem 
    
55.668*** 
  
54.565*** 56.750*** 
     
(13.114) 
  
(13.260) (13.155) 
Democracy*neighb. Dem 
    
-13.716 
  
-12.889 -12.132 
     
(14.795) 
  
(14.998) (14.857) 
Polity2 -3.080*** -1.035 
       
 
(0.635) (0.652) 
       
Autocracy*intrastate 
     
60.545 
 
32.583 
 
      
(47.081) 
 
(47.359) 
 
Democracy*intrastate 
     
-40.866 
 
-20.847 
 
      
(56.366) 
 
(56.874) 
 
Autocracy*interstate 
      
101.178** 
 
100.031** 
       
(49.974) 
 
(49.870) 
Democracy*interstate 
      
26.728 
 
28.284 
       
(52.571) 
 
(52.510) 
Constant -262.35*** -199.20*** -275.644*** -206.358*** -184.553*** -204.807*** -203.066*** -183.738*** -179.630*** 
  (32.709) (32.81) (34.848) (34.952) (38.173) 835.332) 835.051) (38.277) (38.397) 
Observations 6,032 6,032 6,032 6,032 6,032 6,032 6,032 6,032 6,032 
R-squared 0.026 0.047 0.025 0.047 0.058 0.048 0.048 0.058 0.059 
Standard errors shown in parentheses. Significance by asterisk: *p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01 
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Table 11. Non-state democide 
  Model 19 Model 20 Model 21 Model 22 Model 23 
      
ln(Population) -0.010 -0.004 -0.002 -0.008 -0.006 
 
(0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) 
ln(PEC/capita) -0.015 -0.013 -0.014 -0.012 -0.012 
 
(0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) 
Democide in neighb. states -0.028 -0.040 0.036 -0.035 0.100 
 
(0.025) (0.025) (0.081) (0.025) (0.081) 
Years since last democide -0.004*** -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.004*** -0.004*** 
 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Intrastate war 1.892*** 1.889*** 1.885*** -1.828** -2.048** 
 
(0.104) (0.104) (0.104) (0.869) (0.880) 
Autocracy 
 
0.225*** 0.396** 0.059 0.386* 
  
(0.085) (0.201) (0.088) (0.200) 
Democracy 
 
0.177* 0.369* 0.116 0.363* 
  
(0.095) (0.217) (0.099) (0.216) 
Ethnic fractionalization -0.398*** -0.412*** -0.414*** -0.359*** -0.362*** 
 
(0.117) (0.117) (0.117) (0.117) (0.117) 
Size of 2nd largest ethnic 
group 1.390*** 1.427*** 1.425*** 1.405*** 1.369*** 
 
(0.284) (0.287) (0.288) (0.286) (0.288) 
Autocracy*neighb. democide 
  
-0.080 
 
-0.155* 
   
(0.085) 
 
(0.085) 
Democracy*neighb. 
democide 
  
-0.093 
 
-0.119 
   
(0.096) 
 
(0.097) 
Polity2 0.002 
    
 
(0.004) 
    
Autocracy*intrastate war 
   
1.866*** 1.948*** 
    
(0.302) (0.305) 
Democracy*intrastate war 
   
0.483 0.545 
    
(0.361) (0.366) 
Constant 0.159 -0.067 -0.171 0.070 -0.084 
  (0.211) (0.225) (0.247) (0.226) (0.247) 
Observations 6,032 6,032 6,032 6,032 6,032 
R-squared 0.061 0.063 0.063 0.071 0.072 
Standard errors shown in parentheses. Significance by asterisk: *p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01 
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Table 12. Foreign democide 
  Model 24 Model 25 Model 26 
    
ln(Population) 2.377** 2.284** 2.065** 
 
(0.931) (0.930) (0.927) 
ln(PEC/capita) 1.396*** 1.416** 1.515*** 
 
(0.541) (0.552) (0.550) 
Democide in neighb. 
states -0.039 -0.052 -0.064 
 
(0.057) (0.057) (0.056) 
Years since last 
democide 61.626*** 61.222*** 113.550*** 
 
(5.380) (5.385) (39.103) 
Autocracy 
 
1.035 0.137 
  
(3.841) (3.973) 
Democracy 
 
-7.287* -2.517 
  
(4.303) (4.454) 
Autocracy*interstate war 
  
24.894* 
   
(14.580) 
Autocracy*intrastate war 
  
-66.281*** 
   
(15.357) 
Polity2 -0.615*** 
  
 
(0.183) 
  
Constant -18.868** -15.898* -14.475 
  (8.839) (9.428) (9.416) 
Observations 6,082 6,082 6,082 
R-squared 0.027 0.027 0.036 
Standard errors shown in parentheses. Significance by asterisk: *p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01 
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Appendix C - data 
The source refers to page number/line number in Rummel 1997b. The data for China and most of Russia were retrieved from Rummel’s home 
page (http://www.hawaii.edu/powerkills/) and refer to the table number/line number. Germany’s numbers are from Rummel 1992 and refer to 
table/line number. 
 
 
Source Country 
Start 
year 
End 
year 
Low 
estimate 
Medium 
estimate 
High 
estimate Notes 
216/60 Afghanistan 1978 1979 30.00 50.00 100.00 Executions, political prisoners, disappearances, massacres 
216/64 Afghanistan 1979 1987 32.00 178.00 603.00 Democidal bombing/shelling/strafing/intentional starvation 
216/66 Afghanistan 1978 1987 5.00     Democide by Afghan resistance 
270/3 Afghanistan 1978 1987 30.00     Rebel democide 
216/94 Albania 1944 1987 25.00 100.00 150.00 Albanian democide 
270/16 Algeria 1962 1963 12.00 50.00 150.00 Harkis/OAS supporters killed 
270/34b Algeria 1954 1962 50.00 100.00 150.00 Rebel democide 
295/1285 Algeria 1945 1945   0.10   Europeans killed by native Algerians 
217/135 Angola 1978 1987 100.00 125.00 200.00 Terror/massacres 
271/76 Argentina 1976 1982 15.00 20.00 40.00 Disappearances, assassinations and other killings 
271/81 Argentina 1970 1979 1.00     Democide by guerrillas 
272/101 Armenia 1918 1918   2.00   Azerbaijanese massacre 
272/103 Armenia 1909 1909   1.85   Muslim Turks killed 
272/106h Armenia 1914 1918 64.00 75.00 300.00 Genocide 
272/106i Armenia 1920 1921 1.00     Muslim Turks killed 
272/115 Armenia 1918 1920 15.00     Muslims and Tartars killed/massacred 
273/163 Austria-Hungary 1914 1918 27.00 34.00 52.00 Democide of Serbians, Romanians and Russian POWs 
273/175 Azerbaijan 1918 1918 4.00     Massacre of Armenians 
274/204 Bangladesh 1972 1987 9.00 15.00 20.00 
Bangladeshi democide - riots, collaborators, political, 
Chittagong Hill Tracts 
274/216 Bangladesh 1974 1974     4.00 Murders/assassinations by Bangladeshi opposition groups 
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274/217 Bangladesh 1972 1974 6.00     Murders/assassinations by Bangladeshi opposition groups 
274/228 Bolivia 1964 1987 2.00     Caracoles disappeared 
266/20 Brazil 1900 1920 25.00     
Democide of Brazilians by Amazon rubber companies - 10% 
assumed to be Brazil's government's responsibility (that is - this 
number) 
274/240 Brazil 1945 1964 40.00 50.00 75.00 Dutra/Vargas democide 
275/266 Brazil 1964 1985 53.00 79.00 105.00 
Indians killed, and other democide - such as terrorism, Rio dead, 
Sao Paulo dead, prisoner dead 
275/276 Brazil 1900 1930 50.00     Indians killed 
275/300 Brazil 1930 1945 30.00 60.00 100.00 Indians killed 
218/167 Bulgaria 1944 1987 25.00     Labor camp democide 
218/172 Bulgaria 1944 1987 44.00     
Other forced labor democide. Estimate is 0.1% of total annual 
foreign labourers 
218/176 Bulgaria 1944 1987 3.30     
Prisoner democide. Estimate is 0.5% of the minimum average of 
non-forced labour prisoners per year 
218/186 Bulgaria 1944 1987 100.00 150.00 250.00 Other democide - executions, death sentences and killed 
276/326 Bulgaria 1921 1921   0.30   Assassinations 
276/328 Bulgaria 1916 1918   19.00   Greeks killed 
276/345 Bulgaria 1923 1926 4.00     White terror, executions, killings 
277/365 Bulgaria 1943 1943   40.00   Reprisal deaths of Greeks 
277/366 Bulgaria 1942 1942 10.00     Reprisal deaths of Yugoslavs 
277/389 Burma/Myanmar 1948 1955 2.00 8.00 36.00 Democide in rebellions 
277/395 Burma/Myanmar 1948 1955 2.00     Rebel democide 
278/426 Burma/Myanmar 1962 1987 11.00 43.00 227.00 Government's democide 
278/448 Burma/Myanmar 1962 1987 5.00     Rebel democide 
278/454b Burma/Myanmar 1944 1947 3.00     Democide by the Burma Independence Army 
219/240 Burundi 1971 1972 80.00 150.00 300.00 Genocide of Hutus by Tutsi army 
220/245 Burundi 1972 1972 2.00 25.00 50.00 Genocide by Hutu rebels 
279/464 Burundi 1965 1965 2.50 3.75 5.00 Hutus killed 
58/13a Cambodia 1968 1970 1.00     Democide by Khmer Rouge guerrilla 
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60/110 Cambodia 1970 1975 71.00 211.00 311.00 
Khmer Rouge democide of Vietnamese, purges and other 
democide 
66/391 Cambodia 1979 1987 68.00 230.00 383.00 Killings and democidal famines 
66/395 Cambodia 1979 1987 10.00     Rebel democide 
67/409 Cambodia 1970 1975 9.00 15.00 21.00 Lon Nol regime democide 
67/414 Cambodia 1975 1979 600.00 2000.00 3000.00 Khmer Rouge regime domestic democide 
67/415 Cambodia 1975 1979 35.00     Khmer Rouge regime foreign democide in Vietnam 
67/416a Cambodia 1979 1987 10.00     Other guerrilla democide 
67/5b Cambodia 1952 1954 1.00     Democide during Sihanouk period. 
67/7a+8a Cambodia 1967 1970 11.00     
Democide during Sihanouk period. Communists killed, and 
Samlaut Rebellion dead. 
281/585 
Central African 
Empire 1966 1979 2.00     
Disappearances, demonstrators killed, repression killed, 
schoolchildren massacre 
280/515 Chad 1965 1987 10.00     Communal violence against muslims, and massacres 
280/535b Chad 1960 1987 20.00     Muslims killed in southern Sahara 
281/567 Chile 1973 1987 2.00 10.00 30.00 
Murders, disappearances, genocide, executions, 
genocide/politicide 
220/273 China 1900 1900 32.00 100.00 250.00 Chinese killed by boxers 
china.tab3.a/113 China 1927 1928 50.00 100.00 197.68 Repression, revolutionaries killed, workers killed 
china.tab3.a/120 China 1923 1928 12.50 43.45 74.40 Communist massacres/atrocities 
china.tab3.a/24 China 1917 1919 6.562 9.312 12.062 
Warlords period formative phase - 50% of numbers (high and 
low, mid is average of those two) on line, as per line 64 
china.tab3.a/32 China 1920 1923 10.8 15.8 20.8 
Warlord period, balance of power phase - 50% of numbers (high 
and low, mid is average of those two) on line, as per line 64 
china.tab3.a/57 China 1924 1928 21.5 94.75 168 
Warlord period, ending phase - 50% of numbers (high and low, 
mid is average of those two) on line, as per line 64 
china.tab3.a/65 China 1928 1928 194.53 198 199 Muslim rebellion dead 
china.tab3.a/66 China 1926 1926 70   80 Siege of Sian dead 
china.tab4.a/119 China 1929 1937 600.00 850.00 1118.00 Communist democide 
china.tab4.a/65 China 1929 1937 250.00 350.00 500.00 Warlord democide 
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china.tab4.a/88 China 1929 1937 1130.00 1524.00 2258.00 Kuomintang democide 
china.tab5.a/116 China 1937 1945 101.70 135.26 203.40 Kuomintang democide 
china.tab5.a/122 China 1937 1945 100.00 250.00 500.00 Democide by communists 
china.tab5.a/78 China 1937 1944 100.00 110.00 150.00 Democide by warlords 
china.tab7.a/130 China 1945 1949 1125.00 2322.00 10000.00 Communist democide 
china.tab7.a/84 China 1945 1949 1206.20 2645.10 5394.90 Kuomintang democide 
china.tabIIa.1/156 China 1949 1953 750.00 6262.50 20225.10 Democide during totalization(sic) period 
china.tabIIa.1/196 China 1954 1958 250.00 5550.00 9287.33 
Democide during collectivization and "Great Leap Forward" 
period 
china.tabIIa.1/232 China 1959 1963 3984.50 5680.00 8486.95 Democide during great famine and retrenchment period 
china.tabIIa.1/291 China 1964 1968 100.00 400.00 3346.66 Executions 1964-68 
china.tabIIa.1/292 China 1966 1975 280.00 1505.00 10500.00 Executions 1966-75 
china.tabIIa.1/315 China 1976 1987 18.00 36.00 54.00 
Suppression of demonstrations/protests, and 
executions/killings 
china.tabIIa.1/362 China 1950 1987 75.00 375.00 900.00 Minorities, Tibetans killed 
china.tabIIa.1/466 China 1954 1958 50.00 1875.00 6466.67 Forced labour 
china.tabIIa.1/467 China 1949 1953 85.00 2125.00 7295.83 Forced Labour 
china.tabIIa.1/496 China 1959 1963 250.00 5000.00 13350.00 Forced labour 
china.tabIIa.1/511 China 1964 1975 240.00 6000.00 21600.00 
Labour camp deaths based on annual death rate for cultural 
revolution years 
china.tabIIa.1/538 China 1976 1987 12.00 720.00 4620.00 Forced labour deaths 
china.tabIIa.2/551 China 1949 1987 5000.00 7500.00 10000.00 Famine deaths 1949-58 and 1964-87 
Dikötter (2010: 
325-334) China 1959 1963 23000.00 45000.00 55000.00 The great famine 
281/601 Colombia 1958 1962 2.1 3 6 Political domestic violence 
281/610 Colombia 1963 1987 20.00 25.00 30.00 
Guerrilla/drug war, using 15%, 20% and 30% of numbers on 
line, as per line 614 
282/628 Colombia 1958 1987 3.00 4.00 5.00 Domestic democide 
283/668 Colombia 1948 1958 35.00 70.00 105.00 Democide by the party in power 
283/669 Colombia 1948 1958 35.00 70.00 105.00 Democide by the party out of power 
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283/704 
Congo 
(Brazzaville) 1959 1968 1.00 5.00 15.00 Geno-politicide 
176/248 Croatia 1941 1945 242.00 655.00 1088.00 Nazi occupation democide 
284/739 Cuba 1952 1959 0.50 1.00 20.00 Domestic democide, terror 
284/744 Cuba 1952 1959 0.25 0.50 1.00 Rebel democide 
285/788 Cuba 1959 1987 4.00 15.00 33.00 Executions 
285/800 Cuba 1959 1987 30.00 51.00 80.00 
Boat people who have died trying to cross to the US, assuming 
2, 3 or 4 dead for every survivor reported 
286/824 Cuba 1959 1969 1.10 5.50 16.50 
Prison/camp deaths. Assumed death/kill rate of 9,5%, 1% and 
1,5% per year 
286/838 Cuba 1970 1979 0.04 0.75 10.00 Political prisoners 
286/845 Cuba 1980 1987 0.02 0.40 1.20 Political prisoners 
287/867 Cyprus 1977 1987 2.00     Estimate of disappearances and otherwise killed 
143/191 Czechoslovakia 1945 1950 68.00 197.00 510.00 Flight/expulsion German dead 
287/892 Czechoslovakia 1948 1955 1.2 4 12 
Prison/concentration/forced labour camp dead. Numbers based 
on a yearly death rate of 1%, 2,5% and 5% of numbers on line 
891 
287/892 Czechoslovakia 1956 1968 0.975 2.6 7.8 
Prison/concentration/forced labour camp dead. Numbers based 
on a yearly death rate of 0,5%, 1% and 2% of numbers on line 
891 
287/912 Czechoslovakia 1948 1955 12 36 100 
Concentration camp inmates/forced labourers. Numbers based 
on a yearly death rate of 1%, 2,5% and 5% of numbers on line 
891 
287/912 Czechoslovakia 1956 1968 9.75 23.4 65 
Concentration camp inmates/forced labourers. Numbers based 
on a yearly death rate of 0,5%, 1% and 2% of numbers on line 
891 
335/3313 
Democratic 
Republic of the 
Congo 1960 1987 4.00 6.00 10.00 Domestic democide 
335/3322 
Democratic 
Republic of the 
Congo 1964 1964   20.00   Assassinations by rebels 
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335/3325 
Democratic 
Republic of the 
Congo 1977 1977   5.20   Rebel democide 
288/932 
Dominican 
Republic 1937 1937 5.00     Haitians killed 
296/1349 East Germany 1949 1987 70.00     Estimate of East German democide 
288/937 Egypt 1960 1969 5.00     Democide in Yemen 
290/1040 El Salvador 1931 1932 10.00 24.00 32.00 Peasant revolt/uprising, massacres 
290/1044 El Salvador 1970 1979 1.00     Pre-insurrection democide 
290/1071 El Salvador 1979 1984 10.00 12.00 20.00 Government democide during insurrection 
291/1079 El Salvador 1979 1987 0.50     Guerrilla democide 
291/1116 El Salvador 1984 1987 2.00 3.00 5.00 Domestic democide 
292/1141 
Equatorial 
Guinea 1968 1979 40.00 50.00 90.00 Democide in Equatorial Guinea 
222/378 Ethiopia 1974 1978 30.00 50.00 100.00 Executions/red terror 
222/402 Ethiopia 1984 1985 50.00 100.00 160.00 Killed in settlements 
223/407 Ethiopia 1976 1985 50.00     Other killed: peasants massacred, bombing, children dead 
223/423 Ethiopia 1974 1987 2.00     Democide by Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Army  
223/427 Ethiopia 1974 1987 2.00     Democide by Eritrea 
223/437 Ethiopia 1974 1975 6.00 25.00 75.00 Democidal famine 
223/421 Ethiopia 1976 1977 0.30     Assassinations by Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Army 
224/452 Ethiopia 1984 1985 100.00 500.00 900.00 Democidal famine 
225/550 France 1914 1918   2.70   
Condemned to death by military courts; posthumously 
rehabilitated in 1920 
226/558 France 1900 1940 200.00     
Forced/slave labour dead - excess deaths and killed from forced 
labour in French colonies 
226/565 France 1900 1940 10.00     Killings of non-forced labour throughout French colonial system 
227/650 France 1948 1987 10.00     
Colonial forced/slave labour dead. Includes so-called contract 
labour that in effect turned out to be forced. Estimate of excess 
deaths and killed from forced labour in French colonies 
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228/652 France 1946 1948 2.00     Colonial forced/slave labour dead 
228/655 France 1947 1948 10.00 45.00 80.00 Geno-politicide in Madagascar 
228/664 France 1954 1962 100.00     Democide in Algeria 
228/667 France 1958 1958   0.08   Tunisians killed 
228/669 France 1946 1946 6.00 10.00 20.00 Haiphong killed 
228/677 France 1961 1962 13.00     OAS democide 
294/1261 France 1944 1946 0.50 1.25 28.00 Democide by government 
294/1265 France 1944 1946 5.00     Forced/slave labour dead 
295/1275 France 1945 1946 21.00 23.00 25.00 German POWs 
293/1185 France (Vichy) 1940 1944 10.00     Democide by Vichy government 
293/1189 France (Vichy) 1940 1944 22.00     Democide in colonies 
293/1202 France (Vichy) 1940 1944 2.50 5.00 7.00 Democide by resistance 
294/1259 France (Vichy) 1944 1946 1.50 3.75 85.00 
Democide by resistance, includes private revenge and political 
killing by communists 
283/693 
Free state of 
Congo 1900 1910 25.00     Estimate of excess deaths and killed from forced labour 
230/797 Germany 1914 1918 61.00 75.00 102.00 World War I democide 
231/811 Germany 1904 1907 32.00 55.25 72.00 Herreros massacred/killed in Namibia 
231/816 Germany 1904 1907 16.00 17.00 18.00 Nama and Berg Damara democides 
231/832 Germany 1905 1907 50.00     Genocide in Tanganyika (Maji-Maji uprising) 
231/834 Germany 1900 1905 10.00     Bushiri killed 
Table A/1126 Germany 1941 1945 8678.00 12250.00 19985.00 Jews, gypsies, POWs, forced labour, famine, executions 
Table A/1187 Germany 1941 1945 507.00 625.00 831.00 Jews, massacres 
Table A/230 Germany 1943 1945   0.20   Jews killed in Albania 
Table A/242 Germany 1938 1945 40.00 58.00 65.00 Jews killed in Austria 
Table A/245 Germany 1939 1945   65.00   Gypsies killed in Austria 
Table A/249 Germany 1938 1945 10.00     Other killings in Austria 
Table A/313 Germany 1941 1945 221.00 235.00 324.00 Democide in the Baltics 
Table A/342 Germany 1941 1945 35.00 51.00 68.00 Democide in Belgium 
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Table A/358 Germany 1941 1945 0.00 7.00 14.00 Democide in Bulgaria 
Table A/390 Germany 1942 1942   20.00   Kozara killed 
Table A/370 Germany 1941 1945 0.00 0.00 8.00 Jews killed in Croatia 
Table A/387 Germany 1941 1945 0.00 1.00 2.00 Gypsies killed in Croatia 
Table A/447 Germany 1939 1945 155.00 214.00 400.00 Democide in Czechoslovakia 
Table A/463 Germany 1939 1945 0.05 0.50 1.50 Jews killed in Denmark 
Table A/466 Germany 1940 1945 0.20     Murders in Denmark 
Table A/482 Germany 1941 1945 0.00 0.06 0.11 Democide in Finland 
Table A/536 Germany 1940 1945 183.00 256.00 500.00 Democide in France 
Table A/557 Germany 1939 1945 123.00 160.00 195.00 Jews killed in Germany 
Table A/575 Germany 1933 1937 39.15 52.0695 78.3 
Repression/terror – non-Jewish, mid is 1/3 higher than low, 
high is twice the low 
Table A/582 Germany 1934 1934 0.77 1.0241 1.54 
Repression/terror – non-Jewish, mid is 1/3 higher than low, 
high is twice the low 
Table A/583 Germany 1938 1939 126.3 167.979 252.6 
Repression/terror – non-Jewish, mid is 1/3 higher than low, 
high is twice the low 
Table A/598 Germany 1933 1945 62.00 67.00 72.00 Reprisals/law and order (non-Jewish) 
Table A/598b Germany 1933 1945 2.50 55.00 250.00 Homosexuals killed 
Table A/599 Germany 1939 1945 70.00 173.00 275.00 Euthanasia 
Table A/601 Germany 1945 1945 75.00 88.00 100.00 Miscellaneous dead 
Table A/641 Germany 1941 1945 91.00 140.00 525.00 Democide in Greece 
Table A/705 Germany 1941 1945 273.00 406.00 586.00 Democide in Hungary 
Table A/737 Germany 1943 1945 50.00 64.00 90.00 Democide in Italy 
Table A/741 Germany 1939 1945   0.56   Jews killed in Libya 
Table A/757 Germany 1940 1945 0.70 2.00 3.00 Jews killed in Luxembourg 
Table A/761 Germany 1940 1944   0.20   Gypsies killed in Luxembourg 
Table A/822 Germany 1940 1945 131.00 176.00 200.00 Democide in the Netherlands 
Table A/840 Germany 1940 1945 0.80 1.50 2.00 Democide in Norway 
Table A/894 Germany 1939 1945 3900.00 5400.00 6371.00 Democide in Poland 
92 
 
Table A/956 Germany 1941 1945 54.00 70.00 170.00 Democide in Romania 
Table A/963 Germany 1937 1945   21.60   Democide in Spain 
Table A/973 Germany 1940 1945 68.00 87.60 107.00 Bombing of the UK and UK POWs 
296/1362 Greece 1916 1916 1.00     Royalists killed 
296/1364 Greece 1918 1923 15.00     Foreign democide during war with Turkey 
297/1412 Greece 1944 1949 2.00     Domestic democide 
297/1413 Greece 1944 1952 1.00     Domestic democide 
298/1435 Greece 1944 1949 14.00 20.00 25.00 Democide by ELAS guerrillas 
298/1444 Grenada 1983 1983 0.11     Demonstrators killed, executions 
232/874 Guatemala 1954 1959 60.8 71.1 78.85 
Govt. Democide in the 1950s. Based on government’s 10-1 ratio 
- numbers are 80%-90%-95% of totals 
232/874 Guatemala 1954 1959 4.15 7.9 15.2 Guerrilla democide in the 1950s 
232/891 Guatemala 1960 1969 1.6 5.4 8.55 
Govt. Democide in the 1960s. Based on government’s 10-1 ratio 
- numbers are 80%-90%-95% of totals 
232/891 Guatemala 1960 1969 0.4 0.6 0.6 
Guerrilla democide in the 1960s. Numbers are totals in the line, 
minus govt. democide - then in reversed order (low being high) 
233/912 Guatemala 1970 1979 15.2 20.7 27.55 
Government Democide in the 1970s. Based on government’s 
10-1 ratio - numbers are 80%-90%-95% of totals 
233/912 Guatemala 1970 1979 1.45 2.3 3.8 
Guerrilla democide in the 1970s. Numbers are totals in the line, 
minus govt. Democide - then in reversed order (low being high) 
233/954 Guatemala 1980 1987 24 34.2 56.05 
Government Democide in the 1980s. Based on government’s 
10-1 ratio - numbers are 80%-90%-95% of totals 
233/954 Guatemala 1980 1987 2.95 3.8 6 
Guerrilla democide in the 1980s. Numbers are totals in the line 
minus government democide - then in reversed order (low 
being high), following Rummel’s system 
298/1458 Guinea 1969 1976 3.00     Prisoners disappeared 
298/1471 Haiti 1957 1986 3.00     
Haiti (Duvalier) democide - disappearances, massacres, 
executions, murders - estimate 
299/1481 Honduras 1982 1987 0.15     Domestic democide, disappearances 
176/272 Hungary 1941 1945 66.00 78.00 91.00 Hungarian democide in Yugoslavia 
234/998 Hungary 1919 1929 330.00 400.00 490.00 White terror killings 
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235/1007 Hungary 1941 1945 30.00 37.00 43.00 Jewish forced labourers killed by Hungarians 
235/1013 Hungary 1941 1944 4.00     Other Jews killed 
235/1021 Hungary 1940 1940 1.00     Massacre 
235/1035 Hungary 1944 1945 12.00 15.00 20.00 Democide by Arrow Cross/other groups 
299/1504 Hungary 1919 1919 5.30     Red terror and Jewish pogroms 
299/1517 Hungary 1945 1948 3.00 12.00 21.00 Domestic democide 
300/1564 Hungary 1948 1987 26.72     Prisons/camps/dead plus executions 
301/1577 Hungary 1956 1956 0.20     Rebel democide 
302/1635 India 1947 1948 6.00 36.00 300.00 Indian democide post-partition 
303/1712 India 1950 1987 12.00 25.00 63.00 Estimate of democide 
304/1728 India 1980 1980   1.00   Bengalis massacred 
237/1134 Indonesia 1965 1966 376.00 509.00 821.00 "Coup" triggered massacres 
237/1142 Indonesia 1968 1971 5.00     "Other massacres" 
237/1146 Indonesia 1983 1984 3.00 4.00 10.00 Anti-"crime" terror 
238/1171 Indonesia 1965 1987 13.00 61.00 180.00 Political prisoners killed in Indonesia 
239/1232 Indonesia 1975 1987 100.00 150.00 349.00 
Population deficit, Timorese starvations, camp death, timorese 
killings 
304/1734 Indonesia 1948 1948   1.00   Indonesian muslims 
304/1765 Iran 1978 1979 3.00 4.00 5.00 Killed during protests/demonstrations 
304/1770 Iran 1978 1979 3.00 4.00 5.00 Executions, killed during protests, rebellion 
304/1772 Iran 1963 1963 6.00     Other killings 
306/1858 Iran 1979 1987 35.00 55.00 90.00 Executions, disappearances, politicide, genocide 
306/1860 Iran 1980 1987 1.00     Indiscriminate rocketing/shelling of Iraqi cities 
241/1354 Iraq 1980 1987 2.00     Indiscriminate bombing/shelling of Iranian cities 
241/1362 Iraq 1986 1987 50.00 100.00 200.00 
Executions/killed, Disappearances, forcible deportations and 
additional democide. Removed big numbers from Rummel's 
dataset, and included only the Al-Anfal campaign. Other 
democide is removed 
307/1916 Iraq 1958 1962 3.00 9.00 15.00 Democide of Kurds 
308/1972 Israel 1950 1987 0.50     PLO foreign democide 
94 
 
308/1973 Israel 1950 1987 0.70     PLO domestic democide 
315/2300 Israel 1974 1987 10.00     Israeli democide in Lebanon 
242/1411 Italy 1941 1943 10.00 15.00 20.00 Democide during Yugoslavian Occupation 
242/1414 Italy 1943 1943   9.00   Greek reprisal 
242/1515 Italy 1922 1943 209.00     Democide of Ethiopians/Libyans 
243/1421 Italy 1922 1943 0.25     Executions/assassinations/killings 
309/1982 Italy 1943 1946 1.00     Died in prison, killed and extrajudicial executions 
309/1997 Italy 1943 1946 4.00 10.00 20.00 Fascists killed/massacred 
309/2000 Italy 1943 1945 1.00     Terror by Italian fascist bands 
310/2023 Japan 1923 1923 3.00 7.00 11.00 Massacre of Koreans in Japan 
310/2025 Japan 1918 1920 1     Democide in Siberia 
310/2026 Japan 1913     2   Democide of Chinese 
310/2027 Japan 1920 1920   3.1   Chientao massacre 
310/2028 Japan 1932   1.2     Democide in Manchuria 
310/2029 Japan 1931 1937 5     Democide in Manchuria 
310/2030 Japan 1919 1920   7.6   Democide in Korea 
310/2034 Japan 1900 1900 0.13 0.63 6.25 Foreign democide in Siberia, Chientao, Manchuria and Korea 
40/46 Japan 1941 1945   7.41   Australian POWs killed 
40/49 Japan 1941 1945   0.27   Canadian POWs killed 
40/53 Japan 1940 1945   14.00   French POWs killed 
40/63 Japan 1941 1945   30.00   Europeans interned in Indochina 
40/68 Japan 1941 1945     0.05 New Zealand POWs and civilians 
40/71c Japan 1941 1945 21.00 25.00 30.00 Dutch internees killed 
40/73 Japan 1941 1945   27.26   Filipino POWs killed 
40/83 Japan 1941 1945   10.65   US POWs killed 
40/86 Japan 1941 1945   12.43   UK POWs killed 
40/87 Japan 1941 1945   11.06   UK colonial POWs killed 
41/105 Japan 1942 1943 30.00 60.00 100.00 Killed building the Siam railroad 
41/116 Japan 1941 1945 200.00 300.00 1430.00 Indonesian forced labourers 
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41/123 Japan 1939 1945 270.00 378.00 810.00 Korean forced labour 
41/128 Japan 1939 1945 100.00 130.00 200.00 Manchurian forced labour 
43/224 Japan 1940 1945 42.00 57.00 85.00 Massacres/atrocities in occupied areas 
44/250c Japan 1941 1945 68.00 207.00 575.00 Indo-Chinese killed 
45/286b Japan 1942 1945 75.00     Democide in Indonesia 
45/323 Japan 1941 1945 55.00 83.00 100.00 Malayan massacres, executions 
45/330 Japan 1937 1945 7.00 16.00 25.00 Democide in Manchuria 
46/343 Japan 1941 1945 90.00 119.00 180.00 Democide in the Philippines 
46/362 Japan 1941 1945 150.00 200.00 300.00 Democide in Singapore 
46/365 Japan 1941 1945   0.59   US civilian victims 
46/378 Japan 1945 1945 250.00     Famine in Indochina 
46/386 Japan 1937 1945 1578.00 3949.00 6325.00 Democide in China 
310/2053 Kenya 1952 1960   1.88   Mau Mau uprising 
310/2061 Kenya 1964 1987 0.50     Domestic democide 
184/112 Korea, North 1950 1953 129.00     
Korean War democide - atrocities/massacres of South Korean 
civilians 
184/120 Korea, North 1950 1953 5.00 8.50 12.00 South Korean POWs killed 
184/128 Korea, North 1950 1953 150.00 225.00 300.00 Democide of South Koreans Illegally impressed(sic)/conscripted 
184/141 Korea, North 1950 1953 5.00 6.00 6.00 Democide of American POWs 
184/146 Korea, North 1950 1953 1.00     Democide of UN military 
185/158 Korea, North 1983 1987 0.10     Bombings 
185/158 Korea, North 1983 1987 0.03     Bombings 
185/163 Korea, North 1948 1987 10.00     Executions of purged in North Korea 
185/166 Korea, North 1958 1960 10.00     Democide during open struggle campaign 
185/173 Korea, North 1956 1959 25.00     Democide during collective guidance campaign 
185/186 Korea, North 1948 1987 71.00 265.00 707.00 
Labor concentration camps. Average number per year from 
1948-1987 with a 4-year break during the Korean War period. 
Using an annual death rate of 0.02%, 0.05% and 0.1% on 
numbers on line 190 
185/192 Korea, North 1948 1987 315.00 983.00 2360.00 Corvée and hard labor by those classified "hostile". Using an 
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annual average times an annual death rate for 39.33 years. 
Using an annual death rate of 0.004%, 0.125% and 0.03% of the 
numbers on line 190 
310/2072 Korea, South 1946 1946 0.75 1.50 2.25 Democide during country-wide rebellion 
310/2073 Korea, South 1946 1946 0.25 0.50 0.75 Rebel democide 
311/2083 Korea, South 1948 1949 1.50 5.00 13.20 Cheju-Do democide 
311/2084 Korea, South 1946 1949 1.25 1.50 1.05 Estimate of rebel democide 
312/2129 Korea, South 1948 1987 10.00     
Overall estimate of domestic democide - Kwangju rebellion, 
student rebellion, Yosu rebellion 
312/2134 Korea, South 1965 1973 3.00     Vietnamese killed 
312/2135 Korea, South 1950 1953 3.00     North Koreans killed 
313/2216 Laos 1975 1980 5 11.25 18.75 
Re-Education/labour camp deaths. Assumed 2.5%, 5%, and 
7,5% average annual excess death rate 
313/2217 Laos 1981 1987 0.007 0.105 1.4 
Re-Education/labour camp deaths. Assumed 1% average annual 
excess death rate 
313/2228 Laos 1975 1980 40.00 43.00 50.00 Domestic democide 
314/2253 Laos 1963 1965 18.00 18.00 20.00 Geno-politicide 
314/2254 Laos 1960 1975 15.00 20.00 35.00 Executions/killed, includes Meo tribesmen 
315/2328 Lebanon 1974 1987 25.00 54.00 98.00 Democide by all Lebanese groups 
316/2340 Liberia 1900 1987 10.00     Forced labour dead - mainly in early years 
316/2362 Libya 1969 1987 1.00     Libyans assassinated abroad 
316/2371 Lithuania   1941   5.00   Jews killed by anti-Soviet partisans 
316/2374 Malaysia   1951     2.55 Terror by Malayan communist guerrillas 
317/2387 Malaysia 1979 1979   76.00   Boat people killed 
190/35 Mexico 1900 1910 30.00     Massacres/executions pre-civil war 
191/47 Mexico 1910 1920 280.00 388.00 825.00 Massacres/executions during civil war 
191/57 Mexico 1900 1911 15.00 30.00 60.00 Dead or killed during deportation of Yaquis 
191/79 Mexico 1900 1911 233.00 825.00 2015.00 Slavery deaths 
191/87 Mexico 1900 1911 60.00 144.00 360.00 Conscription deaths 
192/113 Mexico 1910 1920 388.00 420.00 550.00 Warlord democide 
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317/2394 Mexico 1926 1929 5.00     Cristiros killed 
317/2408 Mexico 1930 1987 2.00     Massacres and killings 
243/1437 Mongolia 1935 1945 2 3 3 Nomonan War/war with Japan 
243/1439 Mongolia 1930 1945 10     War/rebellion dead 
243/1451 Mongolia 1930 1939 35.00 100.00 200.00 
Party purges, South Gobi, executions, population loss, 
executions 
244/1513 Mozambique 1976 1987 125.00     Renamo democide 
245/1533 Mozambique 1975 1987 83.00 118.00 250.00 Executions and camp deaths 
317/2416 Mozambique 1964 1975 3.00     Frelimo democide 
318/2452 Netherlands 1900 1914 10.00     Forced/slave labour dead in Netherlands East and West Indies 
318/2454 Netherlands 1946 1946 2.00     Forced/slave labour in Netherlands East and West Indies 
320/2543 Nicaragua 1979 1987 4.00 5.00 7.00 
Disappearances, executions, Miskito indians and political 
prisoners 
320/2558 Nicaragua 1980 1987 0.50     Democide by Nicaraguan Contras 
246/1600 Nigeria 1966 1966 9.00 15.00 50.00 Riots, massacres, pogroms 
246/1610 Nigeria 1967 1970 3.00 5.00 10.00 Massacres/atrocities/genocides during civil war 
246/1614 Nigeria 1967 1970 5.00     Bombing/shelling 
246/1621 Nigeria 1967 1970 250.00 375.00 500.00 Democidal famine 
157/31 Pakistan 1958 1971 3.00     Democide by West Pakistan 
157/32 Pakistan 1971 1971 300.00 1500.00 3003.00 East Pakistan democide 
162/167 Pakistan 1971 1971 50.00 150.00 500.00 Democide by Bengalis 
320/2577 Pakistan 1947 1948 6.00 36.00 300.00 Partition democide 
320/2578 Pakistan 1949 1956 5.00 25.00 175.00 Additional democide 
321/2608 Paraguay 1954 1987 1.50 2.00 4.00 Aché indians killed 
266/21 Peru 1900 1920 25.00     Democide of Peruvians by Amazon rubber companies 
322/2627 Peru 1900 1911 30.00     
Estimate of excess deaths and killed from forced labor and 
related causes 
322/2674 Peru 1980 1987 8.00 10.00 15.00 By military and paramilitary 
323/2686a Peru 1980 1987 2.00 4.00 5.00 Democide by Peruvian Shining Path rebels 
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324/2730 Philippines 1972 1986 10.00 15.00 25.00 Disappearances, executions, genocide/politicide 
324/2739 Philippines 1972 1986 5.00     Communist (NPA) democide 
324/2750 Philippines 1899 1905 3.00 13.00 49.00 Rebel democide 
141/83 Poland 1945 1950 528.00 1863.00 3724.00 Flight/expulsion German dead 
324/2760 Poland 1935 1937 0.08 0.10 0.12 Jews killed 
324/2766 Poland 1939 1939 2.00 4.00 6.00 Ethnic Germans killed 
325/2776 Poland 1941 1944 1.00     Ukrainians killed 
325/2786 Poland 1948 1987 10.00 20.00 50.00 Executions/killed 
248/1706 Portugal 1961 1962 20.00 30.00 40.00 Democide by Portugal in Angola 
248/1706 Portugal 1961 1975 0.50 1.00 3.00 Democide by Portugal in Angola. Africans/blacks massacred 
248/1718 Portugal 1956 1963 10.00     Democide in Angola 
249/1733 Portugal 1959 1959 1.25     Other democide, includes East Timor and Guinea Bissau 
249/1740 Portugal 1961 1962 5.00 8.00   UPA democide 
249/1777 Portugal 1900 1910 200.00     Forced/slave labour dead, and other democide in all colonies 
250/1779 Portugal 1906 1906   8.53   Democidal famine 
250/1814 Portugal 1910 1926 125.00     Forced/slave labour dead and other democide in all colonies 
251/1846 Romania 1941 1943 138.00 218.00 298.00 Jews killed by Romanians 
251/1855 Romania 1941 1943 40.00 60.00 100.00 Bessarabia/Bukovina killed 
251/1859 Romania 1941 1941 0.17 0.60 1.03 Bucharest killed 
251/1863 Romania 1941 1941   24.00   "Elsewhere killed" 
252/1878 Romania 1938 1941 1.50     Legionnaires killed 
252/1880 Romania 1941 1941   144.00   Odessa murdered 
252/1881 Romania 1941 1945   36.00   Gypsies killed 
252/1926 Romania 1948 1987 245.00 435.00 920.00 Prisoners/inmates/forced labourers, plus executions 
326/2826 Romania 1900 1938 15.00     Peasants killed, pogroms, legionnaires killed, murdered 
326/2837 Romania 1941 1941   0.20   Jews massacred 
196/47 Russia 1903 1906 1.61     Jewish pogroms 
197/105 Russia 1914 1915 64.00 75.00 300.00 Turkish/Kurdish dead 
197/55 Russia 1905 1912 0.33 0.35 1.20 "Other massacres" 
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197/60 Russia 1915 1917 25.00 83.00 140.00 Deportation of Volhynia Germans 
197/69 Russia 1900 1917 3.00 6.50 10.50 Executions - based on 18th century executions 
197/72 Russia 1903 1903 0.10     Terror campaign - Cossacs vs. Armenians 
197/75 Russia 1914 1916   500.00   Turks exterminated 
197/98 Russia 1914 1917 280.00 400.00 540.00 World War I POWs 
198/113 Russia 1900 1917 5.00     Opposition terrorism 
253/1936 Russia 1917 1917   0.40   Provisional government vs. factory-workers and soldiers 
253/1938 Russia 1917 1917 14.00 40.00 81.00 World War I POWs 
326/283b Russia 1905 1905 0.10     Armenians killed 
326/2842 Russia 1916 1916   9.00   Massacres 
334/3247 Russia 1940 1945 70.00 95.00 120.00 Russians slaughtered by Crimean tartars 
334/3253 Russia 1941 1944 90.00     Poles and Jews killed by Ukrainian partisans 
Ussr.tab2a/102 Russia 1922 1922 4.00 12.00 22.00 Camp/forced labour 
Ussr.tab2a/108 Russia 1918 1922 1.00 3.00 9.00 Forced labour camps 
Ussr.tab2a/181 Russia 1918 1921 70.00 250.00 650.00 Rebellions 
Ussr.tab2a/185 Russia 1921 1922 1000.00 5000.00 7500.00 Famine 
Ussr.tab2a/80 Russia 1917 1922 250.00 500.00 3650.00 Red terror 
Ussr.tab2a/85 Russia 1918 1918 0.00 1.00 3.00 Camp dead 
Ussr.tab2a/88 Russia 1919 1919 0.00 1.00 3.00 Camp dead 
Ussr.tab2a/92 Russia 1920 1920 1.00 4.00 7.00 Labour camp 
Ussr.tab2a/94 Russia 1921 1921 4 12.00 28.00 Camp dead 
Ussr.tab3a/67 Russia 1923 1928 2000.00 2200.00 3000.00 Census based estimates 
Ussr.tab4a/216 Russia 1929 1935 677.00 1733.00 3592.00 Collectivization/dekulakization 
Ussr.tab4a/217 Russia 1929 1935 985.00 1400.00 2863.00 Deportations 
Ussr.tab4a/218 Russia 1929 1935 1566.00 3306.00 6426.00 Camp dead 
Ussr.tab4a/219 Russia 1932 1933 3000.00 5000.00 10000.00 Famine 
Ussr.tab5a/74 Russia 1936 1938 1508.00 3280.00 8678.00 Camp/forced labour 
Ussr.tab5a/8 Russia 1936 1938 36.00 65.00 143.00 Deportations 
Ussr.tab5a/93 Russia 1936 1938 500.00 1000.00 2000.00 Executions 
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Ussr.tab6a/114 Russia 1939 1941 113.00 146.00 349.00 Deportations 
Ussr.tab6a/122 Russia 1939 1941 44.00 65.00 86.00 Terror against Poles 
Ussr.tab6a/134 Russia 1940 1941 18.00 30.00 65.00 Deportation of Romanian-Bessarabians 
Ussr.tab6a/148 Russia 1939 1941 27.00 65.00 172.00 Miscellaneous deportations 
Ussr.tab6a/24 Russia 1940 1941 2.00 10.00 65.00 Terror of Estonians 
Ussr.tab6a/15 Russia 1940 1941 5.00 8.00 14.00 Deportation of Estonians 
Ussr.tab6a/210 Russia 1939 1941 111.00 251.00 480.00 Foreign camp dead 
Ussr.tab6a/234 Russia 1939 1941 1000.00 1800.00 1952.00 Terror/purges 
Ussr.tab6a/236 Russia 1939 1941 1307.00 2638.00 5795.00 Camp/transit dead 
Ussr.tab6a/38 Russia 1940 1941 1.00 3.00 6.00 Deportation of Latvians 
Ussr.tab6a/47 Russia 1940 1941 1.00 35.00 64.00 Terror of Latvians 
Ussr.tab6a/61 Russia 1940 1941 3.00 6.00 14.00 Deportation of Lithuanians 
Ussr.tab6a/67 Russia 1940 1941 1.00 20.00 65.00 Terror of Lithuanians 
Ussr.tab6a/77 Russia 1940 1941 14.00 26.00 65.00 Deportation of Bessarabians/Bukovians 
Ussr.tab6a/80 Russia 1940 1941 1.00 2.00 2.00 Terror of Bessarabians/Bukovians 
Ussr.tab7a/227 Russia 1941 1945 142.00 285.00 775.00 Foreign deportations 
Ussr.tab7a/337 Russia 1941 1947 1404.00 2243.00 3435.00 Foreign camp/transit dead 
Ussr.tab7a/354 Russia 1941 1945 0.00 731.00 3929.00 Terror/repression 
Ussr.tab7a/363 Russia 1942 1945 3.00 4.00 6.00 Deaths in the Baltics 
Ussr.tab7a/368 Russia 1944 1944 200.00 266.00 400.00 Democide of Germans 
Ussr.tab7a/376 Russia 1941 1944 74.00 96.00 144.00 Democide of Poles 
Ussr.tab7a/387 Russia 1941 1945 120.00 160.00 240.00 
Democide of other nationals, Bulgarians, Belorussians, 
Ukraines, Czechs, Hungarians, Koreans, Japanese, Yugoslavs 
Ussr.tab7a/398 Russia 1941 1945 337.00 751.00 1134.00 Deportations 
Ussr.tab7a/399 Russia 1941 1945 4735.00 8518.00 14440.00 Camp/transit dead 
Ussr.tab8a/107 Russia 1944 1953 68.00 103.00 194.00 Bulgarian deportations 
Ussr.tab8a/113 Russia 1945 1953 121.00 260.00 441.00 Czech deportations 
Ussr.tab8a/119 Russia 1946 1953 271.00 585.00 1287.00 Pole deportations 
Ussr.tab8a/124 Russia 1946 1955 18.00 35.00 86.00 Moldovian deportations 
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Ussr.tab8a/269 Russia 1946 1953 345.00 960.00 1652.00 Foreign camp dead 
Ussr.tab8a/273 Russia 1946 1953 334.00 500.00 665.00 Terror and repression 
Ussr.tab8a/274 Russia 1946 1953 113.00 228.00 538.00 Deportation of domestic people 
Ussr.tab8a/275 Russia 1946 1953 3295.00 11388.00 29032.00 Camp/transit dead 
Ussr.tab8a/276 Russia 1946 1953 250.00 333.00 500.00 Famine 
Ussr.tab8a/280 Russia 1946 1953 826.00 876.00 926.00 Terror and repression 
Ussr.tab8a/72 Russia 1944 1953 63.00 78.00 118.00 Deportation of Baltic nationals 
Ussr.tab8a/83 Russia 1946 1953 51.00 65.00 68.00 German deportations 
Ussr.tab8a/91 Russia 1946 1953 11.00 23.00 50.00 Hungarian deportations 
Ussr.tab8a/99 Russia 1946 1953 103.00 180.00 350.00 Romanian deportations 
Ussr.tab9a/16 Russia 1956 1956 4.00 8.00 18.00 Deportation of Hungarians 
Ussr.tab9a/25 Russia 1953 1955 300.00 950.00 1290.00 Camp/forced labour dead 
Ussr.tab9a/35 Russia 1956 1960 736.00 3083.00 4933.00 Camp/forced labour dead 
Ussr.tab9a/43 Russia 1961 1970 400.00 1600.00 3920.00 Camp/forced labour dead 
Ussr.tab9a/60 Russia 1970 1982 130.00 780.00 1456.00 Forced labour/prisons/camp deaths 
Ussr.tab9a/69 Russia 1983 1987 25.00 200.00 350.00 Camp/forced labour dead 
Ussr.tab9a/82 Russia 1979 1987 100 250 500 Terror/repression - Afghans 
326/2864 Rwanda 1962 1964 10.00 15.00 20.00 Genocide of Tutsi by Hutu 
221/336 Somalia 1958 1959 23.00 48.00 75.00 Democidal Tigre famine 
221/347 Somalia 1973 1974 25.00 100.00 300.00 Democidal Tigre/Wollo famine 
327/2896 South Africa 1934 1987 6.00     Estimated domestic democide 
327/2900 South Africa 1934 1987 3.00     Foreign democide in Angola and Namibia 
254/1998 Spain 1934 1934 1.50     Asturias killed 
254/2009 Spain 1936 1939 25.00 100.00 300.00 Democide during civil war 
254/2017 Spain 1936 1939 25.00 100.00 200.00 Democide by nationalists 
256/2079b Spain 1939 1975 210.00 275.00 300.00 
Post-civil war domestic democide by nationalists -- 
prisons/concentration camps + executed/dead in or out of 
prison camps 
328/2950 Sri Lanka 1983 1987 2.00 4.00 10.00 Domestic democide 
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328/2965a Sri Lanka   1986 0.50 1.00 2.00 Democide by Sri Lankan Tamils 
257/2140 Sudan 1956 1972 94.00 494.00 744.00 Domestic democide 
257/2148 Sudan 1980 1987 22.00 133.00 250.00 Calculated democide based on democide done in 1955-72 
257/2169 Sudan 1956 1987 12.00     Anya-Nya guerrilla democide - equals about 10 per week 
315/2304 Syria 1974 1987 5.00     Syrian democide in Lebanon 
330/3038 Syria 1980 1982 2.69 14.00 27.00 Domestic democide 
330/3050 Syria 1979 1982 2.00     Prisoners killed 
330/3073c Syria 1970 1987 1.00     Estimate of Syrian terrorists 
331/3087 Thailand 1976 1976 0.10     Domestic democide - demonstrators 
331/3104 Thailand 1976 1987 8.20     
Foreign democide of Cambodian, Laotian refugees plus boat 
people 
331/3126 Turkey 1909 1909   1.00   Democide by Abdul Hamid's Partisans 
332/3148 Turkey 1971 1983 2.00     
Estimate of political prisoners dying/killed in prison and 
extrajudicial executions 
332/3152 Turkey 1971 1983 3.00     Estimate of foreign democide in Cyprus 
332/3167 Turkey 1971 1983 6.00     Turkish terrorist killing 
90/71b Turkey 1909 1914 5.00     Christian democide 
92/189 Turkey 1915 1918 300.00 1404.00 2686.00 Genocide of Armenians 
92/198 Turkey 1914 1918 60.00 68.00 75.00 Genocide of Greeks 
92/204 Turkey 1915 1918 16.00     Greeks killed 
93/208 Turkey 1914 1917 102.00     Christian democide 
93/208i Turkey 1914 1918 160.00 163.00 169.00 Democidal famine 
93/228 Turkey 1918 1918 50.00 75.00 100.00 Foreign genocide of Armenians 
93/229 Turkey 1915 1915 7.00 8.00 9.00 Foreign genocide of Armenians 
93/239 Turkey 1915 1915 45.00     Nestorians killed 
93/240 Turkey 1915 1918 1.80 2.00 2.20 Nestorians killed 
93/244 Turkey 1915 1915   0.80   Azerbaijanis killed 
96/420 Turkey 1920 1922 127.00 175.00 243.00 Armenian genocide 
98/485b Turkey 1919 1923 538.00 703.00 913.00 Kemal nationalist democide 
103 
 
259/2230 Uganda 1977 1977 1.00     Tanzanians killed 
259/2240 Uganda 1971 1979 100.00 300.00 500.00 Domestic democide 
260/2299 Uganda 1979 1987 80.00 255.00 505.00 Democidal famine, massacres, genocide 
260/2300 Uganda 1979 1987 25.00 50.00 100.00 Rebel democide 
333/3220 Uganda 1966 1971   2.00   Baganda massacres 
333/3203 Ukraine 1918 1921 27.00 40.00 60.00 Executions and Jewish pogroms 
263/2477 United Kingdom 1972 1972   0.13   Demonstrators killed 
264/2481 United Kingdom 1900 1900   0.03   Foreign democide in China 
264/2482 United Kingdom 1927 1927   0.03   Chinese killed 
264/2485 United Kingdom 1914 1919 125.00 203.00 350.00 German civilians dead due to economic blockade of Germany 
264/2486 United Kingdom 1914 1919 36.00 75.00 163.00 
Austria-Hungarian civilians dead due to economic blockade of 
central powers 
264/2487 United Kingdom 1914 1918 40.00 56.00 88.00 
Levant civilians dead due to economic blockade of central 
powers 
264/2495 United Kingdom 1919 1919 0.38 1.00 1.50 Amritsar massacre 
264/2497 United Kingdom 1945 1945 1.00     Greeks killed 
264/2499 United Kingdom 1948 1956 5.00 12.50 20.00 Geno-politicide in Malaysia 
264/2501 United Kingdom 1919 1919   0.05   Arabs killed in Palestine 
265/235 United Kingdom 1900 1963 5.00     Forced slave labour dead in Kenya 
265/2530 United Kingdom 1901 1902 31.00 37.00 43.00 Democide during the Boer war 
265/2532 United Kingdom 1940 1945 307.00 424.00 608.00 World War II European urban bombing 
334/3233 Uruguay 1973 1984 0.30     Disappearances, political deaths 
126/592 USA 1960 1972 0.50 1.00 5.00 Bombing/shelling by the United States 
126/601 USA 1965 1970 1.00 1.50 1.50 US massacres/atrocities in Vietnam 
127/607 USA 1961 1970 0.50 1.00 2.00 Defoliation, gas, herbicides 
127/610 USA 1965 1972 2.00     
Unestimated residual, Individual unit atrocities assumed near 
25 a month 
208/89 USA 1899 1905 25.00 128.00 487.00 Executions of POWs and camp deaths 
209/97 USA 1900 1900 0.13 0.63 6.25 Boxer rebellion 
104 
 
210/148 USA 1943 1945 225.00 337.00 855.00 Indiscriminate bombing of Japan 
211/216 USA 1942 1945 16.00 32.00 59.00 Indiscriminate bombing of Germany 
211/222 USA 1942 1945 1.00 4.00 7.00 Indiscriminate bombing of Romanian and Hungarian cities 
211/228 USA 1945 1945 3.00 3.00 3.00 German POWs 
212/260 USA 1900 1987 1.00 2.00 4.00 
Lynchings/vigilante executions/Ku Klux Klan victims - 
extrapolation based on reports from 1882 to 1951, then 
multiplied by 88 
67/412 USA 1970 1973 3.00 60.00 200.00 US democide in Cambodia 
121/275 Vietnam 1945 1947 10.00 15.00 20.00 Anti-Nationalist terror 
122/329 Vietnam 1953 1956 195.00 363.00 865.00 
"Land Reform" dead, Political struggle/repression, suppression 
of uprisings 
122/336 Vietnam 1945 1956 24.00     
Imprisonment/forced labour dead. Assuming 100,000 
imprisoned/forced labourers with an unnatural death rate of at 
least 2 per year over 12 years 
122/362 Vietnam 1945 1956 13.00     Foreign democide, mostly of French POWs 
122/372 Vietnam 1957 1975 25.00 50.00 75.00 Democide by North Vietnam/Vietcong 1954-1975.  
123/428 Vietnam 1954 1975 19.00 66.00 113.00 
Officials/civilians Assassinated/executed/killed in South 
Vietnam by North Vietnamese - based on extrapolated figures 
124/448 Vietnam 1968 1968 5 6 7 Tet/Hue democide 
124/451 Vietnam 1970 1975 1     North Vietnam/Vietcong democide in Cambodia 
124/454 Vietnam 1975 1975 25 50 100 Refugees killed 
124/456 Vietnam 1961 1965   0.126   Saigon killed 
124/459 Vietnam ? 1973     1.307 South Vietnam POWs dead 
124/464 Vietnam 1954 1975 50.00     Unestimated democide assumed as at least 200 a month 
124/481 Vietnam 1955 1963 9.00 24.00 50.00 Relocation/resettled dead 
125/494 Vietnam 1954 1963 2.00 4.00 20.00 Arrested/detained deaths 
125/515 Vietnam 1954 1963 5.00 10.00 90.00 Executed/terror 
125/518 Vietnam 1954 1963 0.60 1.50 7.00 Bombing/shelling 
125/540 Vietnam 1963 1975 1.00 5.00 19.00 Forced relocation deaths by South Vietnam post Diem regimes 
126/556 Vietnam 1964 1975 1.00 5.00 50.00 Arrested/detained prisoner deaths by South Vietnam post-Diem 
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regimes 
126/563 Vietnam 1963 1975 30.00     Executions/terror 
126/566 Vietnam 1963 1975 4.00 6.00 14.00 Deaths due to bombing/shelling 
126/569 Vietnam 1969 1969   4.70   Other massacres 
126/576 Vietnam 1970 1973 1.00     South Vietnam democide in Cambodia 
128/669(673) Vietnam 1975 1980 22.5 90 225 
"Re-education" camps - assuming 2.5%, 5% and 7.5% of 
unnatural death rate from total camp population 
128/670(673) Vietnam 1980 1987 3.5 5.25 0.7 
"Re-education" camps - assuming 1% of unnatural death rate 
from total camp population 
128/684(687) Vietnam 1975 1980 11.25 30 120 
Forced labourers. Assuming 0.75%, 1% and 2% death rate for 
first 6 years 
128/684(687) Vietnam 1981 1988 8.75 17.5 35 Forced labourers. Assuming 0.5%death rate for last 7 years 
128/698 Vietnam 1975 1987 50.00 100.00 250.00 
Executions/killed, exclusive of those executed in "re-education" 
camps 
129/753 Vietnam 1975 1987 33.00 250.00 934.00 Dead at sea while fleeing 
129/759 Vietnam 1979 1987 80.00 87.00 100.00 Vietnamese democide in Laos 
66/392 Vietnam 1979 1987 137.00 460.00 767.00 Vietnamese democide in Cambodia 
334/3276 
Yemen Arab 
Republic 1962 1987 2.50     Executions, killings, murders, disappearances 
335/3297 
Yemen People's 
Republic 1967 1987 1.00     Disappearances, executions. Estimate 
172/53 Yugoslavia 1941 1944 50 100 150 Partisan democide - Russian émigrés and Slovenes erased 
172/66 Yugoslavia 1944 1946 300.00 500.00 700.00 
Tito government democide (after July 1944) - "anti-
communists," opponents, and "collaborators" killed 
172/71 Yugoslavia 1944   50 70 100 Belgrade killed 
172/75 Yugoslavia 1948 1950 2     Cominformists killed 
173/117 Yugoslavia 1945 1955 2.75 23.5 123.75 
Forced labor camp/prison. 25%, 50% and 75% of numbers on 
line, as per note on line 119 
173/118 Yugoslavia 1956 1965 0.75 7 30.75 
Forced labor camp/prison 25%, 50% and 75% of numbers on 
line, as per note on line 119 
173/125 Yugoslavia 1945 1948 55 75 85 German ethnics killed 
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173/136 Yugoslavia 1944 1945 47.2 63 76 
German POWs killed. Numbers are 80%, 90% and 95% of 
numbers of line, as per notes on line 137 
173/140 Yugoslavia 1944 1945 5     Italians killed 
173/96 Yugoslavia 1945 1946 100 300 975 Croatians killed 
174//174 Yugoslavia 1944 1945 300 500 750 Wartime democide in Yugoslavia 
174/149 Yugoslavia 1944 1960 3.00 4.00 5.00 Muslims/Albanians killed in Yugoslavia 
174/153 Yugoslavia 1944 1945 10     Chetniks killed 
174/160 Yugoslavia 1945 1945 7 10 15 Trieste and Vicinity occupation killed 
174/165 Yugoslavia 1944 ? 2.2     Partisans/priests/nuns executed 
174/185 Yugoslavia 1941 1945 50 100 500 Chetnik war-time democide 
176/245 Yugoslavia 1941 1945 242 655 1088 
Croatian (Ustashi) democide against Jews, Serbs, Gypsies and 
concentration camps 
336/3335 Zanzibar 1964 1964 3.00 8.00 13.00 Massacres 
 
 
 
 
 
